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Good local governance is essential for an efficient and financially 
robust public sector as well as high quality public services. During 
the last decade or so, many countries have aimed at better local 
governance by reforming their local government and the fiscal 
relations between central and local authorities. In the coming years, 
we can expect to see more reforms in many countries, including 
Finland, as most countries will have to adjust to ageing populations 
and dwindling fiscal resources. 
This book is about reforms that aim to improve local governance. The 
articles of this book are written by academic scholars with outstanding 
expertise about local governance, reforms of fiscal relations and rules 
that steer the economics of local and central government.   
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1Chapter 1 
 
Introduction
Antti Moisio 
 
Government Institute for Economic Research
Reforming fiscal federalism and local government seems to have 
become almost a common trend in recent years, both in developed 
and developing countries. Although the various reforms have focused 
on different aspects of local public administration, they have had one 
common goal: to improve the performance of the public sector. A few 
years ago, the world Bank described very aptly what these reforms 
should aim at (Shah 2005): 
“A well-functioning public sector that delivers quality 
public services consistent with citizen preferences and that 
fosters private market-led growth while managing fiscal 
resources prudently”.
A recent OECD study lists factors that determine the success of 
reforms for fiscal relations and local government (Blöchliger and 
Vammalle 2012). Transitional compensations and the bundling of 
various elements are almost necessary requirements for reforms to 
be successful.  Also, favourable economic and fiscal conditions and 
electoral mandates are important drivers of reforms. Using external 
expertise in planning reforms is also listed as one important element 
for success. 
This book builds solely on independent and external expertise. The 
book consists of four original essays by seven authors, who are 
all acknowledged academic experts in the topics covered by this 
volume. The main aim of the book is to give the reader an insight 
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into fiscal federalism and local government reforms by discussing the 
future of decentralisation policies, by describing the reasons for and 
effects of municipal mergers and by analysing alternative models of 
metropolitan governance. These are themes that are currently topical 
in many countries, not least in the Nordic countries, and they are 
especially topical in Finland. 
This introduction first provides a short description of the present 
situation of Finnish local government and the reforms that lie ahead. 
There then follows a brief summary of each essay.
1.1 A once-in-a-lifetime municipal reform? 
Finnish local government consists of municipalities and joint 
municipal authorities. This single-tier local government is responsible 
for a wide range of public services, such as health care, social welfare 
and education services. Due to these significant responsibilities, 
municipal spending amounts to 65 per cent of total public consumption 
expenditure and 18 per cent of GDP. 
In Finland, all municipalities irrespective of their population size 
are obliged to provide the same services to their inhabitants. Since 
the smallest municipalities usually lack the capacity to provide these 
services alone, small municipalities are often involved in inter-
municipal cooperation, especially within health care. Municipal 
cooperation has been a successful way to solve many of the scale and 
externality problems in public services. The main problems identified 
with joint municipal authorities include a lack of transparency and 
accountability in decision-making, and the gradual shift of decision-
making power from elected politicians to professionals. 
At the moment it seems that the Finnish local government sector 
is about to face unprecedented changes. Central government is 
determined to push through a reform so as to increase the size of 
municipalities through municipal mergers and to significantly alter 
local service responsibilities by 2015. The “strong municipality” plan 
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aims to create municipalities that are able to bear the increasing service 
burden of an ageing population in coming decades. The stronger 
municipalities are also expected to take on more tasks, since under 
to the plan the present 20 hospital districts will be closed down and 
some of the more demanding health services will be transferred to the 
municipalities. The most advanced health care would be centralised in 
five special health care districts. Until now, municipalities have been 
directly responsible only for basic health care, as hospital services 
have been provided by hospital districts, owned by joint municipal 
authorities. The proposed “strong municipality” model is expected 
to result in less need for equalisation between municipalities, since 
the enlarged municipalities will – by definition – be economically 
stronger than the existing municipalities. Therefore, the central 
government grant system will also be reformed by 2015.
The municipalities have strongly resisted the reform. The results of 
a recent survey of municipal decision-makers show that although 
most municipalities agree with the need for reforms in general, the 
majority of them still reject the central government proposals for 
new municipalities. The respondents feel that the new proposed 
municipalities are simply too big. In addition, the proposal to abolish 
the present hospital districts has raised concerns about the ability of the 
municipalities to organise the most demanding health care services. 
For example, the largest hospital district, the Hospital District of 
Helsinki and Uusimaa, which is the joint municipal authority of 
26 municipalities in the Greater Helsinki region and surroundings, 
has been critical of the plan if it leads the joint authority being broken 
up. 
Despite of central government’s commitment to proceed with the 
“strong municipality” model, alternatives also seem to be still “on 
the table”. The main alternatives include centralised health care or a 
new regional government tier for health and welfare services. It has 
also been argued – by central government too – that different parts 
of the country may need different types of solutions. One example 
of an area that may be in need of a tailored solution is the Helsinki 
region, where the debate has concentrated on two options: the merger 
Introduction
4
of the three biggest cities (Helsinki, Espoo and Vantaa) and the “two-
tier” alternative. In the Helsinki region, the municipalities already 
cooperate in health care, so the discussion about a possible new two-
tier model has been mostly about land use and planning tasks.
Finland is by no means alone in its plans for municipal reform. 
Similar processes have been faced in many other countries. The 
Nordic countries, which often form the best reference group for 
Finland, all carried out major municipal reforms back in the 1960s 
and 1970s. Despite this, a further reform was carried out in Denmark 
in 2007, and in Norway the tasks of central government and the 
regions were redistributed in 2002. A similar discussion is also going 
on in Sweden. Metropolitan governance seems to have been less of 
an issue in the other Nordic countries, in contrast to Finland, where 
the metropolitan area around the capital city has an unusually large 
role. However, there are many recent examples in the EU and OECD 
countries of reforms of metropolitan governance. 
1.2 the future of the nordic model of 
decentralisation
The second chapter of the book, written by Lars-Erik Borge and Jørn 
Rattsø, focuses on the future of decentralisation policy in the Nordic 
welfare state. The article is based on a thorough summary of the latest 
developments in the fiscal federalism theory and empirical research. 
The authors discuss the differences between fiscal federalism as 
described in standard economic theory and the systems applied in 
practice in the Nordic countries. The Nordic countries have devolved 
many public service tasks at the local level, and have at the same 
time increased central government control over local government. 
This decentralisation policy has been justified on grounds of public 
sector efficiency, and of enhanced democratic control of public 
services. Central control has been justified by equity considerations 
and by local fiscal discipline and accountability targets. It is clear 
that the decentralisation practised in the Nordic countries differs 
considerably from the so-called Musgrave-Oates-Tiebout model 
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of fiscal federalism, which is based on assumptions of local public 
goods, benefit taxation, mobility and no spillovers. Therefore, Borge 
and Rattsø prefer to call the Nordic model administrative federalism 
rather than fiscal federalism. 
Central control and involvement can be seen as a threat to the basic 
values of local self-rule and democracy, and at times all the Nordic 
countries have tried to limit centrally set norms and regulations. 
Although favouring local autonomy in general, and acknowledging 
the benefits of yardstick competition, which has also proved its worth 
in the Nordic countries, Borge and Rattsø conclude that preventive 
central government measures and control at the local level are needed 
in order to secure fiscal balances and to avoid bailouts. 
Borge and Rattsø make an interesting point when observing that 
reforms of local government structure have returned to the policy 
agenda in many countries, mainly because the benefits of adjustments 
to central government control systems and grant systems have become 
smaller. The authors think that the future model of federalism will 
depend mainly on the future organization of welfare services. The 
authors see two possible paths, one that is based on local provision 
(a renewed model of administrative federalism) and the other where 
local government concentrates on the provision of local public goods 
(a Nordic model of fiscal federalism). 
A renewed model of administrative federalism would require larger 
and stronger municipalities, especially in countries like Norway and 
Finland. In other words, a national reform of municipal mergers 
would be needed for municipalities to be able to maintain their 
present tasks and take on new ones. Borge and Rattsø list several 
advantages resulting from strengthened municipalities, such as 
the ability to continue decentralisation in the provision of public 
services, reduced variation in tax bases and spending needs, smaller 
dependence on central government grants, improved local democracy 
and accountability, better utilisation of economies of scale, the ability 
to build solid groups of specialists and increased political power in 
the municipal tier.
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The second option, a Nordic model of fiscal federalism, would mean 
returning to the roots of fiscal federalism, as local government would 
concentrate on tasks that are truly local in nature. If the burden of 
welfare services is lifted off the shoulders of the local public sector, 
the need for large municipalities is reduced. Borge and Rattsø even 
see the possibility of break-ups of municipalities in some urban areas. 
There would be less need for equalisation and municipalities would 
be less dependent on central government grants. Central government 
would take responsibility for welfare services, and this would permit 
an increased focus on equality. However, a new system of governance 
would also require resources. New bureaucracy and inefficiency 
could emerge. According to Borge and Rattsø, the experiences from 
the Norwegian hospital reform serve as a warning example of failed 
centralisation. 
The authors’ assessment of the situation in the Nordic countries is 
that the Nordic model of fiscal federalism is less likely to prevail. 
Therefore, whether we like it or not, municipal mergers will be part 
of the solution in securing the future of the Nordic welfare state.
1.3 the Danish local government reforms
The third chapter, written by Jens Blom-Hansen, describes and 
discusses the reforms of Danish local government during the last 
decade or so. The biggest adjustment, the 2007 municipal reform, 
meant a sharp reduction in the number of municipalities and regions. 
The reform also resulted in a considerable redistribution of tasks 
between the two local government tiers and central government. 
The need for reform was first investigated by an expert committee. 
The government then made a political analysis of the reform 
options, concluding that amalgamations were needed to reach the 
target municipal size of 30,000 inhabitants. The government plan 
that followed gave municipalities only six months to find a partner 
either for merger or cooperation. To the surprise of many observers, 
the reform was completed within the set time limit. Moreover, 
most municipalities chose to merge instead of entering into deeper 
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cooperation. Another surprise was that the new municipalities 
ended up being much larger than expected, since after the reform 
the average municipal population size was above 50,000. The whole 
reform process from the appointment of the expert committee until 
the start-up of the new municipalities took four and a half years.
According to Blom-Hansen, the 2007 reform was thoroughly 
planned, with special attention paid to pre-merger spending and debt. 
Several limits to municipal decision-making were set, with a promise 
to lift the restrictions from 2007. The government kept its promise 
and abandoned the restrictions, but the rapid increase in municipal 
spending and deviations from the nationally agreed general spending 
and taxation targets forced central government to restore the 
regulations already in 2008. At present, central government imposes 
rules on municipalities including sanctions such as grant cuts to 
municipalities that fail to follow their expenditure growth and tax rate 
limitations. Both individual and collective sanction elements are used. 
As a result, the municipalities no longer deviate from the nationally 
agreed targets and even some expenditure cuts have been seen in 
the municipalities since 2009. This has not come about without cost, 
however. Blom-Hansen argues that the present situation constitutes a 
remarkable break with the Danish tradition of local autonomy. It will 
be seen whether the regulation has come to stay or whether the rules 
will be gradually lifted.
The 2007 reform stripped the regions of many of their previous tasks. 
Also, the number of regions was reduced from 14 to five. The main 
task of the regions before the reform, health care, was maintained 
as a regional task. Some health care functions were nevertheless 
transferred to the municipalities, and the municipalities were also 
made financially co-responsible for hospital services. In addition, 
specialised social services and employment services were transferred 
to the municipalities. As a result, the municipalities have become 
stronger players in the public sector. It has also been argued that 
democratic decision-making has strengthened as a result of the new 
division of tasks. However, according to Blom-Hansen, the latest 
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research evidence suggests that the Danish amalgamations have not 
improved local democracy. 
1.4 Municipal mergers in a metropolitan area
The fourth chapter of the book, written by Enid Slack and Richard 
Bird, focuses on metropolitan governance and municipal mergers. The 
authors discuss the merits and drawbacks of alternative metropolitan 
governance models based on each model’s ability to fulfil important 
targets such as efficiency, accountability, economies of scale, 
reduction of negative externalities, and the capacity to deliver and 
coordinate services. In particular, the authors discuss the pros and 
cons of municipal mergers compared to the main alternatives such as 
two-tier models, voluntary cooperation and special purpose districts. 
Although emphasising that the answers are highly context-specific, 
and the policy choices are difficult, they do find that the best way to 
secure effective governance in a metropolitan region is either through 
one-tier (municipal mergers) or two-tier models. 
According to the authors, the main strength of municipal amalgamation 
is that it results in one political body that makes taxing and spending 
decisions. Amalgamations can also lead to greater fiscal capacity, and 
municipal services may be funded more fairly because there is a wider 
tax base. Bigger municipalities may be able to achieve economies of 
scale and internalise externalities. Amalgamations can also lead to 
better service coordination and more equitable and efficient service 
provision. But Slack and Bird also stress that amalgamations may 
reduce access and accountability since jurisdictions may become 
too large and bureaucratic. Moreover, the ability of municipal 
amalgamations to achieve significant economies of scale has been 
questioned in many empirical studies. One reason for these results 
is that most municipal services are labour-intensive, and this may 
make it hard to achieve significant economies of scale. The benefits 
of amalgamations are also case-specific: economies of scale are 
hard to achieve in regions with low-density housing that is spread 
out and more costly to serve. Many empirical studies conclude that 
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there may not be many further economies of scale to achieve once 
municipalities are much larger than 20,000–40,000 in population. 
The cost savings that are obtained from scale economies may also 
be more than outweighed by the costs that result, for example, from 
wage and service level harmonisation in the merged municipality. 
Finally, the authors note that municipal mergers rarely result in 
boundaries that encompass the entire economic region. 
Slack and Bird acknowledge that municipal cooperation is very far 
advanced among Finnish municipalities and that the cooperation 
applies to important services such as hospital services. At best, 
municipal cooperation can achieve economies of scale in service 
delivery and address externalities associated with service provision. 
By entering into inter-municipal cooperation, municipalities can 
maintain their spending and taxation autonomy, and, if needed, 
cooperation can also be easily disbanded. On the other hand, 
cooperation may become difficult if the member municipalities have 
very different objectives. Slack and Bird point out that cooperation 
involves bargaining and some municipalities may not have much to 
bargain with. Especially in metropolitan areas, the problems that need 
to be solved (global competition, fiscal disparities, sprawl) may be 
so great that more a permanent institutional solution than voluntary 
cooperation is needed. 
A two-tier model has many advantages compared with single-tier 
administrations or inter-municipal cooperation arrangements. In a 
two-tier governance model, economies of scale and scope can be 
achieved at the upper-tier, whilst the lower tier can provide services 
where local variation in preferences is important. The two-tier model 
can easily incorporate large areas to internalise externalities and 
redistribute through tax and spending policies at the upper-tier level. 
However, Slack and Bird also write that two-tier structures can be 
less transparent and more confusing to taxpayers than single-tier 
administrations. At worst, the two-tier model can result in waste and 
duplication in the provision of services.  
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In their article, Slack and Bird use the merger of the Toronto 
metropolitan area to illustrate the effects of reforming metropolitan 
governance. In 1998 the Province of Ontario decided to merge the 
Toronto metropolitan government and the six lower-tier municipalities 
(including the former City of Toronto) into one single-tier City of 
Toronto. In other words, the two-tier metropolitan system that had 
been in place since 1954 was abandoned. The aim of the reform 
was to reduce costs. But, according to the authors, the merger in the 
Toronto area did not prove to be a big success. In their analysis, Slack 
and Bird find almost no cost savings. On the revenue side, residential 
property taxes did not change much following the amalgamation. 
Business property taxes declined following the amalgamation largely 
as a result of the amalgamated city’s policy of reducing the tax burden 
on business and the changing provincial rules governing property 
taxes. The positive effects of the reform, according to Slack and Bird, 
include a fairer sharing of the tax base among the municipalities, 
harmonisation of service levels and increased political weight for 
Toronto in a regional and national context. 
In the last section of their article, Slack and Bird comment on the 
plans to reform Finnish local government, especially metropolitan 
governance. Although they emphasise that the Helsinki region differs 
considerably from the Toronto metropolitan area, they find it unlikely 
that considerable economies of scale could be achieved through 
amalgamation reforms in the Helsinki region. As for voluntary 
municipal cooperation, the authors cast serious doubt on the idea 
that by cooperating municipalities would be able to develop a joint 
“regional” vision to coordinate service delivery, land use planning or 
transportation. Therefore, Slack and Bird conclude that despite the 
problems associated with the two-tier model, it would still be the best 
alternative for reform in the Helsinki region. 
1.5 Municipal mergers and local representation
The fifth and last chapter of the book is written by Tuukka Saarimaa 
and Janne Tukiainen. Their article examines the importance of local 
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representation in Finnish municipalities, with a special focus on 
voting behaviour in the context of municipal mergers. Citizen-voters 
may benefit from having a local representative in the council for 
a number of reasons. First, if households with similar preferences 
have a tendency to sort into same municipalities or neighborhoods, 
a councilor living close to a voter is more likely to share the 
preferences of the voter in terms of the service-tax bundle provided 
by the municipality. The second reason why local representation may 
be important is related to the common pool problem. If there are 
identifiable (geographic) local groups within a municipality that 
benefit from spending in their area and if the spending is financed 
globally by all taxpayers in the municipality, having a local 
representative may be instrumental in receiving the benefits from 
local spending. Third, if councilors and voters consume similar 
services and dislike travel costs, a councilor living close to a voter 
is more likely to share the voter’s preferences over the geographic 
location of public services. Furthermore, since house values are tied 
to the prevalence and quality of (public) services in the neighborhood, 
house value becomes an incentive device that may align 
councilors’ and voters’ preferences. In this case, both the citizen-
voter and the councilor want to promote policies that increase 
neighborhood quality.  
The empirical analysis of Saarimaa and Tukiainen is based on a 
unique individual candidate and polling district level data. Using 
this information, each merged municipality is decomposed into the 
original pre-merger municipalities so that the vote distributions of 
candidates can be traced back to the pre-merger municipal level. The 
researchers then perform a difference-in-differences analysis where 
the unit of observation is the pre-merger municipality and the voting 
data comes from elections before (2004) and after (2008) the series 
of mergers. 
The authors find that municipal mergers lead voters to concentrate 
their votes on those local candidates that seem to defend the 
geographic location of public services best. This effect is the larger 
the farther away the municipality is from its larger merger partner. 
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However, despite the importance of local representation, voters are not 
willing to cross party lines in order to guarantee local representation. 
Based on these results, Saarimaa and Tukiainen argue that 
policymaking should pay special attention to voters’ preferences over 
the location of public services and local representation, especially if 
forced mergers of municipalities are planned. 
Antti Moisio
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Chapter 2 
 
Fiscal federalism: International experiences 
and the nordic response1
Lars-Erik Borge 
 
Jørn Rattsø 
 
Department of Economics 
Norwegian University of Science and Technology
2.1 Introduction
The standard theory of fiscal federalism prescribes major fiscal 
operations at the central government level. Given a benevolent planner 
at the center, the theory develops arguments for decentralization. 
Since the gain of decentralization relates to the heterogeneity of 
preferences for local public goods, the main tasks of government are 
assumed centralized. The optimal size structure of local governments 
is determined by the cost conditions and heterogeneity of preferences 
for local public goods. The expanded case for the local public sector 
adds arguments for the handling of individual redistributive welfare 
services (such as schooling and health care) at the local level. The 
fiscal federalism relevant for the Nordic countries represents an 
important role of decentralized government in the welfare state, and 
we will discuss the challenges that follow.
The alternative view of fiscal federalism is more decentralist in 
nature. The advantages of fiscal competition represent a case for 
decentralized government. Brennan and Buchanan (1980) suggested 
a competitive federalism where decentralization is a mechanism 
to control inefficient central government. In this setting, the role 
 
1 we appreciate discussions with Antti Moisio.
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of central government is less clear. The comprehensive literature 
about ‘Leviathan’ government is not explicit about the sources of 
government failure. Mobility and competition are relevant in the 
Nordic context also, but the dominating thinking has concentrated on 
the understanding of the public sector as an administrative system.
The new ‘second generation’ fiscal federalism theory introduces 
political and institutional conditions for the working of fiscal 
federalism (Oates, 2005, Boadway and Shah, 2009). This literature 
deals with issues of fiscal discipline and accountability and is of 
particular relevance for the Nordic model with  a strong center. Recent 
collections of country studies by Rodden et al. (2003) and Dafflon 
(2002) discuss the concern for opportunistic behavior, excessive 
government and fiscal imbalance in federalist systems. They form 
the background of the “dangers of decentralization” discussed by 
Prud’homme (1995). 
The Nordics struggle with the balancing of integration into the 
welfare state and local autonomy. The expansion of welfare services 
has increased the role of decentralized government, but has also 
increased the involvement of central government. Some argue that 
the welfare state aspects have threatened basic values of local self 
rule and democracy. Nordic governments have reformed their fiscal 
federalism to improve the conditions for the handling of expanded 
welfare services and to strengthen local accountability. The 
background and content of the reform process are discussed in this 
article.  
2.2 Fiscal discipline and accountability
As mentioned in the introduction, the conventional theory of fiscal 
federalism is really a theory about decentralized government. 
Decentralization of public goods accommodates preference 
heterogeneity, but must be traded off against the disadvantages 
associated with economies of scale and externalities. The theory 
designs well-functioning decentralized governments that can handle 
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the responsibilities with accountability. The workhorse Musgrave-
Oates-Tiebout model (Musgrave, 1959, Oates, 1972, Tiebout, 1956) 
is based on four key assumptions: Local public goods, benefit 
taxation, mobility, and no spillovers. The strength of the local public 
sector is competition (Tiebout) and balancing of local benefits and 
costs (Oates’ decentralization theorem). Local governments in this 
design are like Buchanan (1965) clubs established by the local 
population to solve common problems. Benefit taxation assures local 
accountability, and there is no case for central government financial 
controls.
The normative consequences of the standard model are well known 
and assign a strong role for the center. The distribution function 
and the stabilization function, using the terminology of Musgrave, 
must be centralized. In the allocation function, public goods should 
be centralized in areas with strong externalities and economies of 
scale and homogenous preferences across regions. The case for 
decentralization is really to realize allocation gains for local public 
goods. The subsidiarity principle, approved by the EU, argues that 
public goods should be organized at the lowest level appropriate.
The standard recipe assumes fiscal discipline and accountability in 
local units with high degree of autonomy. But in practice all countries 
struggle with the control of decentralized spending. It is important 
to understand the active involvement of central governments. 
Already the basic model allows for central government grants to 
internalize externalities between decentralized units. The early study 
by Boadway and Flatters (1982) shows how grants can correct for 
imperfections in mobility due to congestion. The desire to establish 
insurance against shocks also constitute an argument for grants 
(Persson and Tabellini, 1996). Even more important in practice are 
issues of tax design. Benefit taxation for local public goods is best 
achieved by property taxation. But property taxes hardly anywhere 
generate revenue above 2–3% of GDP. Other taxes are further away 
from the principle of benefit taxation and there are few ’good’ local 
tax bases anyway. The central government therefore typically adds 
funds from broader tax bases like the value added tax and the income 
Fiscal federalism: International experiences 
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tax. Although central government grants can be based on efficiency 
considerations, they imply central funding of locals and consequently 
vertical fiscal imbalance.
In addition, central government funding of decentralized government 
spending is based on distributional concerns. Local governments have 
varying (private) income levels and their tax bases differ, and grants 
are introduced for tax equalization. In theory equalization can be 
arranged at the individual level, but in practice regional equalization 
is made through local governments. The desires for equalization 
from the center are broader when welfare service spending is 
decentralized. Equalization of spending is designed in complex grant 
systems taking into account factors affecting service demand such as 
the age composition of the population and local cost factors such as 
the settlement pattern and population size. 
Vertical fiscal imbalance seems hard to avoid. Benefits are enjoyed 
at the local level, but are at least partly financed from a common pool 
of national resources. Careaga and weingast (2000) call such revenue 
sharing for a “fiscal pact with the devil”. They put the attention to 
the political and institutional framework of fiscal federalism that can 
generate incentives for good or bad governance. The common pool 
problem implies a spending pressure towards central funds and also 
possibly strategic or opportunistic behavior, and consequently a bias 
to overspending. Interestingly, McKinnon and Nechyba (1997, p. 55) 
see more emphasis on equity as the major threat, even “the beginning 
of a slow collapse of the relatively successful US federal system into 
a unitary state”. 
The essence of the common pool problem within nations is that the 
perceived costs of public services at the local or district level are lower 
than the actual costs. The services offered by the local public sector 
supply benefits to specific geographic areas, here called districts. While 
the benefits are concentrated, the financing is shared through central 
government taxation distributed out as grants. The benefits are fully 
internalized in each district, but these contribute only to a share of the 
financing. The districts consequently impose negative externalities on 
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each other. This understanding of overspending bias was suggested 
by Tullock (1959) and developed by Buchanan and Tullock (1962) 
and weingast, Shepsle and Johnsen (1981) in the context of the US 
Congress. In the extreme case, each district’s spending is financed out 
of a common pool of national tax revenues. As shown by Persson and 
Tabellini (1999, section 9), the common pool problem in this case can 
be described as the situation where each district sets the local service 
production with the tax rate determined residually. 
The second generation fiscal federalism literature addresses design 
of political and fiscal institutions to internalize these externalities and 
to control overspending. The starting point is the universalism theory 
of collective behavior developed by weingast (1979) assuming that 
all districts are represented in a national legislature. Under a “norm 
of universalism” all representatives are members of the winning 
coalition. The norm is a result of a fundamental uncertainty facing the 
representatives. will they be in, or out, of the winning coalition? The 
uncertainty is removed under the norm of universalism. Compared 
to a winning coalition that includes less than all representatives, the 
benefit to each member of the coalition is reduced. However, a small 
but certain benefit may be preferred to a larger but uncertain benefit.
weingast et al. (1981) have not developed a full political equilibrium, 
and more recent theoretical research has addressed the decision 
making within legislature when projects with concentrated benefits 
are financed by universal taxation [see Chari and Cole (1995) 
and Persson and Tabellini (1999)]. In the setting of a multi-party 
parliamentary system with proportional representation from districts, 
the parties will to some extent internalize the costs of decentralized 
spending, thereby limiting universalistic behavior and the negative 
consequences of centralized financing and vertical fiscal imbalances. 
But when the parties have their strongholds in different regions 
and have different marginal districts, they will not agree about 
the geographical distribution of funds. In this setting the party 
composition of the parliament is the crucial determinant of political 
strength to hold back the spending pressure.
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The common pool challenge to fiscal discipline is not limited to 
situations with serious vertical fiscal imbalance. The key point is that 
indiscipline results when the center holds a soft budget constraint 
towards the locals and hands out (marginal) funds with discretion. The 
excess spending bias consequently is the result of lack of commitment 
to a hard budget constraint. The design of fiscal responsibilities, the 
working of the political system, and the commitment problems all 
influence the degree of internalization. The lessons made about the 
working of different political systems and fiscal restrictions in this 
respect offer some guidelines for the design of fiscal institutions.
The understanding above is first and for all relevant for the control and 
regulation of decentralized government. But it is also relevant for the 
discussion of local government size structure. The standard approach 
balances heterogeneity of preferences and costs of local public goods 
to define optimal size of local governments. The challenges of fiscal 
discipline and accountability introduce new factors in the equation. 
The local units should have financial strength based on own revenues 
to take economic responsibility for the costs and risks associated 
with service production. It is easier for central governments to hold 
hard budget constraints when decentralized government control 
large own revenue bases. The responsibility for welfare services also 
requires capacity and competence to operate advanced technology 
and knowledge and to develop the services. Presumably the optimal 
size of local units is larger in this setting.
2.3 Empirical evidence of common pool and vertical 
imbalance
The understanding of the common pool problem in fiscal systems has 
been developed and investigated empirically in the context of the US 
Congress. Inman (1988) and Inman and Fitts (1990), analyzing federal 
grants and federal spending in the US, represent the first econometric 
studies of the universalistic model. They show the importance of 
majority-rule leadership in Congress and a strong president to set the 
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agenda and coordinate the national policy. This is the broad lesson 
for political design. An agenda-setter is needed to overcome the 
geographical interests. 
The available analyses relevant for European countries and political 
systems have mostly taken a broader view of the fiscal challenge. 
Perotti and Kontopoulos (2002) address fragmented fiscal policy in 
OECD countries and analyze the political side of the common pool 
problem as a relationship between the number of decision makers 
and the size of government. The size fragmentation is measured as 
number of parties in the ruling coalition and number of spending 
ministries. They follow an extensive empirical literature of the effects 
of political structure and political fragmentation started up by Roubini 
and Sachs (1989). The broad conclusion from this literature at the 
country level is that political fragmentation tends to lead to larger 
government size and that the common pool problem is an important 
background factor. Hallerberg and Hagen (1999) extend the analysis 
to electoral institutions, which is a background determinant of political 
fragmentation. 
The relationship between decentralization of government and 
government size has been investigated in light of the hypothesis that 
competition leads to smaller government (Brennan and Buchanan, 
1980). The empirical studies following Oates (1985) are not able 
to establish that decentralization holds back government size. 
Kirchgässner (2002) surveys the arguments and estimates. The 
hypothesis that decentralization implies common pool problems and 
generates larger government has been studied for Latin-American 
countries in a research project at the Inter-American Development 
Bank. The project emphasizes vertical fiscal imbalance and other 
aspects of intergovernmental relations that may give rise to soft 
budget constraints. Stein (1999) concludes that decentralization 
tends to produce larger governments, and in particular when vertical 
fiscal imbalance is high, central government grants are discretional, 
and local borrowing autonomy is large. Interestingly, vertical fiscal 
imbalance here is a level effect and not limited to marginal funds.
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Expansion of the local public sector over time has been studied in 
the same perspective. Borge and Rattsø (2002) analyze the fiscal 
federalism design in Norway in an econometric analysis of growth of 
local public spending during 1880–1990. The benefits of decentralized 
government spending are concentrated to each municipality and county, 
while the costs to a large extent are carried by general taxation and 
distributed as central government grants. The party fragmentation of the 
parliament is the main determinant of the political strength to internalize 
costs and thereby contribute to a socially efficient allocation in this 
system. Party fragmentation of parliament is measured by a Herfindahl 
index, and has a significant impact on decentralized spending growth. 
Two other indicators of political strength, capturing type and duration 
of government, are shown to have similar effects. Internalization of 
costs seems to be a serious challenge to the national political system 
under vertical fiscal imbalance. The asymmetry between decentralized 
spending and centralized financing contributes to public sector growth. 
Experiences at the local government level offer broader databases for 
empirical testing. Direct tests of the relationship between districting 
and government spending are hard to do, since most political 
systems are more complex. Pettersson-Lidbom (2012) has shown 
that the size of the legislature affects the size of government. In his 
study of Swedish municipalities a higher number of legislators is 
associated with smaller size of government. City councils across US 
city governments come closer to theory and are analyzed by Baqir 
(1999). The size of the city councils is determined by their districting, 
and redistricting is not a very frequent event. The analysis of US 
cities confirms that larger city councils are associated with larger 
government expenditures per capita. The effects of districting are 
estimated in a demand model of city government spending, and the 
main result seems to be robust to alternative econometric approaches 
and alternative measures of spending. The quantative effect is of 
economic interest, since adding one district on average raises per 
capita spending by 3%.
Outside the US district representation, empirical measures of the 
common pool problem is harder to find. An analysis of high school 
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spending by county governments in Norway gives some indirect 
evidence (Falch and Rattsø, 1999). The high schools offer benefits to 
each municipality such as employment and higher local tax revenues. 
Also the presence of a high school reduces student commuting and 
may increase enrollment. It follows that municipalities can obtain 
benefits from a common pool when the costs are shared within the 
county. In this study, the average population size of the municipality is 
a measure of the common pool effect. Many small municipalities are 
assumed to have the same effect as many districts. School spending is 
disaggregated to separate between the sources of variation in teacher-
student ratio, non-wage spending per student, and student enrollment. 
In the estimated demand model of county level school spending, 
the average size of the municipality has a clear impact. Resource 
use per student goes up when the average population size of the 
municipalities is reduced. The municipalities seem to be successful in 
influencing the number and the location of high schools determined 
by the counties. The teacher-student ratio increases because smaller 
schools mean smaller classes, and non-wage spending increases 
because more schools mean more administration and maintenance 
per student.
The database on high school spending allows simultaneous analysis 
of the common pool effect and political institutions. while average 
size of municipalities measure spending pressure, political strength 
affects the ability to hold back the pressure. Political strength is 
measured by type of government a la Roubini and Sachs (1989), 
separating between majority and minority and one party versus 
coalition, and by a Herfindahl index of party fragmentation of the 
county councils. Falch and Rattsø (1999) apply interaction terms 
between municipality size and political strength, and the estimates 
show that spending pressure is most effective in counties with 
weak political leadership. The effect of municipality size on student 
enrollment is strong and depends critically on political strength. In 
weak county councils, smaller municipalities increase resource use 
per student at the cost of student enrollment, while strong county 
councils are able to increase student enrollment.
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we conclude that multiple layers of government represent a 
challenge for fiscal discipline. The intergovernmental relations 
vary across countries with different assignments of responsibilities, 
different sources of financing, and different economic and political 
autonomies at the levels involved. The empirical literature indicates 
that countries share common problems of central government control 
of decentralized government. The institutional responses in particular 
have been developed to control deficits and debt.
2.4	 Intertemporal	imbalances	and	deficits
Oversized government can be understood as the result of the static 
common pool problem discussed above. The associated concern for 
stabilization and deficit bias requires an extension into dynamics and 
mobility. The essence of the fiscal federalist model is that households 
and firms can move between jurisdictions. The competition for 
households and firms and the threat of exit are important disciplining 
devices on fiscal performance. 
The main worry is fiscal decentralization as a source of fiscal 
crisis. Excessive local deficits and debts may generate overall fiscal 
imbalance and with high social costs. The issues are clearly relevant 
for the present day understanding of fiscal balance in the US and in 
the Euro area. In our context, the mobility of households represents 
an incentive for deficit financing. If local governments borrow to 
finance current spending, the costs are shifted to future taxpayers. 
Households may see this as an attractive financing alternative, 
because they can move out before the bill is paid. Capitalization will 
work to constraint the mobility mechanism. At best, private credit 
markets will evaluate the creditworthiness of the local governments 
and stop the borrowing spree in due time. The problem here is 
the possible mechanisms of soft budget constraint for the central 
government. The central government can hardly be passive when 
local governments default and financial markets and local taxpayers 
suffer. The expectation of central government bailout will encourage 
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further local deficits and debt. It should be noticed that such deficits 
may appear in complicated ways like pension underfunding. 
Inman (2003) clarifies the conditions for ‘deficit-shifting’ and studies 
more closely the exceptions to the US success of fiscal discipline, 
notably the recession in the 1930’s and more recent big city crises 
(like New York City, washington DC, Philadelphia and Miami). 
He identifies institutions promoting fiscal discipline, in particular 
powerful presidents, constitutional balanced budget rules, and fiscal 
oversight boards. His major conclusion is that “this tradition of 
refusing to provide significant national fiscal relief to governments in 
distress continues to this day”. 
The deficit bias of decentralized government inherent in fiscal 
federalism necessitates institutional restrictions on local behavior 
to avoid moral hazard. All countries with decentralized government 
have put restrictions on the locals, although in various forms and 
strength. Balanced budget rules and limits to borrowing are the two 
main instruments of control. Recent country studies of constraints and 
their performance are offered by Ter-Minassian (1997) and Dafflon 
(2002). Country studies of bailout mechanisms and experiences are 
collected in Fernandez-Arias et al. (2003) and Rodden et al. (2003). In 
principle, fiscal discipline can be taken care of by market constraints, 
political constraints or administrative constraints. Private credit and 
property markets can discipline local governments only when the 
locals have full economic autonomy and provide the credit market 
with full information about their economic situation. US states and 
Canadian provinces seem to be the only decentralized units where 
market discipline plays an important part. we are then left to the 
combination of political structure and administrative regulations to 
secure discipline in more integrated public sectors.
Most of the empirical literature analyzes aggregate measures 
of fiscal imbalance in cross-country studies. Alesina and Perotti 
(1995) summarize the fiscal consequences of a variety of aspects 
of the political system in OECD countries. The main conclusion is 
that political fragmentation is associated with fiscal deficits. Weak 
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governments lead to deficits as well as government oversize because 
they are unable to internalize costs. The effects of intergovernmental 
fiscal relations on fiscal balance are less clear. Mello (2000) relates 
both central and local government fiscal balance to measures of 
tax autonomy and vertical fiscal imbalance in a cross-country 
study. Local tax autonomy (local taxes high share of local revenue) 
tend to worsen fiscal positions both for the locals and the central 
government, and the consequences of vertical imbalance (grants 
high share of local revenue) are mixed.  Interestingly, restrictions 
can be understood as the result of the intergovernmental relations. 
Von Hagen and Eichengreen (1996) test the relationship between 
vertical fiscal imbalance and borrowing restrictions in a dataset of 45 
countries. They find econometric evidence that centralized financing 
is associated with borrowing controls. They also find that countries 
with borrowing restrictions have higher government debt. The 
understanding is that the fiscal pressure against the center is higher 
when the center controls the funds.
Studies of fiscal restrictions at the local government level are hard to 
do since most countries have common rules for all local governments. 
There is no variation in regulations to take advantage from. The 
European case studies edited by Dafflon (2002) show that countries 
apply different forms of restrictions to budget balance and borrowing. 
All allow for administrative discretion at the central government 
level, and all struggle with local authorities attempting to get around 
the restrictions (typically off-budget activities). Restrictions seem to 
work although they are imperfect. The episodes of local fiscal crisis 
experienced, notably in Italy and Spain in the late 1970s, motivated 
an overhaul of the fiscal controls. Central government interventions 
and bailouts were followed by institutional reforms to avoid future 
repetitions. Many contributors to Dafflon’s volume report that the 
EMU process has been helpful in arranging sustainable balances. 
More extensive econometric studies of the consequences of budget 
balance requirements and borrowing limitations are made for the US 
states. The US states with their relative homogeneity and institutional 
variation offer an attractive database for the investigation of fiscal 
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restrictions. The states generally have balanced budget requirements 
and limitations on debt, but in different forms. Von Hagen (1991) did 
an innovative study of how these rules affect state indebtness. The 
motivation for his study was the discussion about European monetary 
integration and the use of fiscal restraint. The US case represents an 
opportunity to investigate how fiscal restraints in a monetary union 
are functioning. His main conclusion is that fiscal restraints ‘do little 
to reduce the likelihood of extreme outcomes in fiscal performance’ 
and thus that they cannot be expected to be effective in a European 
monetary union. 
Poterba (1997) summarizes the many studies available about US states 
and classifies three main types of regulations: Required submission 
of a balanced budget; required legislative decision of a balanced 
budget allowing for actual deficits; combining a balanced budget 
from the legislature with a prohibition to carry forward the deficit. 
The empirical analyses apply an index of the stringency of the state‘s 
balanced budget requirements. Most contributions estimate broad 
models of economic and political variables affecting spending and 
revenue behaviour. The analysts agree that the most restrictive fiscal 
limits do reduce the state indebtness and also reduce the borrowing 
costs for a given deficit. The lessons above indicate that national 
restrictions only work when they are part of a well-functioning and 
robust political decision making system. 
2.5 the nordic model of administrative federalism
The Nordic countries have developed a model of fiscal federalism 
characterised by local responsibility for welfare services, local tax 
financing through an income tax, and extensive equalization systems. 
Overview and discussion are offered in Rattsø (1998).
The background for the development of a Nordic model is the building 
of the welfare state after world war II. Key elements in the building 
of the welfare state were expansion of education, health care, and 
social services and with the same service standards throughout the 
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country. Local governments were given responsibility for provision 
of most welfare services.
The assigned role of local governments in welfare services was 
not grounded in the theory of fiscal federalism emphasizing 
heterogeneous demand for local public goods. It was rather 
understood as administrative delegation from an overburdened central 
state. Compared to central government agencies, provision through 
local governments were considered to have advantages in terms of 
efficiency and democratic control. The efficiency argument was to 
some extent related to localization of institutions and the importance 
of welfare services for community development. The Nordic model 
consequently has been named as administrative federalism rather 
than fiscal federalism. In the context of Brueckner’s (2009) theory of 
decentralization it can be called partial decentralization.
The choice of using the local governments in the building of 
the welfare state had important implications for the design of 
intergovernmental relations. First, the expansion of welfare services 
was accompanied by an increase in central government grants. Second, 
tax and spending needs equalization became more important with the 
increased responsibility for welfare services. Third, legal regulation 
and earmarking were used to achieve the detailed objectives of each 
service. The increased central government control and involvement 
led to less local autonomy by increasing the dependence on grant 
financing and reducing the importance of tax financing (increased 
vertical fiscal imbalances), and by reducing local discretion in the 
allocation of resources across services.
There was a growing concern that the local government structure was 
not well suited for the new responsibilities. The local governments 
were too small to exploit economies of scale and to develop attractive 
environments for highly skilled workers. National amalgamation 
reforms were carried out in Sweden, Norway, and Denmark. 
Sweden led the way by a reform in 1952 that reduced the number 
of municipalities from nearly 2,500 to just above 1,000 (Dahlberg 
2010). During the period 1962–74 the number of municipalities was 
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further reduced to 278. In Norway an amalgamation reform was 
carried out in the early 1960s, reducing the number of municipalities 
from nearly 750 to around 450 (Borge 2010). In Denmark more than 
1,000 parish municipalities and 80 towns were merged into 275 
municipalities in 1970 (Blom-Hansen 2010). Finland is the only 
Nordic country without a national merger reform. However, the 
number of municipalities was reduced from nearly 560 in 1945 to 
460 in 1990 through voluntary mergers.
The rising level of national control was also of concern. This 
motivated reforms to promote local democracy, local accountability, 
and efficiency by giving local governments more discretion in 
the allocation of resources between service sectors. The reforms 
attempted to reduce mandating and regulation in general and in grant 
systems earmarked grants were replaced by general grants based 
on objective criteria. The movement to general purpose grants, also 
called block grants, was gradually introduced in Denmark in the 
1970s. Later a block grant system was implemented in Norway in 
1986 and in Finland and Sweden in 1993.
The Nordic model is best understood as a mixed model that attempts 
at combining local democracy with an agency role in welfare services. 
However, the extent of national regulations varies somewhat across 
the countries. In terms of local tax financing and tax discretion 
Norway stands out as the least decentralized country. Local taxes 
amount to around 40% of revenues and in practice there is little 
tax discretion. Formally the local governments can choose tax rates 
within an interval, but since 1980 each and every local government 
has used the maximum rate in income and wealth taxation. In 
practice tax discretion is limited to the property tax. The property 
tax is a voluntary tax where the tax rate varies across municipalities. 
They can also decide whether to tax property or not and the type of 
property to be taxed. However, the property tax only amounts for 
5–10% of municipal tax revenues. In the other Nordic countries there 
is less central regulation of local tax rates. In Denmark, Finland, and 
Sweden the central governments do not impose maximum tax rates in 
the income tax, and there is considerable variation in tax rates across 
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local governments. However, both in Denmark and Sweden the 
central government has temporarily taken actions to avoid local tax 
increases. Sweden had a tax freeze in the early 1990s and in Denmark 
the local tax level has been a key topic in the annual negotiations 
between the Danish central governments and Local Government 
Denmark. Blom-Hansen (2012) argues that local tax discretion in 
Denmark is de facto abolished after the municipal reform of 2007. 
The temporary adjustment rules certainly reduced the local discretion, 
and it will be interesting to observe how the tax setting will evolve 
over time in the new system. 
There is also considerable variation across the Nordic countries 
when it comes to handling fiscal discipline by balanced budget rules 
and limitations on borrowing. In this dimension Denmark has the 
strictest regulations. In general local borrowing is forbidden, but 
with permanent exemptions for investments in certain areas such as 
public utilities. Norway has a balanced-budget-rule where the main 
requirement is operational budget balance. In the budget, current 
revenues must cover current expenditures, interest repayments, and 
regular instalments of debt repayment. Actual deficits are allowed 
to be carried over, but as main rule they must be “repaid” within 
two years. If a deficit is not “repaid” within two years, the local 
government is listed in a register (ROBEK) and will be subject to 
budget and borrowing control. Similar BBRs are in place in Finland 
and Sweden, but with no sanctions for violating the BBR.
It is tempting to speculate whether there is a relationship between 
local tax discretion and fiscal rules, at least when comparing Norway 
to Finland and Sweden. More tax discretion in Sweden and Finland 
may reduce the need for tight monitoring of BBRs as the local 
governments have an instrument to raise revenues in times of fiscal 
distress. In Norway tighter regulation of the BBR may be necessary to 
avoid large fiscal crisis where the only way out is central government 
bail-out.
To sum up, we think the central regulations of local governments in 
the Nordic countries first are foremost must be understood on the 
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background of decentralized responsibility for welfare services. Tax 
and expenditure needs equalization, substantial grant financing, and 
detailed regulation of the services are necessary to achieve equal 
access to welfare services. Moreover, the local public sector makes 
up a large part of the total economy. National regulation of local 
taxes are to some extent necessary to control the overall tax level and 
balanced-budget-rules are in place to avoid bail-outs and to control 
the overall fiscal balance of the public sector.
2.6 Fiscal competition in the nordic countries
The literature on fiscal federalism emphasizes competition between 
local governments as an important disciplinary device. However, 
competition has not played an important role in the Nordic model 
as the main disciplinary devices are the design of local political 
institutions and central government regulation and control. If 
anything, competition is seen as a threat to the Nordic model. 
Söderström (1998) argues that a competition problem arises when 
local governments are financed by income tax. With a local income 
tax communities with wealthy inhabitants will be able to provide 
good services even with low tax rates. A threat for these wealthy 
communities is inmigration of poor individuals that will erode the tax 
base and the good services. Consequently, local governments may 
engage in competition to avoid inmigration of poor people. From a 
national perspective this competition is largely unproductive since the 
poor have to reside somewhere. Söderström (1998) makes the point 
that the competition problem is solved by extensive tax equalization.
In the last decade a growing empirical literature has focused on fiscal 
interactions or competition among local governments. This literature 
investigates whether the fiscal decisions of one local government is 
affected by the fiscal decisions of its neighbours. Several studies from 
the Nordic countries have appeared, analysing tax welfare benefits, 
tax setting, and efficiency.
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welfare competition is analysed by Fiva and Rattsø (2006) and 
Dahlberg and Edmark (2008) using Norwegian and Swedish data 
respectively. The two studies analyse welfare benefits to individuals 
and households not captured by the national social insurance systems. 
Welfare benefit is a transfer program administered at the local 
government level. A key issue is whether there is strategic interaction 
among local governments in the setting of benefit levels. Do local 
governments react on the welfare benefit levels in neighbouring 
jurisdiction when setting their own benefit levels? Dahlberg and 
Edmark (2008) find strong evidence of a positive reaction. A 
municipality decreases its benefit level by around SEK 40 when the 
neighbouring municipalities decrease their benefit level by SEK 100. 
Fiva and Rattsø (2006) document similar effects for Norway.
As discussed in the previous section, the property tax is a voluntary 
tax for Norwegian municipalities. Fiva and Rattsø (2007) analyse 
whether fiscal interactions are important for the discrete decision to 
have property tax. They find that the probability of having a property 
tax increases significantly if the neighbouring jurisdictions also use 
the property tax. Edmark and Ågren (2008) perform a similar analysis 
on the local income tax in Sweden. As Fiva and Rattsø, they document 
positive spatial interactions. An average cut of 1 percentage points in 
neighbouring jurisdictions is correlated with a decrease of about 0.74 
percentage points in own taxes.
A recent Finnish study by Lyytikäinen (2012) uses a clever strategy 
to identify spatial interactions in property taxation. In Finland the 
municipalities can choose property tax rates within an interval 
and in 2000 the lower bounds of the intervals were increased. As 
a consequence, many municipalities were forced to increase their 
tax rates. when the forced increase in the tax rates of neighbouring 
municipalities are used as instruments, there is no evidence of 
spatial interaction in property tax rates. However, when the standard 
estimation methods are applied, positive spatial interactions cannot 
be rejected. This suggests that the standard methods may have a 
tendency to overestimate the degree of interdependence in tax rates.
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A possible interpretation of spatial interactions in tax setting is that 
voters evaluate incumbents by comparing the performance of their 
own local government with the performance of the neighbours. 
Good performance relatively to the neighbours acts as a signal of 
a competent incumbent. Revelli and Tovmo (2007) represent an 
interesting twist by analysing spatial interactions in performance. 
They utilize an efficiency indicator that is calculated and published 
annually by a government commission set up to monitor local 
public finances in Norway. It appears that the degree of efficiency is 
positively correlated across neighbours. Moreover, when exploiting 
survey information it comes out that significant spatial correlation 
only occurs for those local governments that compare their own 
service provision to those in nearby communities.
The above mentioned studies provide clear evidence of spatial 
interactions and competition among local governments. But is this 
competition for good or for bad? In general there are two competing 
theoretical frameworks; mobility of households or tax bases or yardstick 
competition. The typical prediction from the former framework is that 
competition among local governments leads to a race-to-the-bottom, 
either in welfare benefit levels or tax rates. Yardstick competition 
(or performance comparison as discussed above) is seen as a more 
productive type of competition that may improve policy outcomes. 
The studies of welfare competition are probably best understood as 
competition to avoid inmigration of welfare recipients and thereby 
evidence of a race-to-the-bottom. However, Fiva and Rattsø (2006) 
point out that the spatial interactions do not necessarily imply too 
low benefit levels, since the grant financing of the local governments 
may generate overall excessive spending. At the other end, spatial 
correlation in efficiency as documented by Revelli and Tovmo 
(2007) is best understood as productive yardstick competition. The 
interpretation of the tax interactions is less clear. Edmark and Ågren 
(2008) find some weak evidence of unproductive tax competition, 
while Fiva and Rattsø (2007) argue that their results should be 
understood as evidence as yardstick competition since the property 
tax base is relatively immobile. Lyytikäinen (2012) acknowledges 
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that his identify strategy may not be very relevant for detecting 
yardstick competition.
2.7 the future of the nordic model
The ongoing reform process since the 1980s has mainly dealt with the 
control of local governments, partly in terms of reduced regulation 
and mandating and consolidation of grants, and partly as a more 
robust regulatory system related to deficits and debt. More recently 
municipal mergers and local government structure have returned to 
the policy agenda. Denmark implemented a major reform in 2007 
where the previous 271 municipalities were merged into 98 new large 
municipalities and the 14 counties were merged into 5 new regions. 
The other countries have a heated discussion of local government 
structure, but the structure has not changed much the last decades. 
A possible exception is Finland where the number of municipalities 
is significantly reduced through voluntary mergers the recent years.
The local government structure cannot be determined independently 
of the tasks assigned to local governments. This co-determination 
of structure and tasks was very explicit in the recent Danish reform. 
Along with the amalgamation reform a number of functions were 
transferred from the old counties to the municipalities. The most 
important functions were specialized social services and selected 
health care services. Later, in 2009, the employment policy was 
unified and placed with the municipalities. Another example of 
the close link between structure and tasks is the hospital reform 
in Norway. The hospitals had “grown out” of the counties due to 
increased specialization. when the structure did not adapt to changing 
conditions, the final outcome was a national take-over.
The future of the Nordic model of federalism is closely linked to 
the future organization of the welfare services, and in our view two 
alternatives stand out. The first alternative is based on continued, and 
possibly strengthened, local government responsibility for welfare 
services (a renewed model of administrative federalism), while the 
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other is based on local governments concentrating on local services 
(a Nordic model of fiscal federalism).
The first alternative can be seen as a continuation of the current 
Nordic model of administrative federalism. However, it is necessary 
to acknowledge that the welfare services, and in particular the social 
services, have become more specialized and require more competent 
personnel. Moreover, better communications has led to drastic 
reduction in travelling time. These developments call for a new round 
of municipal mergers to exploit economies of scale and to build solid 
groups of specialists. The municipalities will then be up to the task 
of maintaining existing functions and take on new ones. Denmark is 
the role model in this respect, and the other countries can follow the 
Danish model. A national reform on municipal mergers is required, 
especially in Norway and Finland.
A renewed model of administrative federalism has several 
advantages. First, larger and stronger municipalities facilitate 
continued decentralization in the provision of public services. 
Second, with larger municipalities the variation in tax bases and 
spending needs will be reduced. The financing can to a larger extent 
be based on local taxes and the municipalities can be less dependent 
on central government grants. Third, larger municipalities with 
increased responsibilities and more tax financing may strengthen 
local democracy and accountability and increase the political power 
of the municipal tier.
A renewed model of administrative federalism will strengthen the 
capacity of the local public sector to take responsibility of welfare 
services. It is still an open question how welfare services will be 
organized in the future and how the local public sector fits in. In 
particular this is discussed regarding the responsibility of hospitals. 
The model may be combined with municipal cooperation (as in 
Finland), regional governments with a few functions (Denmark), 
or national responsibility for some services currently provided by 
local governments (Norway). It can also be argued that the new 
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municipalities may be “too large” for some services, thereby reducing 
decentralization gains and productive competition.
For hospitals a possible solution could be to separate the role 
of purchaser and the role of producer. The municipalities could 
concentrate on purchasing specialized health service on behalf of 
their citizens, while state agencies take care of production. This 
solution can be interpreted as an extended version of recent models 
in Denmark and Norway where the municipalities are co-financing 
the use of hospital services. A main argument for these models is 
to give the municipalities a more coherent responsibility for health 
care and to provide incentives for preventive actions. Even if the 
municipalities are to concentrate on the purchasing role, there is need 
for larger municipalities (in Finland and Norway) in order to limit 
the financial risk associated with year-to-year variation in the use 
of hospital services. However, the most critical issues issues in the 
evaluation of this model is whether it is possible to be a competent 
purchaser of specialized health care without being involved in the 
production.  
The second alternative is to develop a Nordic model of fiscal federalism 
where the burden of welfare services is lifted off the shoulders of 
the local public sector. Local governments can concentrate on local 
public goods and other services where national goals of equality are 
less pronounced. The need for large municipalities is reduced, and 
in many urban areas break-up of municipalities may be warranted. 
Larger decentralization gains and more productive competition may 
be enjoyed for the remaining local services. Moreover, the need for 
tax and spending needs equalization is reduced when redistributive 
welfare services are no longer a local responsibility. The financing can 
rely more on local taxes and the dependence on central government 
grants will be reduced. Local democracy and accountability will 
benefit from having a portfolio of tasks with less central government 
regulation, but the scaled down municipal tier will have less political 
power.
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The main challenge of a Nordic model of fiscal federalism is what 
to do with the welfare services that are lifted off the shoulders of the 
local governments. The natural response is that these services must be 
provided by the central government, and a new system of governance 
must be set up for each of these services. A positive effect of such 
centralization is that the emphasis on equalization can be increased 
compared to the present provision through local governments. On the 
negative side adjustment to local conditions and preferences will be 
further reduced. A central government organization of welfare services 
may create new bureaucracy and inefficiency. The experiences with 
central government nationalization of hospitals in Norway indicate 
that this concern should be taken into account.
Another common issue in the Nordic countries is the organization 
of local governments in metropolitan areas. The trend is that a larger 
share of the population resides in the larger cities and as a consequence 
commuting areas stretch beyond the borders of the central city. It is 
an argument for a unified metropolitan government in order to handle 
services with substantial spillovers such as infrastructure, roads and 
public transport. As in the general discussion of municipal structure, 
a possible disadvantage is that a unified metropolitan government 
may be “too” large for some services.
Overall we expect that the local public sector in the Nordic countries 
will survive as a large part of the public sector and within a system 
of administrative delegation from central government. Local 
governments will continue to be the main service producers of the 
welfare state. The conclusion holds as long as broad privatization 
of welfare services is out of the question and central government 
is not seen as an efficient organizer of local schools, care for the 
elderly and primary health services. In this case mergers between 
municipalities will be part of the package. Larger local governments 
will be necessary to carry welfare services that are getting more and 
more advanced and to have the revenue base needed to take the bulk 
of the responsibility for financing and risk. Fiscal discipline and 
accountability will still be challenges that the central government 
must handle. 
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3.1 Introduction and historical background1 
Danish local government balances between self-government and 
central control. On the one hand, there is a tradition of strong local 
government. Municipalities and regions are entrusted with more 
functions than in most countries, especially the municipalities which 
also have independent taxation rights. Furthermore, Denmark has 
a vibrant democracy at the subnational level. On the other hand, 
Denmark also has a tradition of central government control and 
interference in local affairs and of using local government as a 
provider of national services.
In Kjellberg’s (1995) terms, there has been a tension between an 
autonomous model and an integrational model. According to the 
first model, central and local governments are two separate spheres 
of government, which operate largely independently of each other. 
Local governments’ primary function is to secure the traditional 
values of liberty, democratic participation, and efficient provision 
of local services. According to the latter model, local governments 
form an integral part of the public sector, and their main role is to 
implement national policies. 
1 This chapter builds, where nothing else is mentioned, on Blom-Hansen and 
Heeager (2010) and Blom-Hansen, Ibsen, Juul and Mouritzen (2012).
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The tension between the two roles for local governments began 
during the era of absolutist royal rule (1660–1849). In the 1830s 
the king established a new local government system. In the urban 
areas Denmark’s approximately eighty market towns were entrusted 
with all local functions. In the rural areas a two-tiered structure 
was established: around 1,100 parish municipalities would handle 
basic local functions such as primary education and social security, 
while county councils would be responsible for tasks that required a 
larger population basis such as hospital services. Although suffrage 
remained circumscribed, this system contained a rudimentary form 
of democracy. The market towns, the parish municipalities, and the 
county councils all had elected bodies with some decision-making 
competence. However, another important purpose of the system, 
securing implementation of national policies, led to strict central 
control. In the market towns the mayor was appointed by the king, 
in the parish municipalities, the pastor – as the local branch of the 
absolutist hierarchy – played an important role in schools and social 
services; in the county councils the governor (amtmand) was a central 
government official who possessed wide powers or scrutiny over the 
parish municipalities (Bundsgaard, 2000).
After the end of absolutist rule and the introduction of a democratic 
constitution in 1849, the values of local self-government, democracy, 
and popular elections gained ground. Restrictions on suffrage were 
somewhat eased in the 1850s; the role of the pastor was reduced in 
the parish municipalities in the 1860s; in 1908 an electoral reform 
gave women and servants voting rights in local elections and 
introduced proportional election at the local level; from 1919 mayors 
in the market towns were no longer appointed by the king, but elected 
by the town council; and in the 1930s, the first inter-municipal 
equalization system was introduced (Dedenroth-Schou et al. 1991). 
As these examples show, changes did take place, but on a limited 
scale. The basic features of the system introduced under absolutist 
rule remained unchanged until the large-scale reform in 1970. 
As noted by Page (1991:108–37) in a seven-country comparison, 
Denmark had, contrary to conventional categorizations, strong traits 
of a Napoleonic local government system until the twentieth century.
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In 1970 three sets of reform led to a complete overhaul of the Danish 
local government system (Ingvartsen and Mikkelsen 1991). First, a 
dramatic geographical consolidation was initiated. More than 1,000 
parish municipalities and eighty market towns were amalgamated 
into 275 new municipalities, the twenty-five counties were merged 
into fourteen; and the amalgamations abolished the old distinction 
between rural and urban local government systems. From then on, 
a new two-tiered system was introduced nationwide: counties were 
responsible for regional tasks, the new municipalities for local 
tasks. Only Copenhagen was left untouched and functioned as both 
county and municipality in the new system. Second, following the 
amalgamations, a reform of local government functions was carried 
through over the next ten to twenty years. New tasks were transferred 
to local governments from the central government, and increased 
autonomy was introduced in the welfare areas that municipalities 
and counties already administered. Third, a financial reform was 
implemented. In a series of separate reforms, matching grants in a 
number of areas were gradually transformed into one general block 
grant which together with the local income tax became the main 
local income sources. In addition, an advanced inter-municipal 
equalization system was established. These reforms strengthened 
local autonomy, but also stressed the municipalities’ role as providers 
of national services.
The decades following the 1970 reform consolidated these wide-
ranging reforms. At the formal level no major changes took place 
until the new overhaul in 2007. However, informally the integration 
of the municipalities in the public sector was gradually tightened. 
Induced by the economic crisis in the early 1980s the central 
government increasingly included the economic dispositions of the 
local government sector in its macroeconomic policies. This was 
done through informal so-called budgetary cooperation with the local 
government associations. A system of annual negotiations ending 
with agreements on local expenditure and taxation level gradually 
took shape and became a permanent trait of Danish intergovernmental 
relations (Blom-Hansen, Ibsen, Juul and Mouritzen, 2012).
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In 2007 a new comprehensive reform was carried through. As in 
1970, the major ingredients were geographical consolidation and 
redistribution of functions across tiers in the public sector. The purpose 
of this chapter is to introduce this reform and its consequences in 
greater detail. 
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 briefly introduces 
the more permanent features of the Danish local government system. 
Sections 3.3 and 3.4 go into greater detail with the municipal 
amalgamations and the redistribution of functions in 2007. Section 
3.5 provides an account of reforms undertaken since 2007. Section 
3.6 and 3.7 discuss the effects of the 2007 reform and the ensuing 
challenges. Finally, section 3.8 concludes and discusses the need for 
further reforms and the central government’s ongoing evaluation of 
the 2007 reform.
3.2 Permanent features of Danish local government: 
Elections,	political	system,	functions	and	finances
Although the 2007 municipal reform was comprehensive, it is 
important to keep in mind that important parts of the local government 
system were not changed, and have remained stable since the early 
1970s.
The first stable part is the local election system. Municipal and regional 
elections are held every four years and use the same system. Elections 
are proportional, and each municipality constitutes one constituency. 
The number of seats in the municipal council is divided among the 
parties and lists by the D’Hondt method. There are no formal electoral 
thresholds, but because of the relatively low number of council seats 
there are relatively high natural thresholds.2 Candidates are selected 
 
2 The municipalities decide the size of the local council, but must respect these 
rules: In municipalities with more than 20,000 inhabitants the council must have between 
19 and 31 members; in municipalities with less than 20,000 inhabitants the council must 
have between 9 and 31 members; in Copenhagen the municipal council can have up to 55 
members.
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by parties or lists, who can nominate up to four persons more than the 
size of the local council. Local elections result in multiparty systems 
at the local level. Local branches of national parties have traditionally 
dominated local politics, in particular the Social Democratic Party, 
the Liberal Party and the Conservative Party. Local lists have also 
been frequent in Danish local politics, but both the 1970 and the 2007 
municipal amalgamations have made their life difficult. Local party 
systems have increasingly become ‘nationalised’, especially after 
the 2007 reform. Table 1 shows the present distribution of the total 
number of Danish municipal seats among the political parties. 
Table 1 National result of the Danish municipal elections
Share of seats (per cent)
Red-Green Alliance 0.6
Socialist People’s Party 13.8
Social Democratic Party 32.5
Social Liberals 2
Liberal Alliance 0
Liberal Party 28.3
Conservative People’s Party 10.6
Danish People’s Party 7.5
Local lists 4.4
Schleswigian Party 0.2
N=100 per cent 2,468
 
Source: Statistics Denmark
After elections, the political positions in the municipal political 
system are filled. This system constitutes the second permanent part 
of the local government system. It consists of three political bodies: 
a council, a set of standing committees, and a mayor. The council 
consists of 9–31 members, it is the supreme municipal body, and may 
be considered the local legislature. Executive power is exercised in a 
committee system with a division of labour between the mayor and 
Local Government in Denmark and the 2007 
municipal reform
48
the standing sectoral committees. The mayor is elected by and among 
the council members on a simple majority basis, is the formal head 
of the municipal administration and chairs the council’s financial 
committee. The members of the standing committees are also elected 
by and among the council members, but on a proportional basis. The 
committees are responsible for the day-to-day administration within 
the various policy sectors. The chairmen of the committees are elected 
by the committees on a simple majority basis. Although the chairmen 
only have few formal powers, they can be quite powerful since 
considerable influence is often delegated to them in practice. Together, 
the mayor and the chairmen of the sectoral standing committees 
constitute the executive power in the Danish local government 
system. They are the functional equivalent of the government in the 
national system (Skjæveland et al., 2007). The local political system 
is assisted by a large professional administration. In formal terms it is 
a unitary service directed by the mayor, but in practice it has strong 
sectoral traits since it is divided into departments and, in substantial 
matters, the departments do not answer to the mayor, but to the 
committees.
Table 2 Municipal politicians and local administrators over time
1966 1990 2010
Number of municipal politicians 10,005 4,677 2,468
Number of local administrators 46,020 451,916 527,775
Number of administrators per 
politician 4.6 96.6 213.8
Source: Blom-Hansen, Ibsen, Juul and Mouritzen (2012: 158)
Since the size of the municipal council has only increased slightly 
over time, the municipal amalgamations in 1970 and 2007 have 
meant a radically decreasing number of local councillors. At the 
same time, the municipal administration has grown considerably 
over time, which has led to a dramatic increase in the number of 
administrators per local politician, cf. Table 2. This development is 
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seen by some as a rising challenge to the democratic control of the 
local administration (Blom-Hansen, Ibsen, Juul and Mouritzen 2012: 
157–175).
At the regional level, counties and municipalities had similar 
political systems until the 2007 reform, but now there are important 
differences. The regional council, which has 41 members, is the 
supreme body. There is also a regional chairman, a post that is 
comparable to the municipal mayor. However, the regions do not 
have a committee system. They may, but are not obliged to, leave 
daily administrative matters to an executive committee, but cannot 
establish standing sectoral committees like the municipalities and the 
old counties before 2007.
Turning to functions, the municipalities and, to a lesser extent, the 
regions are heavyweights in the Danish public sector. Although 
the 2007 reform redistributed a number of functions across the 
tiers in the public sector, the basic division remains stable. This 
constitutes the third permanent part of the local government system. 
In total, municipal functions amount to more than half of all public 
expenditure in Denmark and have done so for many years. The 
most important municipal functions are – and have always been – 
basic welfare services: child care, primary education, and elder 
care. In addition, municipalities have traditionally administered 
social transfers such as housing benefits, social security and old age 
pensions. Furthermore, the municipalities have – and have always 
had – important responsibilities in the utility area (garbage collection, 
local roads) and, since more recent times, in culture and recreation 
(libraries, theatres, sports facilities). In addition to these traditional 
tasks, the 2007 reform transferred a number of functions from the old 
counties to the municipalities. This is explained in more detail below 
in section 3.4. The 2007 reform means that, in terms of functions, the 
Danish municipalities today are stronger than ever. Table 3 shows 
the budget shares of the municipalities’ present tasks. It is evident 
that, according to this yardstick, local welfare is their most important 
function.
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At the regional level, the 2007 reform stripped the old counties of 
almost all their functions, except health care, which has always been 
their most important task. As is also evident from Table 3, health care 
(hospitals and primary health care by general practitioners) is by far 
the most important task for the five Danish regions. In addition, they 
are responsible for running specialized social institutions and have a 
coordinating function in the regional development area.
Table 3 The functions of municipalities and regions (gross 
current and capital expenditure, budget 2012)
Municipalities Mill. 
DKK
Percent Regions Mill. 
DKK
Percent
Urban and environmental affairs 13,150 3 Health care 113,268 92
Public utilities 9,471 2 Social affairs 4,705 4
Traffic and infrastructure 15,422 3 Regional 
development
3,006 3
Education and culture 75,829 17 Administration 1,942 2
Health care 26,094 6
Social affairs 266,442 60
Administration 42,244 9
Sum 448,652 100 Sum 122,558 100
Source: Statistics Denmark
Finally, the local government system of finance has remained stable 
since the 1970s. Municipal and regional expenditures are financed by 
different income sources, cf. Table 4. At the municipal level, taxes 
are the main source of revenue. The most important one is the local 
income tax, and municipalities are free to decide the rate within 
the limits set by the annual agreement between their association 
and the central government. For many years these agreements 
have stipulated that the average municipal tax rate is to be kept 
constant, but individual municipalities may adjust their rates up- 
and downwards. In recent years more and more controls have been 
imposed upon local taxation, which has led to a considerable lack of 
Jens Blom-Hansen
51
flexibility in local taxation. The control system is explained in more 
detail in section 3.7. The average local income tax rate was 24.9 per 
cent in 2012. The income taxation right is traditionally considered 
the cornerstone of Danish local self-government. Municipalities also 
levy property and corporate taxes, but they generate far less revenue. 
The second most important municipal income source is grants from 
the central government: matching grants to help finance local transfer 
payments and a general block grant. Third, municipalities levy fees 
within the utility area and the social service areas. Finally, borrowing 
is generally forbidden, but exemptions are granted in a number of 
areas specified by central government regulation.
At the regional level, there are no taxes after the 2007 reform, so 
grants from both the central government and the municipalities are 
now the main regional income source. Fees are also important, and 
they are levied on the municipalities for their use of regional social 
institutions and hospitals. Borrowing is generally forbidden at the 
regional level but, again, some exemptions are allowed by the central 
government.
Table 4  The local government system of finance (budget 2012)
 
* ‘Other’ includes sale of capital assets, net interest payments, and use of liquid means.
Source: Statistics Denmark
Mill. DKK Per cent Mill. DKK Per cent
Taxes 233,106 52 - -
Grants 145,379 32 108,074 88
Fees 58,420 13 12,855 11
Net borrowing 2,316 1 -417 0
Other* 9,430 2 2,047 2
Total 448,651 100 122,559 100
Municipalities Regions
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3.3 the municipal amalgamations in 2007
when the Liberal Party and the Conservative People’s Party took 
over the government in Denmark in 2001 after ten years of Social 
Democratic rule no-one imagined that a large-scale municipal reform 
was underway. The issue had not played any role in the election 
campaign, and it was not included in the formal government platform 
negotiated between the Liberal and Conservative party leaders. 
Nonetheless, the issue soon became pertinent. In the summer of 2002 
the question of municipal amalgamations and alleged inefficiency in 
small municipalities was intensively discussed in the media, and the 
government’s response was to appoint a commission to investigate 
the need for a new municipal reform. 
One and a half years later the commission had completed a 
two thousand page report (Strukturkommissionen 2004). The 
commission’s answer was a clear yes, there is a need for a new 
municipal reform. However, it was less clear which type of reform 
was necessary. This vagueness was no coincidence. The commission 
was deliberately asked not to be too specific but only to discuss pros 
and cons of different scenarios. The government wanted to keep open 
the political options.
After an intensive negotiation process in the spring of 2004, it was 
clear that broad parliamentary support for a reform did not exist, so 
the government entered into a narrow compromise with the right-
wing Danish People’s Party (Regeringen 2004). This compromise 
gave the municipalities six months to find amalgamation partners 
and establish new municipalities with at least 30,000 inhabitants. A 
so-called cat flap door was introduced for small municipalities with 
less than 20,000 inhabitants that did not want to amalgamate, in 
which case they had to enter a formal agreement with a neighboring 
municipality about a number of specified tasks. The idea behind this 
plan was to give the municipalities relatively short time to settle the 
amalgamations. It was made clear that the alternative to voluntary 
amalgamations was some sort of central intervention, although the 
exact nature of this threat was never specified. 
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These tactics paid off. Each local situation had its own dynamics, but 
the fear of ending up as a benchwarmer helped the process along. 
To many observers’ surprise, local amalgamation agreements were 
quickly concluded. Already by late summer 2004 eleven municipalities 
announced that they had agreed to enter closed amalgamations, 
which meant that they considered their agreements final and not 
open to additional partners. However, these early movers ended up 
as relatively small municipalities on the new municipal map where 
the average number of inhabitants is approximately 55,000. The 
early movers included Billund and Kerteminde with less than 30,000 
inhabitants, Odsherred and Faxe with less than 40,000, and Thisted, 
Skive, Hedensted, and Syddjurs with less than 50,000 inhabitants.
The municipalities which wanted to use the cat flap door and enter a 
formal agreement with a larger neighboring municipality constituted 
a special problem. They had to persuade a large new municipality 
to make this arrangement, but often the large municipality preferred 
the small neighbor to become a part of their new municipality rather 
than to continue as a small neighbor with a complicated cooperative 
arrangement. In practice, the cat flap door turned out to be narrow, and 
the small municipalities were quietly swallowed by their neighbours. 
In the end, only seven of the 190 old municipalities, which before the 
reform had less than 20,000 inhabitants, continued as independent 
municipalities. Five are islands which already in the parliamentary 
reform compromise were mentioned as candidates for the cat flap 
door. Only two other municipalities, Dragør and Vallensbæk in the 
Copenhagen region, succeeded in squeezing through the cat flap door.
The final result was that only 33 municipalities continued unchanged, 
while the remaining 237 were more or less voluntarily amalgamated 
into 65 new large entities. The amalgamations were preceded on the 
island of Bornholm, whose five municipalities were amalgamated 
into one already in 2003, and on the island of Ærø, whose two 
municipalities were amalgamated in 2006. On the island of Langeland 
the three municipalities had decided to amalgamate prior to the 
general reform, but did not make their decision effective until 2007 
and thus followed the general time schedule. The final result appears in 
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Table 5, which shows that the amalgamations were mostly a provincial 
phenomenon. In the capital region, where the municipalities were 
relatively large already before the reform, only about every fourth 
municipality was amalgamated. Today there are speculations in the 
unchanged municipalities in the Copenhagen area that the decision 
not to amalgamate may not have been wise, and that they may have 
become too small in the new municipal landscape. Several have toyed 
with the idea of amalgamating with their equally-sized neighbor. 
None, however, have indicated any wish to be amalgamated with the 
municipality of Copenhagen, probably fearing that this would end in 
a swallow up without any influence on the amalgamation conditions. 
However, so far no new amalgamations have been undertaken.
Table 5  The 2007 municipal amalgamations divided according to 
region
Region No. of new 
municipalities
Per cent 
amalgamated
Average no. of 
inhabitants
Capital 29 28 56,260
Sealand 17 82 47,409
Southern Denmark 22 82 53,810
Central Denmark 19 84 63,841
North Denmark 11 82 52,455
Sum 98 66 55,217
Source: Blom-Hansen, Ibsen, Juul and Mouritzen (2012: 80)
 
In hindsight, the municipal amalgamation process was surprisingly 
smooth. The new municipalities even ended up much larger than 
both expected and desired by the central government. Its goal was 
municipalities with approximately 30,000 inhabitants, but as Table 
5 shows, this goal was exceeded to a remarkable extent. Apparently, 
the amalgamations were difficult to stop once the process was started.
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At the regional level, the old fourteen counties were amalgamated 
into five new regions, including the two metropolitan municipalities 
Copenhagen and Frederiksberg, which until the reform had functioned 
as both county and municipality. However, while the municipal 
amalgamations were semi-voluntary, the regional mergers were 
dictated by the central government. The number of regions, their 
boundaries, names, and the new regional capitals were all decided by 
the central government.
3.4 the accompanying redistribution of functions 
across tiers
The municipal amalgamations constituted the structural part of the 
2007 municipal reform. The functional part of the reform entailed 
a series of both centralizing and decentralizing changes of the 
distribution of functions among the central government, the new 
municipalities and the new regions.
In the area of taxation, the municipalities have traditionally been 
responsible for the assessment of property values and taxable incomes, 
both personal and corporate incomes. This may sound strange because 
these are tasks where equality before the law is obviously more 
important than adaption to local needs and preferences. But in the old 
days, local knowledge was also important in order to assess farmers’ 
incomes, and equality before the law was ensured by an arm’s length 
principle. The municipal tax administration was independent from 
the municipal council and the mayor when deciding individual cases. 
when the 2007 municipal reform transferred all tax assessment 
functions to the central government, it was the culmination of a series 
of reforms where parts of the tax assessment functions were gradually 
centralized. In 1998 corporate income tax assessment was transferred 
to the central government, and in 2002 property value assessment 
was also centralized.
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However, from the perspective of the municipal reform these 
centralizing changes in the tax area were remarkable. As in many 
other areas there had been speculations before the reform that the 
small municipalities had problems solving their tasks in a fully 
qualified way. In the tax area these speculations had more empirical 
backing than in the other areas, where the reform advocates never 
really succeeded in documenting problems in the small municipalities. 
Nevertheless, the tax area was the only area where amalgamations 
were not the solution to the problems in the small municipalities. As 
a rare exception, the central government instead chose to transfer the 
task out of the municipal system.
Apart from the tax area, the functional part of the 2007 municipal 
reform resulted in a considerable transferral of tasks to the new 
municipalities. Most came from the old counties, most importantly 
specialized social services and health care.
within the area of specialized social services, which includes 
institutions for the physically and mentally handicapped, the 2007 
reform presented a new solution to a problem that has been present 
ever since the municipal reform in 1970, namely the tension between 
general and special social services. Until 2007 the special services, 
which are targeted at narrow client groups, were placed with the 
counties, while the municipalities took care of general social services 
targeted at broad groups of clients. However, the special and general 
services cannot be run independently of each other, and this problem 
has given rise to many coordination problems between the counties 
and the municipalities over time. It has also given rise to speculations 
of strategic behavior due to complicated co-financing systems. The 
2007 reform places the responsibility for both special and general 
social services with the new municipalities. From then on, they are 
responsible for referring all handicapped persons to institutionalized 
services. However, the idea was that the new regions should maintain 
responsibility for running the most specialized institutions, which 
need a larger population base than even the new large municipalities 
have. Coordination between the regions and the municipalities would 
take place in a new system of negotiated agreements at the regional 
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level between the region and the municipalities within the region. 
The final solution to the old coordination problem was therefore 
under no circumstances in sight. But the role of the regions turned 
out to be much smaller than the central government expected. The 
municipalities were given the choice to either take over the old 
county institutions or let them be transferred to the new regions. To 
the government’s surprise the municipalities engaged in considerable 
‘empire building’ and decided to take over almost all the counties’ 
old special institutions. They could do this without incurring new 
costs, but had to respect that these institutions should be open to 
clients from other municipalities and that capacity and prices had 
to be coordinated in the new agreements between the regions and 
municipalities. This meant that many municipalities ended up with 
institutions for which they did not have enough clients of their own. 
This again meant that a market was created where municipalities sell 
and buy places in specialized social institutions.
within the health care area, all primary (general practitioners) and 
secondary services (hospitals) have traditionally been the counties’ 
responsibility. The health care part of the 2007 reform was prepared 
by a special working group that investigated three organizational 
models: A local, a regional, and a national health care system. The 
working group recommended that health care continued as a regional 
system, although it wanted fewer regional entities (Indenrigs- og 
Sundhedsministerens rådgivende udvalg 2003). The commission 
responsible for preparing the 2007 reform more or less adopted the 
working group’s conclusion, and ultimately so did the government. 
So although alternative and quite radical organizational models were 
analyzed, there was never any serious threat to the regional health 
care system. However, the 2007 reform nevertheless resulted in not 
insignificant adjustments of the existing system. It both transferred 
some health care functions to the municipalities and made them 
financially co-responsible for hospital services. As to health care 
functions, the municipalities took over rehabilitation of hospital 
patients, health prevention and promotion of healthy life styles. 
As to finances, the municipalities became financially responsible 
for approximately 30 per cent of the costs of having their citizens 
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treated at the regional hospitals. The overall idea was to provide the 
municipalities with an incentive to solve their health tasks efficiently. 
If they are efficient, hospital treatments may be avoided, and because 
of the new co-financing arrangement, this again means that they 
save money. However, this idea rests upon quite heroic assumptions 
(Pedersen, 2005). First, the municipalities do not refer patients to the 
hospitals, which means that there is no automatic connection between 
the municipalities’ and the hospitals’ activities. Second, the municipal 
share of hospital costs is only about 30 per cent. This means that the 
municipalities only save money if their alternative solution costs less 
than one third of a hospital treatment. To support relations between 
municipalities and regions in the new system, the central government 
introduced a formal requirement that they conclude cooperation 
agreements with each other that specify practical arrangements.
From the perspective of the regions, the functional part of the 
2007 reform was a set-back. First, the municipalities were given 
responsibilities within their traditional main function, health care. 
Second, almost all their other traditional functions were taken away. 
Specialized social services were transferred to the municipalities, and 
all their institutions within secondary education were transferred to 
the central government.
In sum, the functional part of the 2007 reform entailed a considerable 
strengthening of the functional base of both the central government 
and the new municipalities, while the new regions were created 
as reduced versions of the old counties. A considerable number 
of employees in the municipalities and counties got a new public 
employer and some had to accept a longer commute to work because 
their work place was relocated as part of the reform. However, no-
one lost their job because of the reform since employment rights were 
legally protected.3 
3 According to the Danish law on employees’ rights in case of transfer of 
undertakings (lov om virksomhedsoverdragelse) employees cannot be laid off because 
their job is transferred to another employer (but it does not protect against dismissal for 
other reasons). This law implements EU rules on safeguarding of employees’ rights.
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3.5 Reforms since the municipal reform in 2007
The labour market
Four major reforms have been undertaken since the 2007 municipal 
reform. The first is a further decentralization of functions to the 
municipalities. In the central government’s original reform plans, 
employment policies within the labour market area were to be fully 
decentralized to the municipalities. Traditionally, employment policy 
has been a divided area in Denmark. The central government has 
been responsible for persons insured in an unemployment fund, while 
municipalities have been responsible for uninsured persons, who 
have to rely on social security in case of unemployment. In 2007, 
the government wanted to create a unified system and decentralize 
it to the municipalities. The Social Democratic Party opposed the 
idea, however, and the government therefore abandoned it, hoping 
to lure them into backing the whole reform project. Even though the 
plan failed, the government did not re-introduce the original idea 
of decentralizing employment policies (Christiansen and Klitgaard, 
2008: 159–193). Most observers thought that yet an attempt to unify 
the employment system had failed, but in the autumn of 2008 the 
government caught most actors by surprise and successfully raised 
its original proposal in the parliamentary negotiations on the 2009 
finance bill. Again it was a narrow compromise that did not include 
the Social Democratic Party, but only the Danish People’s Party and 
the new center party Liberal Alliance. Economic incentives play a 
large role in the new institutional set-up. The municipalities have 
not only taken over the employment services, but also the financial 
responsibility for unemployment benefits. This allegedly provides 
them with an incentive to deliver efficient employment policies, 
because if unemployment goes down, the reduction in expenditures 
on unemployment benefits ends up as municipal savings. However, 
in reality, it is relatively difficult for the individual municipality 
to influence the employment situation, which primarily depends 
on the national economic situation. And macroeconomic policy is 
still a central government responsibility. This means that the new 
responsibilities within the employment area carry considerable 
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economic risks for the individual municipalities. Not surprisingly, 
this fact made the municipalities’ national association demand an 
economic safety net. This was granted in the form of a complicated 
system of grants and reimbursement schemes. From the perspective 
of the individual municipality this makes a lot of sense, but the price 
is that the local incentive to effectively combat unemployment is 
blunted.
The administration of transfer payments
The second reform is an instance of centralization driven by 
digitalization and scale effects. Traditionally, Danish municipalities 
have administered a number of transfer payment schemes even in 
areas without local autonomy, e.g. old age pension. Starting in 2012 
the practical administration of all transfer payments that are fully 
specified by legal regulation are transferred from the municipalities 
to a new organization, Udbetaling Danmark. More specifically, this 
organization takes over the administration of family allowances, 
maternal benefits, housing benefits, early retirement benefits, and 
old age pensions. The reform was the result of pressure for higher 
efficiency by means of digitalization and large-scale operations. This 
pressure had for some years been confined to the central government 
apparatus and led to various reforms, including the establishment of 
central service centers taking over administrative tasks such a wage 
administration, accounting, IT service, and travel administration for 
the central government ministries. But the pressure to obtain these 
apparently free savings was then directed to the municipal sector, and 
soon the question was raised whether the administration of transfer 
payments could not be made more efficient by means of large-scale 
operations and digitalization. After several years of discussion a 
compromise between the government and the municipalities’ national 
association was reached. The government succeeded in centralizing 
the administration of these transfer payments in five centers to be 
established in different parts of the country, and the municipalities 
succeeded in keeping the savings from the reform. Furthermore, 
the municipalities’ national association succeeded in avoiding a full 
central government take-over. The future administration is not placed 
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in a central government agency – like other central government 
transfer payment schemes, e.g. student benefits – but with a the 
new organization, Udbetaling Danmark. This is a self-governing 
organization with a majority of municipal representatives in its 
governing board.
Budget and account systems
The third reform is an example of a silent change that has gone 
unnoticed by the public, but which may have important implications. 
In the wake of the 1970 municipal reform a standardized municipal 
budget and account system was introduced. This was a big step 
forward because it made it possible to measure total expenditure 
spent by the local government sector and to compare individual 
municipalities with each other on a standardized basis. The system 
was based on the cash flow principle, according to which expenditure 
is measured when it is spent. This principle favors macroeconomic 
control because it precisely measures the economic activity impulse 
from the local government sector. It also makes it easier to estimate 
tax needs and to plan liquidity usage. In contrast, systems based on 
the accrual principle, which measures costs rather than expenditure, 
make it easier to estimate the precise costs of public production which 
is advantageous when, for example, public services are contracted 
out. The debate about the relative pros and cons of the cash flow 
and accrual principle is long-standing, and public budget and account 
systems have shifted back and forth between the two principles over 
time. For example, in the wake of the breakthrough of Keynesianism 
after World War II many countries opted for the cash flow system, 
which facilitates macroeconomic control policies. Today, many 
countries return to the accrual principle because comparisons of public 
and private service production, contracting out, and privatization are 
more politically salient phenomena (Blöndal, 2003). In Denmark, 
the central government has recently opted for the accrual principle, 
although with important exceptions (Finansministeriet, 2003). The 
situation in the local government sector has been discussed between 
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the central government and the municipalities’ national association 
for more than ten years. The accrual principle has been gradually 
introduced, first in the area of local public utilities and then expanded, 
but only to accounts, not budgets. But the municipal budget and account 
system was changed to make both accrual accounting and budgeting 
possible. However, the municipalities’ national association, worried 
about the administrative costs of this reform, increasingly took up 
the issue in the annual negotiations with the central government, and 
in 2010 succeeded in making the choice between the two systems 
voluntary for the individual municipality. The situation today is that 
accrual budgeting and accounting is possible in the municipal sector, 
but not obligatory. 4
Inter-municipal equalization schemes
The fourth and final major reform after the 2007 municipal reform 
concerns the inter-municipal equalization system. This system was 
reformed in connection with the 2007 reform and then again in 2009 
and 2012. The latter reforms were the result of pressure that had built 
up as a consequence of the 2007 reform. The equalization system 
transfers large amounts from rich to poor municipalities in order 
to enable the municipalities to offer local services to their citizens 
at comparable tax prices. Although there is consensus among local 
politicians about the idea behind the system, the equalization level 
and the exact measurement of expenditure needs and tax bases is, 
not surprisingly, controversial since these issues may have important 
economic implications, and because the situation is a zero-sum 
game where gains for one municipality mean losses for another. In 
the wake of the 2007 reform a large-scale reform of the equalization 
system was undertaken. Changes that had been discussed for years 
were carried out. Most importantly, the distribution mechanism of 
the general block grant was changed from tax base to number of 
inhabitants, corporate taxation was included in the equalization 
of tax bases, special grants were abolished, the measurement of 
expenditure needs was changed, and the overall equalization level 
4 All municipalities must register expenditure according to the cash-flow principle 
in the uniform budget and account system. The system allows voluntary extra registrations 
according to the accrual principle.
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was increased. The exact distributional implications of this reform 
were difficult to estimate precisely because of the simultaneous 
amalgamations. However, a number of poor municipalities felt that 
the reform was not far-reaching enough. ‘Equalization rebellions’ 
have been seen before in Danish intergovernmental relations, but this 
time the poor municipalities were more vehement and insistent than 
on previous occasions. Maybe the amalgamations played a role here, 
because before 2007 the poor municipalities tended to be small rural 
municipalities without much influence in national politics. But in the 
post-2007 system poor municipalities have more political muscle. 
An alliance of 39 municipalities launched an equalization campaign 
against the municipalities’ national association, the government, and 
the Danish Parliament, Folketinget. Their main target of criticism 
was the measurement of expenditure needs, which they felt led to 
under-compensation of their true needs. The campaign paid off. A 
first response was given in 2009 when the measurement of the socio-
economic expenditure needs was adjusted. This led to some gains 
for the poor municipalities, but far from satisfied ‘the 39’, as they 
were now known. In 2011 the government changed, and a coalition 
led by the Social Democratic Party took over from the Liberal-
Conservative government. ‘The 39’ intensified their campaign, 
and the new government agreed to an overhaul of the equalization 
system. This was done in 2012, and changes will become effective 
in 2013. The government tried to downplay the implications of the 
overhaul and labeled it an adjustment rather than a reform, since 
changes were (mostly) kept to a recalibration of the measurements 
of expenditure needs. However, seen from the perspective of the 
individual municipalities the changes were considerable. Gains for 
a number of poor municipalities exceed 0.5 income tax percentage 
points, while losses for rich municipalities in some cases are as high 
a 0.3–0.4 income tax percentage points (LF 191/2012).
3.6 Effects of the 2007 municipal reform
This section discusses three types of consequences of the 2007 
reform. First, the implications of the municipal amalgamations for 
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local democracy were intensively discussed before the reform. Small 
municipalities were widely considered to be more democratic than 
large ones, so worries of a democratic loss were widespread. Second, 
inefficient service production in the small municipalities was one 
of the main arguments for the amalgamations. The argument was 
disputed at the time, but did amalgamations increase efficiency? 
Third, before 2007 local and regional governments led separate lives 
in the Danish public sector, but the functional part of the 2007 reform 
forced them to work closely together in health care and specialized 
social services. How does local-regional coordination work in 
practice? 
Local democracy
There is a long debate on the democratic pros and cons of small 
versus large municipalities. Advocates of small units argue that 
smallness facilitates citizens’ participation in politics, enhances 
their trust in their own political competence, and breeds civic 
consensus. It makes politics less abstract and increases politicians’ 
responsiveness to citizen views. It spreads political power, furthers 
control over government, increases political accountability and 
facilitates exit-based empowerment of citizens. However, there are 
also important democratic arguments against small jurisdictions. In 
large jurisdictions, there is allegedly more diversity in beliefs and 
values, and politics becomes more competitive and professionalized. 
Large units have greater system capacity and can supply a greater 
range of public services. They are less vulnerable to the influence 
of local business and have more serious media coverage of local 
politics. They also have more organizational activity and thus more 
community groups, interest organizations and political parties (Dahl 
and Tufte 1973; Treisman 2007).
Before the municipal amalgamations in 2007 the traditional view 
in Denmark was that local democracy is best served in small units. 
This was also the result reached by researchers of local democracy 
who compared democracy in small and large municipalities (e.g. 
Mouritzen, 1999). However, the most comprehensive review of 
size and local democracy before 2007 was published immediately 
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before the government’s decision on the amalgamations. This was a 
report by a group of local government researchers who investigated 
the relationship between the size of municipalities and a number of 
democratic features such as local identity, interest in and knowledge 
of politics, participation, trust, and satisfaction (Kjær and Mouritzen, 
2003a). Their results showed that, measured according to these 
standards, there is no clear relationship between democracy and 
the size of municipalities. The researchers concluded that “Large 
municipalities are not less democratic than small ones” (Kjær and 
Mouritzen, 2003b: 193). Their report was published in the autumn 
of 2003, a few months before the government’s commission on the 
need for a municipal reform completed its work. The researchers’ 
conclusion was immediately used as an argument that there are 
no democratic costs of amalgamations. In this way an important 
argument used by reform skeptics was wiped off the table.
After the amalgamations, it has become possible not only to compare 
democracy in small and large municipalities in a cross-sectional 
perspective. Now, democracy can be studied in municipalities that 
have undergone a change from small to large units. So far, two 
studies have been completed. The first is by Kjær and Olsen (2004, 
2006), who investigate the situation on the island of Bornholm where 
five municipalities were amalgamated into one in 2003. They find a 
remarkable decline in a number of indicators of local democracy, but 
also some signs that the situation may have improved somewhat after 
a couple of years. The second is by Lassen and Serritzlew (2011). 
They focus on one democratic indicator, citizens’ political self-
confidence (socalled internal political efficacy), and their study 
includes all Danish municipalities before and after the 2007 
amalgamations. They find that the amalgamations led to a considerable 
decline in political self-confidence. In sum, this evidence suggests 
that the Danish amalgamations came at a cost for local democracy.
Efficiency in the municipal sector
From an economic perspective, there are also important arguments 
both for and against small municipalities. For many years economists 
have argued that small entities create the potential for welfare gains 
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because public services can be better tailored to local preferences 
(Oates 1972) or because citizens can move to localities that offer the 
ideal tax-service package (Tiebout 1956). However, an equally long-
lived counter-argument holds that large jurisdictions are more cost-
effective due to economies of scale in the production of many public 
functions (Hirsch, 1959).
The latter argument carried considerable weight in the Danish 
debate before the 2007 amalgamations. The general view was that 
the relationship between efficiency and municipality size was curve-
linear. At the outset there are gains by going from small to somewhat 
larger municipalities, but gradually the gains flatten before they 
disappear at a municipality size of about 30–40,000 inhabitants. Above 
a certain threshold costs then start to increase again (Mouritzen, 1999, 
Houlberg, 2000). This view was also promoted by the government’s 
commission on the need for a municipal reform. But the view was not 
unchallenged. A study using different methods found no particular 
relationship between size and efficiency (Blom-Hansen and Larsen, 
2005).
All efficiency studies made before the 2007 amalgamations relied on 
cross-sectional comparisons of small and large municipalities. After 
the reform it has become possible to study how efficiency develops 
in municipalities that undergo a change in size from small to large. 
So far, only two studies that both focus on administrative costs have 
been completed. The costs, of course, only constitute a minor share 
of all municipal costs. But in most other policy areas scale effects in 
local government are a question of the size of institutions, not the size 
of the municipality (Boyne, 1995). For instance, in the school area 
most expenditure (wages to teachers, teaching material, buildings) is 
spent at the level of the individual schools, so the most relevant scale 
question in this area is whether small schools are more expensive 
than large ones. Therefore, scale effects at the municipal level are 
most likely to be in the central administrative area. The first study 
is conducted by the local government evaluation institute, Krevi 
(Krevi, 2011), the second by Blom-Hansen, Houlberg and Serritzlew 
(2012, see also Houlberg 2011). Both studies find that administrative 
Jens Blom-Hansen
67
costs decline in municipalities that undergo amalgamations. The 
findings by Blom-Hansen, Houlberg and Serrritzlew are summarized 
in Figure 1, which shows the isolated effect of amalgamations after 
other relevant factors are taken into account (urbanization, changes 
in functional responsibilities, island status, social conditions, fiscal 
pressure and decentralization of administrative staff). It shows that 
until 2009 administrative costs increased in all municipalities, but 
to a lesser extent in amalgamated ones. In 2010 administrative 
costs declined in all municipalities, most likely as a reaction to the 
fiscal crisis. The gap that developed between amalgamated and non-
amalgamated municipalities in 2008 indicates that amalgamations 
indeed make efficiency gains possible.
Figure 1  Predicted administrative spending in Danish 
municipalities 2005–2010 (DKK per capita)
 
Note: The figure shows the predicted administrative spending per capita for the amalgamated 
and non-amalgamated municipalities. The predicted values are computed from a multivariate 
regression model. All control variables are set to sample means. See Blom-Hansen, Houlberg 
and Serritzlew (2012) for further details.
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Local-regional coordination of health care and specialized social 
service
Before the 2007 reform municipalities and regional governments, the 
counties did not need to coordinate their activities to any great extent. 
The government’s ambition when dividing tasks across tiers in the 
public sector was to create the clearest possible division in order to 
make both financial and political responsibility as clear as possible to 
citizens. Of course, this ideal could not be completely achieved. The 
hospital sector organized at the regional level has always had a need 
to cooperate with the old age care systems organized at the local level; 
the primary school systems organized by the municipalities have 
always had to cooperate with the secondary educational institutions 
organized at the regional level; and the specialized social institutions 
organized at the regional level have always had to cooperate with the 
general social service system at the local level. But the ambition was 
to have clear and separate functional responsibilities.
This ambition was given up in 2007 when the municipalities took 
over responsibility for all social services, also the hitherto specialized 
regional functions and part of the regional health care system. In 
these areas municipalities and regions now have to cooperate and 
coordinate their activities to an unprecedented extent.
As noted above, in the area of specialized social services, the 
municipalities were given the choice whether to take over the old 
county institutions or let them be transferred to the new regions. In 
the end they took over almost all the counties’ old special institutions, 
and many municipalities ended up with institutions for which they 
did not have enough clients of their own. This created a market where 
municipalities sell and buy places in specialized social institutions. 
As a consequence, two coordination challenges have arisen. Not only 
do municipalities and regions need to coordinate activity levels in the 
municipal institutions and the few remaining regional institutions. 
They also need to coordinate activities in relation to one another 
since many municipalities have clients placed in institutions run by 
other municipalities.
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To ease these coordination challenges, two adjustments have been 
introduced since 2007. First, the competence to refer clients to 
institutions has been coupled with the financial responsibility. The 
2007 reform meant that the municipality of residence could decide 
activity levels and treatments and have all costs reimbursed by the 
home municipality. But in 2009 referral competence and financial 
responsibility were coupled so that the home municipality is responsible 
for both decisions on activity levels and costs. Expenditure and its 
financing are thus decided by the same actor. Second, the system 
of agreements between the regions and the municipalities has been 
changed. The 2007 reform introduced a system according to which 
municipalities and regions enter negotiated agreements on prices 
and activity levels. This system was created with the expectation 
that most of the specialized institutions would be run by the regions, 
which would then sell places to the municipalities. The purpose of 
the agreements was therefore to control the regional institutions and 
their capacity, price policy and activity levels. As a consequence, 
the regions were made responsible for organizing negotiation of the 
agreements. But since the municipalities chose to take over most of 
the regions’ institutions, selling and buying of places mostly takes 
place between municipalities, not between municipalities and regions. 
In 2010 the system was therefore changed so that the agreements 
focused more on inter-municipal expenditure control and professional 
development and less on municipal-regional relations. The formal 
responsibility for organizing negotiation of the agreements was also 
transferred from the regions to the municipalities. Gradually a system 
has been installed in which municipalities are getting used to inter-
municipal coordination of capacity, prices, professional development 
and expenditure control.
In the health care area, the 2007 reform meant that the municipalities 
took over rehabilitation of hospital patients, health prevention and 
promotion of healthy life styles. In addition, the municipalities 
became financially responsible for approximately 30 per cent of 
the costs of having their citizens treated at the regional hospitals. 
In the years after 2007 the municipalities’ main challenge has been 
to establish the organizational set-up for delivering their new health 
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tasks. The challenge has been to create a structure that secures that 
the health area is coordinated with related municipal areas, especially 
old age care. The municipalities have handled this challenge in 
different ways. Some establish new health departments within the 
municipal administration, others integrate the health area in existing 
departments, typically the social departments. Many municipalities 
also establish health centers, where professionals cooperate across 
administrative and professional boundaries on prevention and 
rehabilitation. Another challenge is to establish good relations with 
the regions. This is done by way of new agreements which the 
municipalities and regions have to make on activity levels, division 
of work, planning of discharges, etc. But the central government has 
also encouraged good municipal-regional relations by offering grants 
for well-planned patient processes across government boundaries. 
Finally, in to increase the municipalities’ financial incentive to deliver 
efficient health services their co-financing of regional hospital costs 
was raised from 30 to 34 per cent in 2010.
The new need to coordinate activities regionally among municipalities 
and between municipalities and the region has led to a new regional 
coordination game in which actors invest considerable resources in 
forming alliances in order to pursue their interests. The municipalities’ 
national association has established regional offices that support the 
municipalities’ regional interactions with their region. This is used as 
a forum by the municipalities to coordinate negotiation tactics vis-à-
vis the region. But municipalities are also sometimes pitted against 
each other. In specialized social services, some municipalities sell 
places while others buy them. In the health area, municipalities may 
have diverging interests in their interactions with the region, for 
example in relation to the location of new hospitals or closing down 
existing ones. A new game of inter-municipal alliance-building is 
therefore developing in both areas (Heeager, 2012).
Jens Blom-Hansen
71
3.7 Challenges since 2007: Controlling local 
expenditure 
Controlling the municipalities’ expenditure has been the main 
challenge in the years after the 2007 reform; partly because local 
expenditure rose dramatically in the first years after the reform, partly 
because the financial crisis from 2009 made control more salient for 
the central government. The government has met this challenge by 
introducing ever tighter control of local economic dispositions.
Controlling expenditure in the local government sector is no new 
challenge for the Danish central government. Ever since the 1970 
municipal reform, local governments have been responsible for a 
large share of the Danish public budget. Macroeconomic control has 
therefore for a long time been difficult without some coordination 
of local economic dispositions with the central government’s 
macroeconomic policy goals. The Danish solution to this challenge 
has been a system of annual negotiations and agreements between 
the central government and the municipalities’ national association 
(Kommunernes Landsforening) and the regions’ national association 
(Amtsrådsforeningen before 2007, Danske Regioner after 2007), the 
so called budgetary cooperation between central, local and regional 
government. The annual agreements contain guidelines for the overall 
expenditure and taxation level in the municipal and regional sector.
During the reform years 2004–2007 this negotiation system was 
formally kept intact, but in reality control of local expenditure 
was achieved by strict legal regulation by the central government. 
To counter a flurry of unsound economic dispositions before the 
amalgamations, the central government introduced a number of 
control measures, including central approval systems for local 
investments, obligatory saving schemes for socalled surplus 
liquid means (i.e., liquid means above a certain amount), approval 
systems for supplementary appropriations, fees on supplementary 
appropriations, and local tax freezes. It is not easy to evaluate how 
successful these measures were. It is unquestionable that some 
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‘spending before closing time’ took place (Blom-Hansen, 2010), but 
this would probably have been more widespread in the absence of the 
government’s counter measures.
The government’s strict course was widely accepted by the 
municipalities and their national association. But the implicit 
condition was that the controls were loosened once the amalgamations 
were in place. In 2007, the first year after the reform, the central 
government kept the tight regime in place and dictated the tax rates 
of all the new municipalities. But then all controls were lifted, and in 
the spring of 2007 negotiations between the central government and 
the local government association were started anew. The negotiations 
led to a traditional and relatively gentle agreement, which made room 
for some increase in both expenditure and taxation. Apparently, the 
system was back to normal.
But when the municipalities’ 2008 budgets were completed 
some months afterwards, it became clear that the agreement was 
broken to an unprecedented extent. Municipal expenditure exceeded 
the agreed guideline by more than 1 billion DKK, and taxation 
exceeded the agreement by more than 1.5 billion DKK. The breach 
of the agreement had historical dimensions, and the municipalities’ 
national association gave up trying to explain it away or pleading for 
a triviality limit. Initially the government did not react because the 
situation coincided with the national election in the autumn of 2007. 
But in the spring of 2008 the government introduced the so-called 
sanction legislation, which was gradually tightened the following 
years. The sanction laws, enacted with the help of the right-wing 
Danish People’s Party, aimed at both expenditure and taxation in the 
municipalities. On the expenditure side, a rule was introduced that 
allows the central government to withhold 1 billion DKK from the 
general block grant if municipal budgets do not respect the agreed 
expenditure guidelines. This became known as the conditional block 
grant. On the taxation side, sanctions for tax rises were introduced. If 
municipal budgets include tax rises exceeding the agreed guidelines, 
a corresponding cut in the general block grant is implemented. The 
revenue effect of the tax rise is thus neutralized.
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while the new sanction system on the expenditure side – that is, the 
potential withholding of the general block grant – was collective, the 
tax sanctions combined individual and collective elements. In the first 
year 75 per cent of the revenue generated by a local tax increase is offset 
by a corresponding cut in the individual municipality’s grant from the 
central government. The remaining 25 per cent is neutralized by a cut 
in the general block grant, which is allocated among municipalities 
in proportion to jurisdiction size. The individual sanction is gradually 
phased out, with a corresponding increase in the collective element, 
cf. Table 6. As is also evident from this table, the central government 
strengthened the individual element in 2010 (effective 2011) making 
it even more unattractive, from the perspective of the individual 
municipality, to increase local taxes as seen. 
Table 6  Municipal tax limitations in Denmark
Individual sanction (%) Collective sanction (%)
Act 477/2008 Year 1: 75 Year 1: 25
(effective from 2009) Year 2: 50 Year 2: 50
Year 3-: 0 Year 3-: 100
Act 709/2010 Year 1: 75 Year 1: 25
(effective from 2011) Year 2: 50 Year 2: 50
Year 3: 50 Year 3: 50
Year 4: 25 Year 4: 75
Year 5-: 0 Year 5-: 100
 
The sanctions were effective from 2009, and they worked. In the 
spring of 2008 an agreement was, as usual, negotiated between the 
government and the municipalities’ national association. Again, it 
contained guidelines on municipal expenditure and tax levels in the 
coming year. when the municipal 2009 budgets were subsequently 
completed, they respected the guidelines. This fact is a direct result 
of the sanction system which focused on the municipal budgets. But 
one and a half years later, the drawback of focusing exclusively on 
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budgets became clear. The accounts showed that the budgets were 
exceeded dramatically – by a full 5 billion DKK. Budget overruns 
of this magnitude are unprecedented. For two consecutive years, 
the municipalities had now had remarkable difficulties controlling 
expenditure. Problems were not least evident in the new areas which 
the municipalities had taken over in the 2007 municipal reform. Half 
of the 2009 budget overrun was in specialized social services, which 
the municipalities had taken over from the old counties.
The government’s reaction was to tighten the screws in the sanction 
system. Again this was done with the help of the Danish People’s 
Party. On the taxation side, the individual element of the sanctions 
was increased, cf. Table 6. On the expenditure side, the system of 
conditional block grants was expanded. First, the government raised 
the conditional element from 1 to 3 billion DKK in case municipal 
budgets did not respect the guidelines in the annual agreement. 
Second, the system was extended to include accounts. If accounts 
do not respect the budgets, the general block grant is reduced 
correspondingly, but within a limit of 3 billion DKK.
The sanction system has been even further refined after this change. 
In 2011, the sanction for budget overruns was changed from a purely 
collective sanction to one including both individual and collective 
elements. According to this change, in case of budget overruns, 60 
per cent of the overruns are neutralized individually, while only 40 
per cent are collective.
The screws were further tightened in the spring of 2012 in 
connection with the introduction of a general Danish budget law. 
The law implements the EU’s financial pact in Denmark, but the 
government used the occasion to increase municipal expenditure 
control even further. Two new elements were added to the sanction 
system. First, the combination of individual and collective elements 
in the conditional block grant system was extended. From now on, 
it not only holds in relation to accounts exceeding budgets, but also 
to budgets exceeding the agreed guidelines. Again, 60 per cent are 
neutralized individually, while 40 per cent are collective. Second, 
Jens Blom-Hansen
75
the requirement to balance budgets was tightened. It has always 
been obligatory for Danish municipalities to balance their budgets, 
but the exact nature of the requirement has been relatively vague. 
For instance, it includes loans. Now, the requirement to balance 
budgets is supplemented with a stipulation that focuses exclusively 
on current expenditure and income and requires not only a balance, 
but a surplus5.
Table 7  The sanction system in relation to municipal taxation 
and expenditure
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Taxation sanctions :
Sanction for tax rises in violation of 
guidelines in agreement between the 
government and the municipalities’ national 
association (revenue neutralized by cuts in 
block grant)
+ + ++ ++ ++
Expenditure sanctions :
Budgets:
Sanction for expenditure level exceeding 
guidelines in agreement between the 
government and the municipalities’ national 
association (conditional blockgrant)
Accounts:
Sanction for accounts exceeding budgets 
(conditional blockgrant)
Requirement to balance the budget :
Balanced budget + + + + ++
+ + ++ ++ +++
- - + + ++
Note: ‘+’ indicates that the sanction is in place. Increasing numbers of ‘+’ indicates a 
tightening of the sanction
5 The new balance rules will be specified in detail in an executive decree from the 
government. The budget law, enacted in June 2012, only includes a delegation provision to 
this effect.
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In sum, over the years 2008–2012 the Danish central government 
has introduced and gradually refined a system of central control of 
municipal expenditure and taxation that constitutes a remarkable 
break with the Danish tradition of local autonomy. It has been a 
silent revolution that has gone unnoticed by the media as well as 
the population. It has also been an area of parliamentary consensus. 
Until the government change in 2011 all changes were introduced 
by the Liberal-Conservative government with the help of the right-
wing Danish People’s Party. This might indicate that the left wing of 
the Danish parliament disagreed with the sanction system. However, 
when the left wing government led by the Social Democratic Party 
took over in 2011, it did not roll back the system. On the contrary, 
the screws in the system were tightened even further. The gradual 
introduction of the sanction system is summarized in Table 7.
The sanction system works. In both 2010 and 2011 the agreements 
were kept, both in the municipal budgets and the accounts. In addition, 
the sanction system has enabled the government to actively use 
municipal budgets to help cut down public expenditure in the wake 
of the financial crisis beginning in 2009. Figure 2 shows municipal 
wage expenditure in the years 2007–2012, according to both budgets 
and accounts. wages are the most direct measure of controllable 
expenditure in the municipal sector so the figure indicates the result of 
general expenditure control measures. The dramatic increase in 2008 
and 2009 is evident from the figure. It is also evident that accounts 
exceed budgets, especially in 2009. However, 2009 represents a 
peak. From then on the central government has not only succeeded 
in bringing down local expenditure, but also in aligning budgets and 
accounts. Expenditure has been reduced across the board in local 
budgets. So far, reductions have not led to service or quality reductions 
in local services that have generated widespread local protests. In the 
service areas cuts have been facilitated by the closure and merging 
of service providing institutions, especially in the school area where 
a long term trend to close and merge schools has been accelerated in 
the past 4–5 years (Bækgaard, 2010).
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Figure 2 Municipalities’ expenditure on wages 2007–2012 
(thousand DKK, 2012 price level)
Source: Statistics Denmark 
Deflator: Municipal price and wage factor
3.8 new reforms? the government’s 2013 evaluation 
of the 2007 reform 
The Danish 2007 municipal reform is now five years old. As is evident 
from the previous sections, there have been various adjustments 
since 2007, but no major changes. Speculations of new reforms 
have mostly focused on the regions. Their existence has never been 
completely secured or accepted. Indeed, before 2007 the old counties 
were often threatened with abolishment. To make matters worse, an 
evaluation in 2010 showed that the political system in the regions 
is organized in a way that creates considerable frustration among 
regional politicians (Mouritzen, 2010). The regions are not allowed 
to establish permanent committees under the regional councils. This 
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concentrates power in the hands of the regional chairman and the 
regional administrative system. Influence for ordinary members of 
the regional council is reduced, which again makes it harder to recruit 
candidates for regional elections.
Immediately before the national elections in 2011 the Liberal-
Conservative government negotiated the future of the regions with 
its support party, the Danish People’s Party, and agreed to abolish 
the regions and transfer the hospitals to the central government 
(Regeringen og Dansk Folkeparti 2011). It was a short agreement on 
principles that would be specified in detail on the basis of subsequent 
in-depth inquiry by government working groups. But the agreement 
increased the salience of the issue in the ensuing election campaign. 
The parties constituting the alternative to the Liberal-Conservative 
government promised not to abolish the counties if they won the 
elections, but instead to evaluate the whole 2007 reform complex. 
Having won the elections, the new government under Social 
Democratic leadership included in its detailed government platform 
an evaluation of the division of functions between regions and 
municipalities (Regeringen, 2011: 64). The evaluation would focus 
on the part of the 2007 reform dealing with functions, but would 
not evaluate the existence of the regions or the municipal 
amalgamations. It would not evaluate the basic distribution of 
functions across tiers, but focus on coordination problems in areas 
of divided responsibility. In other words, the evaluation was good 
news for the regions whose existence and functional responsibilities 
were not put at risk. The evaluation was initiated in February 2012 
and organized under the Ministry of Economics and Interior Affairs. 
Four working groups with representatives from the government 
ministries and the associations of municipalities and regions, but no 
outside experts, will investigate the distribution of functions between 
the central government, the regions and the municipalities in the 
following areas: Health care, environmental protection, regional 
development, and specialized social service. The working groups are 
to complete their work in the autumn of 2012. The government’s goal 
is then to draw the conclusions from the evaluation in the spring of 
2013.
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The quantity and quality of local public services and the efficiency 
with which they are delivered in a metropolitan area depend, to a 
considerable extent, on how its governance institutions – especially its 
formal governmental structures – function.  Governance determines 
how efficiently costs are shared throughout the metropolitan area as 
well as how  service delivery is coordinated across local government 
boundaries, how effectively local residents and businesses can access 
governments and influence their decisions, and how accountable local 
governments are to their citizens and how responsive they are to their 
demands. And of course all these relationships themselves affect both 
the nature and operation of governance institutions. 
what is the appropriate governance structure for metropolitan areas? 
How can services which extend beyond local government boundaries 
be delivered and financed? Are some local governments even within 
metropolitan areas too small to be able to deliver and finance important 
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services?1 How can service delivery be coordinated when different 
jurisdictions are involved? Should large cities be governed by a single 
tier government or are some cities simply too large and complex for 
such an arrangement? How well does voluntary cooperation among 
local governments within a metropolitan area work?
This paper reviews different ways in which the formal governance 
of metropolitan areas may be restructured, focusing in particular on 
municipal mergers with the case of Toronto, Canada, as an example. 
Section 4.1 begins by setting out some criteria that may be used 
to evaluate mergers and other ways of restructuring metropolitan 
governance. Section 4.2 reviews the advantages and disadvantages 
of local mergers in particular, while Section 4.3 considers such 
alternatives to mergers as two-tier structures, voluntary cooperation, 
and special districts. Section 4.4 discusses in some detail the 
convoluted history of amalgamation in Toronto and evaluates what 
it has achieved. Section 4.5 concludes with a brief consideration of 
whether the Toronto experience suggests any lessons for Finnish 
metropolitan areas. 
4.1  Criteria for evaluating local governance 
structures
A common reason for considering municipal amalgamation is 
to improve the effectiveness and efficiency with which local 
governments deliver services. In Finland, this consideration seems 
not only to have been the main reason for the considerable number of 
municipal mergers that have taken place in recent years (Association 
2011) but also to be the primary driver behind the intention to move 
still further in this direction (Moisio 2011a). Municipal amalgamation 
is seen primarily as a way to ensure that Finnish municipalities will be 
sufficiently large to be financially and technically capable of ensuring 
effective, efficient and sustainable provision of the extensive array of 
social services with which they are charged. In more general terms, 
1 we do not discuss in this paper the quite different problems that may arise in 
financing public services in small and remote communities (Kitchen and Slack 2006).
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the intention appears to be to ensure that municipalities will be able 
not only to reap economies of scale but also to coordinate service 
delivery over their entire (enlarged) territory as well as to share costs 
equitably and to reduce (even eliminate) spillovers of service delivery 
across local boundaries.
These objectives are certainly legitimate, and may indeed suggest that 
larger consolidated government units would produce better outcomes 
than small separate municipalities.  Most countries have dealt with 
such issues ‘vertically’ – by superimposing such units ‘on top of’ 
existing units or by shifting services ‘upwards’ to higher levels – 
rather than ‘horizontally’, simply by enlarging municipal boundaries. 
One reason such alternative approaches are followed is because 
relatively small government units are considered to play an important 
role in ensuring adequate local ‘voice’ and accountability. These 
issues have mainly been discussed in other countries with respect to 
the governance of metropolitan regions although  no ‘one size fits all’ 
model has emerged from this discussion (Bird and Slack 2008).  As 
is often the case with institutional design, while the questions to be 
dealt with seem universal, the answers are invariably highly context-
specific, and policy choices are seldom clear cut (Stren and Cameron 
2005).
The ‘subsidiarity principle,’ for example, suggests that the efficient 
provision of services requires decision-making to be carried out by 
the level of government that is closest to the individual citizen so that 
resources will be allocated with the greatest efficiency, accountability, 
and responsiveness.2  when there are local differences in tastes and 
costs, there are clear efficiency gains from delivering services in as 
decentralized a fashion as possible. Smaller, fragmented general-
purpose government units may also stimulate competition between 
local jurisdictions for mobile residents and tax bases that will induce 
them to offer the best possible mix of taxes and services (Klink 
2 The subsidiarity principle, included in the Treaty of the European Union in 1992 
in the context of the division of powers and responsibilities between European governmental 
bodies and their member countries, has been applied to the role and structure of government 
at all levels (Barnett 1997). 
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2008).3  Access and accountability – both of which depend to a 
considerable degree upon the extent to which citizens have access to 
local government through public meetings, hearings, elections, and 
direct contacts with officials – also appear easier to achieve when 
local government units are smaller and more fragmented (Faguet 
2004, 2011).  The larger the local government, the more likely it is 
that special interest groups will dominate citizen participation (Bish 
2001).
On the other hand, a larger and more consolidated government 
structure may be able to take advantage of economies of scale in service 
provision as well as savings in administrative overhead, thus reaping 
lower per unit costs as the amount of the service delivered increases.4  
The existence of externalities (inter-jurisdictional spillovers) may 
require a larger government jurisdiction to ensure that all benefits 
of a particular public service are enjoyed within the boundaries of 
that jurisdiction. A larger government jurisdiction with a stronger 
administrative and fiscal base may also help all communities in a 
given area – both those with high needs and a small tax base and those 
with low needs and a small tax base – to provide an adequate level of 
service. In economic (and fiscal) terms, the choice of an appropriate 
governance structure for a metropolitan area depends upon how one 
weighs these conflicting considerations – efficiency, responsiveness, 
and accountability versus economies of scale, externalities, and the 
capacity to deliver and coordinate services. 
4.2  to merge or not to merge
In a one-tier structure, one political body makes taxing and 
spending decisions for the metropolitan area.5 Even within a unified 
3 Such competition is perhaps especially important with respect to the adaptability 
that is increasingly a critical aspect of effective local governance in a global economy. As 
noted by Berry (2009), however, fragmenting governance among special-purpose districts is 
unlikely to have any beneficial competitive effects.
4 On the other hand, some evidence suggests that costs are higher for larger 
government units because of “bureaucratic congestion” (Boyne 1992, 336) and other factors. 
Economies of scale are discussed further below.
5 Large, consolidated single-tier governments are generally formed by either 
Enid Slack – Richard M. Bird
87
metropolitan government, however, services need not be provided 
uniformly throughout the metropolitan area. when a one-tier 
municipality is created by amalgamating municipalities, sometimes 
differential services and service levels existing prior to the creation 
of the unified government persist. For example, rural residents do not 
necessarily receive all of the services available to urban residents. 
Presumably, if one reason for amalgamation is to create a jurisdiction 
that encompasses the entire city-region, such differences in service 
delivery and tax rates should not be maintained beyond a short 
transition period.
Consolidated one-tier governments were strongly favoured in the 
seminal study by Bahl and Linn (1992) as providing greater fiscal 
capacity, better service coordination, clearer accountability, more 
streamlined decision-making, and greater efficiency. The larger 
taxable capacity of a consolidated one-tier government increases 
its ability to borrow and to recover capital and operating costs from 
user fees. Services may be funded more fairly because there is a 
wider tax base for sharing the costs of services that benefit taxpayers 
across the region. Large one-tier governments can take advantage of 
economies of scale in service provision. Municipal amalgamations 
may internalize externalities: for example, rural residents outside of 
the original municipal boundary now have to pay for urban services 
that they use.6  
How successful consolidated one-tier governments have been in 
practice at achieving accountability is a matter of debate. A large-
scale one-tier government may reduce access and accountability 
because the jurisdiction becomes too large and bureaucratic. To 
overcome this problem, in some cases community committees have 
amalgamation (the merger of two or more geographically contiguous lower-tier 
municipalities) or annexation (the appropriation of a portion of a municipality by an adjacent 
municipality).  
6 Redrawing boundaries is only a first step in linking taxes to service benefits by 
ensuring that the beneficiaries are located within the jurisdiction providing the services.  The 
critical second step is to identify the benefits received by residents and to tax (or charge) 
them accordingly. For example, while it is fair and efficient to charge rural residents for their 
use of urban services such as recreation facilities and libraries, it is neither fair nor efficient 
to charge them for garbage collection they do not receive (Vojnovic 1998). 
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been established to address local issues, or satellite offices have been 
set up across the municipality where people can pay tax bills, apply 
for building permits, etc. Such devices may – or may not – increase 
accessibility, but they will also to some extent reduce the potential 
cost savings that might otherwise result from a larger government 
unit. 
Also debatable is the extent to which consolidated local governments 
take advantage of economies of scale.7 The empirical evidence is, 
at best, mixed.8 Byrnes and Dollery (2002), for example, reviewed 
research on economies of scale in the UK and the US and concluded 
that only 8 percent of the studies found evidence of economies of 
scale in local government, 29 percent found evidence of U-shaped 
cost curves, 39 percent found no statistical relationship between per 
capita expenditure and population size, and 24 percent found evidence 
of diseconomies of scale. Studies that analyzed specific services (e.g. 
fire, housing) also showed mixed results.  On the whole, as noted 
below, there appear to be few economies of scale with respect to most 
services once municipalities are much larger than 20,000–40,000 or 
so in population. 
Economies of scale depend on the service in question and the units 
of measurement – such as the jurisdiction size or the size of the 
facility. Hirsch (1959), for example, estimated cost functions for 
police services, fire services, refuse collection, water, sewage and 
7 For a good discussion of economies of scale in the provision of local services, see 
Fox and Gurley (2006).
8 There are also problems with the methodology used to measure cost and output 
(Byrnes and Dollery 2002). In most studies, expenditures are used as the measure of cost and 
population is used as the measure of output. Population may not be the best measure of output. 
A larger population may mean greater need for expenditures but the characteristics of the 
population will also influence need. For example, a municipality with a large proportion of 
elderly will have different expenditure needs than one with a younger population of the same 
size; an urban population will have different expenditure needs than a rural population.  The 
density and geographic distribution of population may also be an important factor affecting 
both needs and costs. Furthermore, population does not reflect the non-resident population 
that visits a local government area and uses services. with respect to the measurement of 
cost, expenditures are not always the best proxy because they not only include costs but also 
reflect quality of services and possibly wasteful expenditures. Few studies of economies of 
scale include service levels.
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education and found that expenditures per capita declined with the 
quantity provided for water and sewage (perhaps unsurprisingly, 
given the very heavy infrastructure component of such services) – but 
that there was no similar decline for other urban services generally 
provided by local governments in the US. For some services, 
expenditures per capita actually rose as output expanded, indicating 
that there were diseconomies of scale. Other studies that have 
estimated cost functions have similarly found economies of scale for 
hard services such as water, sewers and transportation but generally 
not for such soft services as police, refuse collection, recreation or 
planning (Bird and Slack 1993). Hard services are capital intensive, 
so large government units can more readily make the substantial 
capital investments needed to extend the water distribution system 
or build a least unit cost size sewage treatment plant, for example 
(Bahl and Linn 1992). Other services, such as policing, are highly 
labour intensive and hence unlikely to show significant economies of 
scale. Presumably much the same can be said with respect to other 
labour intensive services like social services, education, and to some 
extent even health.9  In terms of the importance of the relative size 
of the municipalities in an amalgamation, Kushner and Siegel (2005) 
analyzed whether amalgamations of 29 municipalities in Ontario, 
Canada (in Central Elgin, Chatham, and Kingston) resulted in more 
efficient service delivery. They found lower expenditures following 
amalgamation in Central Elgin, a relatively large township which 
amalgamated with two small adjacent villages but not in the other 
two amalgamations which involved municipalities of relatively equal 
size.
Recent studies in both Canada and Finland have found little evidence 
of economies of scale in large municipalities. Found (2012), for 
example, analyzed economies of scale for fire and police in 445 
municipalities in Ontario, Canada from 2005 to 2008. He found 
that fire services exhibited U-shaped costs with a cost-minimizing 
population of approximately 20,000 residents. Police services also 
9 As Baumol (1967) emphasized, it is precisely the high labour-intensity of many 
public sector services that tends to make such services relatively more expensive as incomes 
(and wages) rise.
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exhibited U-shaped costs with a cost-minimizing population of about 
45,000 residents. In Finland, Moisio, Loikkanen and Oulasvirta 
(2010) reported on a number of studies of the effects of municipal 
mergers on per capita expenditures and found the results to be 
mixed, with the biggest cities showing relatively low cost efficiency 
with respect to basic welfare services. Other studies in Finland that 
focused on specific municipal services (health centres and schooling) 
found the optimal size of the municipality to be somewhere between 
20,000 and 40,000 people (Moisio, Loikkanen and Oulasvirta, 2010). 
The ability to achieve economies of scale depends in part on the 
density of development in the new municipality. A recent study of 
annexation analyzed 952 U.S. cities (with at least 10,000 people) 
that annexed other municipalities between 1992 and 2002 found 
efficiencies from increasing land area but only if the annexation 
was accompanied by higher densities (Edwards and xiao 2009). If 
densities are lower following annexation, per capita expenditures 
may increase or decrease depending on the relationship of the change 
in land area to changes in density. The authors found that service 
delivery and administrative efficiencies are achieved with high density 
developments but compromised with low density developments that 
are spread out and more costly to serve. 
On the whole the empirical evidence on fragmented versus 
consolidated local governments in the U.S. suggests that consolidated 
structures are generally associated with higher spending (Boyne 1992). 
Similarly, the promised cost savings from municipal amalgamations 
in Canada have proven to be elusive (Sancton 1996, Slack 2005).  
when municipalities amalgamate, some duplication is obviously 
eliminated. 10 In particular, the number of politicians and bureaucrats 
may be reduced. On the other hand, when municipalities with 
different service levels and different wage scales merge, expenditures 
may increase.  For example, when the fire departments of several 
municipalities are amalgamated, it is possible to reduce costs by 
10 Service delivery costs could be reduced without changing government boundaries, 
for example, by providing services from one municipality to other municipalities or through 
well-designed and monitored contracting with private sector agents.  
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eliminating a number of fire chiefs. However, all fire fighters in the 
newly amalgamated municipality are doing the same job and working 
for the same employer – the newly created city. Understandably, they 
will want to be paid comparable salaries and benefits, and none will 
be willing to take a pay cut. Salaries and benefits tend to equalize up 
to the highest expenditure municipality.  This upward harmonization 
of wages and salaries generally outweighs any cost savings.11
Competition between municipalities will likely be reduced by 
amalgamation thus weakening incentives to be efficient, to be 
responsive to local needs and to adapt to changing economic 
conditions. Less competition may also lead to higher tax rates. 
Charlot, Paty and Piguet (2012), for example, estimated a model of 
tax setting for the local business tax in French urban municipalities 
from 1993 to 2003 and concluded that a reduction in the number 
of municipalities limits tax competition and increases local business 
tax rates.12 On the other hand, if some localities could not previously 
afford to provide an adequate level of service at a reasonable tax 
rate because they did not have adequate resources, amalgamation 
may allow them to provide a level of service comparable to richer 
localities in the region.
Since mergers seldom result in a political boundary that encompasses 
the entire economic region (Bahl 2010) externalities may still exist 
in transportation, land use planning, and other services. Even if the 
newly consolidated municipality is coterminous with the economic 
region at the time of amalgamation, economic boundaries change 
over time. Political boundaries, on the other hand, are difficult to 
change and only do so occasionally “in big leaps, and often after 
complex procedures” (OECD 2006, 157). As a result, many cities 
need to coordinate services such as transportation and planning 
11 Another reason why costs may increase is that local governments may exploit the 
larger tax base of the newly amalgamated municipality by engaging in last-minute spending 
that results in budget over-runs (Blom-Hansen 2010). Evidence of last-minute spending was 
found in Denmark (Blom-Hansen 2010); evidence of increases in per capita debt prior to 
amalgamation was found for Sweden (Dahlberg 2010).
12 In addition, if intergovernmental transfers to some extent equalize ‘revenue 
capacity’, the cartelization of taxation in the region is strengthened and, as Smart (1998) 
shows, local tax rates tend to be even higher than they would otherwise be.
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with neighbouring municipalities (Slack and Chattopadhyay 2009). 
Frequently, one way this is done is through the creation of ‘special’ 
districts to provide such specific services.  However, as Berry (2009) 
shows, any efficiencies achieved through such specialization are 
often outweighed by the greater ease with which special interests 
may capture special-purpose (one-issue) governance institutions. 
The result is likely to be cost increases to the benefit of interested 
parties rather than cost savings or service delivery efficiencies.
Horizontal consolidation of municipalities through amalgamation, 
merger, or annexation to one tier is not very common around the 
world. In the US and Switzerland the importance attached to local 
autonomy means that there is little or no interest in consolidation. 
In Brazil, larger and richer municipalities fear being exploited by 
poorer municipalities.  The result is that even when they participate 
in metropolitan arrangements such fears generally act as an obstacle 
to their successful operation (Slack and Chattopadhyay 2012).
Nevertheless, there have been some noteworthy examples of 
amalgamation.  In Cape Town, for example, the main rationale for 
amalgamation in 2000 was explicitly to redistribute from rich (former 
‘white’) local authorities to poor (former ‘black’) local authorities 
within the metropolitan areas.  The boundaries of Cape Town were 
deliberately drawn by the Municipal Demarcation Board to merge 
the previous black and white authorities. The result is a one-tier 
municipality with geographic boundaries that cover the economic 
region. Louisville, Kentucky, provides an example of a fairly recent 
city-county consolidation in the US.  However, that merger focused 
only on the city and one county government; cooperation within the 
larger metropolitan region remains minimal. A more interesting case 
is the amalgamation of Toronto in 1998 discussed  in Section 4.
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4.3 Alternatives to municipal mergers13
A major problem with amalgamation as a way to address regional 
issues in a metropolitan area is the likely loss of local accessibility to 
government and government accountability to local residents. This 
section describes briefly three ways in which countries have often 
tried to provide a better balance between regional considerations and 
local responsiveness and accountability – a two-tier model, voluntary 
cooperation, and special districts.
Two-tier model
The two-tier model consists of an upper-tier governing body (usually 
a region, district or metropolitan area) encompassing a fairly large 
geographic area and lower-tier or area municipalities (such as cities, 
towns, villages). In principle, the upper tier should be responsible 
for services that provide region-wide benefits, generate externalities, 
entail some redistribution, and display economies of scale. Services 
that provide local benefits should be the responsibility of the lower 
tier. 
Redistribution is achieved at the upper-tier level through a 
combination of tax and spending policies. Taxes are generally levied 
at uniform rates across the region with the contribution of each lower-
tier municipality to the upper-tier municipality depending upon the 
size of its tax base. The upper-tier government makes expenditures 
on services that benefit the entire city-region and are not necessarily 
distributed among the lower-tier municipalities in the same way 
as revenues are collected. A uniform tax at the upper-tier level 
combined with region-wide expenditures serves to redistribute 
resources from municipalities with relatively large tax bases to 
those with relatively small tax bases. Of course, there may still be 
differentiation in service levels and tax rates with respect to services 
provided by lower-tier municipalities.  
13 This section draws heavily on Bird and Slack (2008).
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Two-tier governance structures can permit any desired degree of 
redistribution. They have potentially important advantages over 
the one-tier model in terms of accountability, efficiency, and local 
responsiveness. Critics of the two-tier model commonly argue that 
costs will be higher because of waste and duplication in the provision 
of services by two levels of government. However, there is little 
evidence to support this argument.  Aspects of the provision of many 
public services can easily be divided among the tiers.  In health and 
education, for example, more specialized (and costly) services can 
be provided regionally with primary services being provided locally. 
with respect to infrastructure (roads, water, etc.) major capital 
projects can be planned, financed, and managed at the regional level, 
with local connections being dealt with at the local level.   Dividing 
responsibility in such ways can also make service provision more 
accountable and responsive to local preferences.  However, two-
tier structures are definitely less transparent and more confusing to 
taxpayers who can seldom determine precisely who is responsible 
for what services. Moreover, the existence of two levels of municipal 
council has been said to lead to considerable “wrangling, inefficient 
decision-making, and delays in implementing policies” (Kitchen 
2002, 312), although the extent to which this is a problem obviously 
depends to a considerable extent upon the precise governance 
structure. 
Metro Vancouver, Canada is an example of a two-tier system 
where the regional district is responsible for delivering a limited 
range of services to twenty-one municipalities, two unincorporated 
areas, and one municipality (for parks only). Metro Vancouver is 
governed by three Boards: the Greater Vancouver Regional District 
Board, the Greater Vancouver Sewerage and Drainage Board, and 
the Greater Vancouver water District Board. There is also a Metro 
Vancouver Housing Corporation.14 Directors are appointed annually 
by their respective local councils (on the basis of representation by 
population) from the politicians who are elected to local councils in 
14 There is also a separate and independent governing body for Translink, Metro 
Vancouver’s regional transportation authority.
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the Metro region and, unsurprisingly, tend more to represent their 
local constituencies than to take a regional perspective. 
Barcelona is a more recent example of a two-tier structure. This new 
body, which came into being in 2011, replaced three metropolitan 
bodies: the Metropolitan Entity of Hydraulic Services and waste 
Management (EMSHTR) which covered 33 municipalities, 
the Metropolitan Transport Entity (EMT) which covered 18 
municipalities, and the Association of Municipalities of the 
Metropolitan Area of Barcelona (MMAMB) which was a voluntary 
body made of 31 municipalities  Not only was the metropolitan 
area greater than that covered by these metropolitan bodies but the 
existence of three different entities in the same metropolitan area, 
each made up of a different number of municipalities, resulted in 
substantial (and unproductive) complexity. Legislation passed by the 
regional Parliament in 2010 significantly modified the governance 
of Barcelona through the creation of an upper tier metropolitan 
government with 36 lower tier jurisdictions.15 The Metropolitan 
Council comprises all of the mayors of the municipalities plus 90 
councillors, the Governing Committee, and the President. The 
President is elected by the Council from among the mayors. This 
new structure may perhaps function better than that in Vancouver 
because there really is a general metro government, though it is too 
soon yet to know.
Voluntary cooperation
Voluntary cooperation has been described as “minimal” government 
restructuring in which there is an “area-wide body based on voluntary 
cooperation between existing units of local government in the 
agglomeration with no permanent, independent institutional status” 
(Sharpe 1995, 12). Such structures, which are common in the US, are 
popular in part because they are easy to create politically and can be 
disbanded equally easily.16 Although the voluntary model does not 
15 For more information on Barcelona, see Bosch, Espasa, and Solé-Vilanova (2012).
16 Although voluntary cooperation has been common in France in the past, 
recent territorial reform has resulted in many municipalities joining a two-tier structure 
(Communautés urbaines) whereby the lower tier municipalities transfer some service 
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include an elected, area-wide government, it is an alternative method 
of recognizing the inter-relationship of localities within a region 
through some form of area-wide arrangement. In contrast to the two-
tier system, which seems generally to be imposed from above (by the 
national or provincial level), the voluntary cooperation model comes 
from below because municipalities choose to cooperate. 
Cooperation takes different forms in different countries but generally 
implies some degree of administrative integration as well as some 
political linkage in that member local governments have some form 
of representation on the boards. Moreover, as a rule, such cooperative 
organizations can levy taxes or collect contributions from the 
municipalities or levy user fees to pay for services.  
Voluntary cooperation is thus a way to provide services across a 
region without resorting to amalgamation. Municipalities retain 
their autonomy with respect to expenditure and tax decisions but at 
the same time can achieve economies of scale in service delivery 
and address externalities associated with service provision (Sharpe 
1995).17 Bel (2011), for example, found that inter-municipal 
cooperation in 186 municipalities in Spain for solid waste services 
resulted in lower costs in 2000. For municipalities with fewer than 
20,000 residents, the average cost was 20 percent lower where there 
was cooperation. For municipalities with under 10,000 residents, the 
costs were 22 percent lower.18 He attributed these lower costs to the 
involvement of small municipalities and the formation of a separate 
government body (the comarca) to oversee the local cooperation.
responsibilities and the setting of the tax rate for the local business tax to the upper tier 
(Gilbert 2011). In 2010, 80 percent of the French population lived in this type of two-tier 
structure.
17 In Finland, for example, the smallest municipalities in particular have formed 
partnerships and cooperative arrangements with other municipalities and the private sector 
to achieve economies of scale (Moisio 2011b). The most common form of cooperation is the 
joint authority in which membership is voluntary except for hospital services and regional 
councils where each municipality is required to belong by law. Authorities are run by boards 
that are indirectly elected by member municipalities.
18 The average cost differences were not significant in cities with a population over 
20,000 residents, however, since they already operate at an optimal scale (Bel 2011).
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Problems of accountability may arise when services are provided by 
another jurisdiction. The voluntary model can work well when policy-
makers in the various local governments have the same objectives. 
It does not work so well, however, when different governments 
have divergent objectives. Some degree of redistribution may or 
may not be accepted by the municipalities involved. Cooperation 
usually involves bargaining, and some municipalities in a region 
may not have much with which to bargain. The problems faced by 
many metropolitan areas – global competition, fiscal disparities, 
sprawl – are so great that any real solution likely requires a governance 
structure that has a permanent institutional status.
The dominant governance model in the metropolitan areas of 
Zurich and Geneva, as in most of Switzerland, is voluntary 
intergovernmental cooperation (including cooperation among the 
three levels of government as well as among local governments 
within the metropolitan area). In the case of Geneva, intergovernmental 
cooperation extends to local government in neighbouring France. 
Intergovernmental cooperation tends to be purpose-oriented, directed 
at services such as electricity, waste disposal, and energy supply. 
Political representation is indirect because decision-making bodies 
for these cooperative schemes are composed of delegates of the 
member communes (Kübler and Rochat 2012). Given the high degree 
of institutional fragmentation, this approach to dealing with inter-
municipal externalities is seen in Switzerland as the most pragmatic 
way of addressing the metropolitan challenges (Kübler and Rochat 
2012). 
Brazil also provides some successful instances of inter-municipal 
cooperation. In 2005, the national government passed legislation to 
promote the creation of municipal consortia. The legislation grants 
legal status to consortia which enables them to get loans and offer 
guarantees on their own. Municipal consortia are also entitled to 
exercise supervisory, regulatory, and planning roles. when the 
state capital is included in an inter-municipal consortium, the state 
government may also (like the federal and cantonal governments 
in Switzerland) take part. In Belo Horizonte, state level incentives, 
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in the form of transfers, were behind a successful inter-municipal 
cooperation in health (Arretche 2012).  
An even less structured form of voluntary cooperation is through 
inter-municipal agreements – formal or informal agreements between 
municipalities to provide specific services, usually with no official 
area-wide body to oversee such arrangements. An example of such 
an inter-municipal agreement is the contract services plan in Los 
Angeles, under which Los Angeles County provides some services 
on behalf of municipalities in the Los Angeles metropolitan area 
on a contract basis.  Similar city-county links occur in other U.S. 
jurisdictions as well (Sharpe 1995). 
Such agreements are generally entered into to reduce costs. They can 
work well for small services that can be contracted out or for sharing 
clearly identifiable costs. Such agreements have proved effective for 
services such as fire fighting and emergency dispatch, maintenance 
of boundary roads, purchasing in bulk, and issuing debentures. This 
approach offers no solution, however, to the need for region-wide 
coordination. Furthermore, inter-municipal agreements generally 
provide no clear public accountability except through the contract or 
agreement. If something goes wrong, it may be difficult for citizens 
to know whether to complain to their local government or to the 
local government that has been contracted to provide the service. 
Experience suggests that inter-municipal agreements may increase 
the likelihood of inter-municipal litigation and conflicts (GTA Task 
Force 1996). Such agreements may be successful in achieving 
coordination and efficiencies for specific services, but they are not 
suitable for achieving region-wide coordination. Indeed, they have 
been described as second-best solutions to reorganization that can 
lead to “an impenetrable jungle of ad hoc commissions and complex 
arrangements that even the most conscientious municipal voter will 
never understand” (Sancton 1993, 33–34). 
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Special purpose districts
Special purpose districts are sometimes used to deliver services that 
spill over municipal boundaries. Single-purpose special districts 
may provide similar municipal services for several municipalities 
or manage regional services with significant externalities. This form 
of cooperation among municipalities for region-wide services is 
used most widely in countries in which there is a history of strong 
and autonomous local governments. In the U.S., for example, one-
third of all local governments are special districts or school districts 
Although school boards responsible for education are often directly 
elected, the boards of other special districts are usually indirectly 
controlled by the constituent municipal councils and are responsible 
for the management of such services as transportation, water and 
waste management, and economic development, well as taxing, price 
setting, and other policy-making. 
One advantage of special purpose districts is that each service spillover 
can be addressed on an individual basis. Since it is unlikely that the 
spillover boundaries are the same for each service, differently sized 
special districts could be established, such as a region-wide transit 
district or a hospital district.19 Other advantages may include the 
delivery of services by professionals with decision-making somewhat 
removed from political influence; the provision of services using 
more professional expertise than may be available to the municipal 
government; and the use of dedicated revenues from user fees to 
finance capital expenditures (Bahl and Linn 1992). Moreover, the 
salary schedule may be outside of the normal civil service and thus 
higher salaries can be offered to attract greater talent (Bahl 2010). 
19 Special districts to some extent illustrate the concept of functional, overlapping, 
competing jurisdictions (FOCJ), which envisages that “welfare could be improved 
substantially by promoting competition between newly emerging jurisdictions that are 
organized along functions instead of territories” (Frey and Eichenberger 1996, 315). In 
this approach, FOCJ are real governments in that they would have enforcement power and 
would be able to levy taxes and they would extend over areas defined by the functions 
for which they are responsible. But they would overlap geographically and individuals and 
communities could choose to which governmental unit they wanted to belong.  
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But special purpose bodies also create problems. First, since each body 
has responsibility for a single service it is not required to make tradeoffs 
between, for example, expenditures on transit and expenditures 
on water and sewers. when there are many independent special 
purpose bodies, it is difficult to coordinate interrelated activities.20 
Secondly, the proliferation of decision-making bodies has “created a 
diffuseness of government organizations that is difficult for citizens 
to understand” (Kitchen 1993, 14). Such bodies weaken general-
purpose local governments both through competition for resources 
and by reducing political accountability (Bird 1995). Thirdly, when 
not funded entirely by user charges, there is no direct link between 
the expenditure decisions made by the special purpose agencies and 
the local councils responsible for collecting taxes to fund them. The 
absence of what Breton (1996) calls the ‘wicksellian connection’ 
between expenditures and revenues reduces accountability.21  Because 
accountability is lacking, there is no incentive to be efficient: a higher 
level of technical efficiency through more professional management 
is not the same thing as economic efficiency. Services may be better 
delivered but they are not necessarily delivered to the right people in 
the right quantities and qualities (Bird 1980). Moreover, such ‘special 
purpose’ jurisdictions are more likely to be captured by special 
interest groups – including public employees – whose decisions tend 
to increase costs and alter service provision in ways not necessarily 
desired by those whose interests the jurisdiction is supposed to 
serve. Berry (2009) finds that “concurrent taxation” with territorially 
overlapping local special-purpose fiscal jurisdictions taxing the same 
20 Three ways have been suggested to address coordination problems (Bahl and Linn 
1992). One is to have overlapping membership so that some of the same people are on a 
number of district boards. This may help coordination but does nothing about accountability. 
Another is to encourage districts with multi-functions instead of single-purpose districts: at 
the limit of course, this leads back to general-purpose government.  Finally, even if special 
districts remain separate authorities they may be made subject to political considerations in 
the decision-making process (as with elected U.S. school boards).
21  As noted by Locke and Tassonyi (1993), in Ontario, Canada, local municipalities, 
which are responsible for collecting all property taxes, must take into account taxes levied 
by the upper tier and (at the time of their study) by school boards when they set their own 
levy but they have no control over school board levies and only limited influence on the 
upper tier.
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base almost invariably raises both tax and spending levels with no 
noticeable increase in service levels or quality.22  
Final observations on governance structure
Neither theory nor practice tells us clearly which model of governance 
is best for large metropolitan areas.23   Nonetheless, it is clear that 
a strong regional structure encompassing the entire city-region 
is important.  Metropolitan areas are characterized both by strong 
inter-dependencies (social, economic, environmental, and political-
administrative) and by externalities among local jurisdictions (Klink 
2008).  Some form of regional structure is needed to address such 
regional problems as fiscal disparities among municipalities and 
externalities in service provision. A regional structure is also needed 
to resolve transportation and environmental coordination issues and 
to ensure the economic competitiveness, social cohesion, and fiscal 
viability of city-regions in the global economic setting.  Few problems 
and processes stop at municipal boundaries, and many solutions 
require access to a larger pool of resources, both human and financial, 
than is likely to be at the disposal of small local governments. Some 
form of regional structure seems necessary if cities are to take 
full advantage of new and emerging opportunities for economic 
cooperation and for enhancing productivity and competitiveness in 
an increasingly knowledge-based economy. 
But what kind of regional structure is needed? Lefèvre (2008) 
emphasizes the key characteristics of an effective regional structure 
as political legitimacy through direct election, geographic boundaries 
that match the functional territory of the metropolitan region, 
independent financial resources, relevant powers and responsibilities, 
and adequate staffing. Yet, voluntary cooperation and special purpose 
22 “Special-district libraries spent more but provided fewer books.  Their employees 
were less likely to be actual librarians. Despite spending more, district libraries did not 
attract more patrons, and therefore their efficiency was significantly lower than that of 
municipally operated libraries.  In other words, district libraries spent more per patron visit 
and more per circulation transaction” (Berry 2009, 183).
23 Other reviews of this issue have also concluded that no model fits all cases or 
stands out clearly above the rest (Klink 2008; Divay and wolfe 2002; Stren and Cameron 
2005).
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districts which have few of these characteristics are popular around 
the world while amalgamation is unpopular. As Dafflon (2012, 7) 
notes, amalgamation is usually justified for economic reasons – 
administrative economies, economies of scale, improved efficiency, 
internalization of spillovers, and more robust tax bases – but 
opponents justify their position on the basis of democratic arguments 
– voice and free democratic choice at the grass roots level. 
Voluntary cooperation may be effective in providing some services 
but it tilts the balance towards local autonomy and responsiveness 
and away from economies of scale, service coordination, and a 
regional vision.  This approach is unlikely to provide an adequate 
regional foundation for metropolitan areas. where special districts 
are created to deliver specific services not only is the regional vision 
further diluted but in addition, since the boards of special districts 
are generally appointed or indirectly elected from members of the 
local councils, accountability to local citizens is compromised. A 
shift from inter-municipal cooperative governance structures to a 
regional government structure with direct election would improve 
political legitimacy but almost inevitably at the expense of local 
responsiveness. At the very least, there would need to be some form 
of community or neighbourhood councils to balance regional and 
local interests. 
The real choice for effective governance in a metropolitan region 
comes down to one-tier vs. two-tier. Because a one-tier (horizontal) 
structure is simpler to understand and more transparent than a two-
tier structure it may enhance political and fiscal accountability. Two-
tier (vertical) structures are inherently more complex and may result 
in undesirable duplication, overlap, and general confusion among 
citizens as to who is responsible for what and who is paying for it. 
On the other hand, a two-tier structure may achieve greater efficiency 
than is likely to be attained in a more centralized one-tier structure. 
Desirable economies of scale and scope can be realized at the upper 
tier level while at the same time the continued existence and vitality 
of the lower tier permits more responsiveness to local variations in 
preferences and maintains the linkage between local financing and 
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spending decision.  Any desired degree of regional redistribution 
can be achieved within either a one-tier or a two-tier structure, although 
obviously most easily – perhaps because less politically transparently 
– in a one-tier structure with uniform tax rates across the city-region 
in which all taxes are made available for redistribution. This seems to 
have been the principal reason for the choice of the one-tier model in 
South Africa (Steytler 2012).  
4.4 the case of toronto: Back to the future?
Toronto was a single tier city until 1954 when a two-tier metropolitan 
government consisting of a metropolitan tier, the then City of Toronto, 
and six lower-tier municipalities was created. Since 1998, it has been 
a single tier (consolidated) city. The creation of the two-tier structure 
in 1954 was applauded around the world for its ability to address 
growth issues and build needed infrastructure on a region-wide basis 
while meeting local needs. The most recent amalgamation in 1998 
which saw the merger of the metropolitan and lower tiers to create a 
single-tier City of Toronto was less well received because people felt 
that it did not address the regional issues facing Toronto and that it 
was less locally responsive than the system it replaced. 
Two-tier government
Prior to 1953, the City of Toronto was surrounded by twelve 
municipalities that had been growing rapidly in the post-war period.24 
Since the City of Toronto had no vacant land for the single-family 
housing developments that accommodated most of the growing 
regional population, most growth took place in the suburban 
municipalities. This growth placed huge demands on the capacity 
of these relatively small municipalities to provide services and such 
infrastructure as educational facilities, roads, sidewalks, lighting, 
24 The twelve municipalities included the Town of Leaside, Town of Mimico, Town 
of New Toronto, Town of weston, Village of Forest Hill, Village of Long Branch, Village 
of Swansea, Township of East York, Township of Etobicoke, Township of North York, 
Township of Scarborough, and Township of York.
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sewage disposal, and so on. An additional problem was that since 
these municipalities were largely residential, they did not have an 
adequate tax base to finance the needed infrastructure. The City of 
Toronto, on the other hand, which had significant commercial and 
industrial property, also had a solid financial base as a result. 25
In addition to the service demands and inadequate resources in the 
suburbs, the political boundaries of the City of Toronto no longer 
reflected the social and economic realities of the metropolitan 
area (Kulisek and Price 1988). Not withstanding cooperation with 
surrounding municipalities, planning was restricted to the boundaries 
of the City of Toronto. Further problems arose because each 
municipality acted independently with respect to transportation, land 
use, and housing – issues that needed to be addressed on a region-
wide basis.
In response to these problems, in 1954 Metropolitan Toronto was 
created by provincial legislation.26 The Metropolitan Toronto Act 
established a two-tier government with a metropolitan tier and 
thirteen lower-tier municipalities (the City of Toronto plus the twelve 
suburban municipalities). The metropolitan government (Metro) was 
initially given responsibility for planning, borrowing, assessment, 
transportation (transit and some roads), and the administration 
of justice. Local area municipalities were responsible for fire 
protection, garbage collection and disposal, licensing and inspection, 
local distribution of hydro-electric power, policing, public health, 
general welfare assistance,27 recreation and community services, and 
the collection of taxes. Both tiers shared responsibility for parks, 
planning, roads and traffic control, sewage disposal, and water 
supply. Costs were shared on the basis of property tax base. This 
25  The only tax base open to municipalities in Ontario was real property and residential 
properties have long been taxed much less heavily than non-residential (commercial and 
industrial) properties: for a detailed examination of the development and operation of the 
Ontario property tax system, see Bird, Slack and Tassonyi (2012). 
26  In Canada, all aspects of municipal government – their boundaries, their 
responsibilities, their taxing powers – are completely controlled by the provincial 
governments.
27 The costs of general welfare assistance are shared with the provincial government.
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meant that, in 1954, the City of Toronto picked up 62 percent of the 
costs of Metro.28 
Over time, many lower tier responsibilities migrated up to the Metro 
level. Metro took over responsibility for police services, social 
assistance, traffic control and operations, licensing, conservation, 
waste disposal, and ambulance services. In 1967, following the 
recommendations of a provincially-commissioned report, the 
number of municipalities in Metro was reduced from thirteen to 
six.29 Property assessment and the administration of justice became 
provincial responsibilities in 1970. 
Early reviews of Metro government applauded its success in meeting 
its intended objectives: “the creation of a federated form of metropolitan 
government for the city of Toronto and its 12 suburbs in 1953 and the 
rapidity with which it was able to overcome serious public service 
deficiencies made the Toronto model an object of admiration for 
students of metropolitan affairs throughout the continent” (Frisken 
1993). The new governance structure provided the necessary 
infrastructure for the orderly growth of the suburbs, maintained a 
vibrant core, and pooled revenues over the whole metropolitan area. 
It solved the water and sewage treatment problems, constructed rapid 
transit lines, established a network of arterial highways, built housing 
for seniors, and created a Metro parks system. 
Spillovers of benefits from transportation and planning were now 
contained within Metro’s borders. Redistribution from the City 
of Toronto to the suburbs enabled the latter to provide needed 
infrastructure. Local autonomy was achieved by maintaining 
the ability to differentiate local services across the lower tiers: 
for example, waste collection in the former Village of Forest Hill 
28 See the Report of the Royal Commission on Metropolitan Toronto as cited in 
Sancton (1994).
29 Forest Hill and Swansea were amalgamated with Toronto, New Toronto, Mimico, 
and Long Branch with Etobicoke, weston with York, and Leaside with East York, while 
North York and Scarborough  (with Etobicoke, York, and East York) became the five 
boroughs which, together with the City of Toronto, constituted the Metro region.
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continued to be twice weekly instead of once a week, as in the rest 
of Metro.
The challenges facing Metro began to change in the 1970s, however, 
as expansion in the region migrated outside the boundaries of 
Metropolitan Toronto.  No longer was the problem to accommodate 
growth within Metro; instead, growth increasingly occurred in what 
became known as the Greater Toronto Area (GTA).  Recognizing this 
reality, the province’s first reaction was in the early 1970s to create 
four new two-tier regional governments around Metro – Durham, 
Halton, Peel and York. It was not until 1988, however, that the 
province established the Office of the Greater Toronto Area (OGTA) 
to encourage Metro and the surrounding regions to coordinate their 
efforts with respect to a number of critical areas – waste disposal, 
regional transportation, land use, and infrastructure planning. In 
addition, a forum of GTA mayors (of the lower-tier municipalities) 
and chairs (of the regional governments) was established to encourage 
and market economic development in the GTA.  
In response to growing concerns about the future economic 
performance of the urban region as whole, a GTA Task Force was 
established in 1995. The Task Force report emphasized the need to 
treat the entire GTA as a single economic unit with a unified economic 
strategy and to create a new GTA governmental body both to deal 
more effectively with GTA-wide environmental and planning issues 
and to share major infrastructure and social costs (GTA Task Force 
1996). The report also recommended that local government within 
the GTA should be simplified by creating a Greater Toronto Council 
for the region, eliminating Toronto’s upper tier (Metro) as well as the 
other four GTA regional governments, and reducing the number of 
lower-tier municipalities through further amalgamation. 
Yet another expert group was appointed by the provincial government, 
the who Does what (wDw) Panel, in 1996.  This group too called 
on the Province to set up a governance structure for the GTA as 
a whole. Specifically, it recommended the creation of a Greater 
Toronto Services Board (GTSB), the elimination of the five upper-
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tier (metropolitan and regional) governments, and the consolidation 
of some of the lower-tier municipalities into strong cities. However, 
there was no consensus within the Panel on whether the six lower-
tier municipalities in Metro Toronto should be merged into one city 
or four cities. 
One-tier government
Despite these repeated recommendations by provincially-
commissioned reports on the need to coordinate service delivery 
between Toronto and the surrounding regions, the provincial 
government chose instead simply to amalgamate the municipalities 
within Toronto. The stated rationale was to save taxpayers’ money 
by replacing six lower-tier governments and the metropolitan level 
of government with one municipal government – the new City of 
Toronto. Since in Canadian municipal affairs provinces get what 
provinces want the result was that a new unified City of Toronto 
was created by the province on January 1, 1998. The upper-tier 
(metropolitan) government and six local area municipalities were 
merged into a single-tier city. 
This restructuring did not arise from local initiative. Indeed, opposition 
to the proposed amalgamation came from many different quarters: 
local municipalities (both inside and outside of Metro Toronto), the 
opposition parties in the provincial legislature, citizen organizations, 
and even from within the governing party itself (Stevenson and Gilbert 
1999). Prior to the passage of the legislation, referenda were held 
in each of the lower-tier municipalities in Metro Toronto. Although 
only 36 percent of eligible voters voted, opposition to the proposed 
amalgamated City of Toronto ranged from 70 to 81 percent of voters, 
depending on the municipality. The major citizen opposition centred 
on the loss of local identity and reduced access to local government. 
In the broader context of the GTA, municipalities outside of Toronto 
were concerned that Metro amalgamation would result in increased 
polarization within the region. 
Once Toronto was amalgamated the provincial government soon 
established the Greater Toronto Services Board (GTSB) initially 
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suggested by the who Does what Panel in 1996.30 However, the 
GTSB was given no legislative authority except to oversee regional 
transit with some limited powers to coordinate decision-making 
among its member municipalities and to provide strategic growth 
management. It was not designed to be a level of government nor 
was it given direct taxing authority. The GTSB comprised elected 
representatives from each of the municipalities in the region. A 
review of the GTSB in 2001 concluded that to have any real effect 
the role and powers of the Board should be strengthened significantly 
through provincial legislation to include responsibility to develop a 
growth management strategy and to create a transportation authority 
for the region that would address growing transportation concerns 
(Deloitte Consulting 2001). Later that year, however, the provincial 
government disbanded the GTSB.  There continues to be no effective 
regional governance structure in the Toronto metropolitan region.31
within Toronto, however, the governance structure was substantially 
simplified.  The City Council comprises a Mayor who is elected at 
large and 44 councillors elected in wards (constituencies).  Decisions 
are made by the Council, however, and not the Mayor: this is 
definitely not a ‘strong mayor’ system because the mayor has only 
one vote on council.32  In addition to the strong community affiliation 
of most of City Councillors, there are community councils intended 
both to deal with local issues that pertain to the community and 
neighbourhood (such as traffic plans, parking regulations, signs, and 
fence, ravine and tree by-laws) as well as to provide a place for local 
30 The Greater Toronto Services Board Act, 1998 sets out the structure and 
responsibilities of the Greater Toronto Services Board (GTSB).
31 There has been some sharing of costs, however. Following the amalgamation, 
the provincial government introduced pooling of the municipal portion of social service costs 
in the GTA. Because social service costs are much higher in the City of Toronto than the 
rest of the region, pooling meant that the regions were paying taxes for services in Toronto 
without any say over how their tax dollars were being spent. The obvious resentment on the 
part of the regions led to pooling (which they referred to as the “Toronto tax”) eventually 
being phased out.
32 Under the new City of Toronto Act passed in 2006, the mayor was given some 
additional powers such as the ability to set the council agenda for the coming term and to 
appoint members of a new Executive Committee that focuses on priority setting for council. 
The mayor has not been the given power to appoint and direct city officials or to veto council 
decisions as in the US-style “strong mayor” system, however. 
Enid Slack – Richard M. Bird
109
input into council’s decision-making process. Community councils 
are composed of elected officials representing between 10 and 12 
electoral wards. Each member of council serves on the community 
council that incorporates his/her ward.
Although amalgamation was not popular when it came into force 
over a decade ago, there is little interest in dismantling it today. And, 
although many have continued to express the need for a regional 
authority for the GTA and beyond, there continues to be little political 
interest in creating such a body at either the local or provincial levels. 
Provincial politicians may perhaps see creating a regional authority 
that would contain about half the provincial population and a much 
higher share of economic activity as constituting too direct a challenge 
to their interests and power base.  Similarly, local politicians outside 
Toronto may fear that City politicians would play too dominant a role 
in any regional entity.   
what ‘regional governance’ there is lies largely in the hands of the 
province.  For example, the provincial government has in effect largely 
taken over responsibility for transportation and land use planning 
for the Toronto region. Metrolinx (originally the Greater Toronto 
Transit Authority) was created by the province to be responsible 
for transportation in the region. Provincial legislation on growth 
management (Places to Grow Act, 2005 and the Greenbelt Act, 2005) 
has put the province squarely in charge of regional land use planning. 
The Places to Grow Act gives the province the authority to designate 
any geographic region of the province as a growth plan area; develop 
a growth plan in consultation with local officials, stakeholders, 
public groups, and members of the public; and develop growth 
plans in any part of Ontario. The greenbelt legislation authorizes the 
provincial government to designate a Greenbelt Area and establish a 
Greenbelt Plan for the Toronto region (defined more broadly than the 
GTA). Moreover, as has long been true, the development of major 
water and sewer facilities – essentially in effect a provincial 
responsibility – continues to be a major factor shaping where 
development actually takes place.
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What has amalgamation achieved? 
Amalgamation in Toronto has resulted in the creation of a city that is, 
at the same time, too small and too big. The city is too small to address 
the regional issues that plague the GTA (such as transportation and 
land use planning and economic development) and yet it is too big to 
be very responsive to local residents. Moreover, it is highly unlikely 
that amalgamation has resulted in  any significant cost savings. 
Amalgamation had not visibly been on anyone’s agenda before 
it became reality. Most efforts of the provincial government had 
been directed at addressing regional issues across the entire Greater 
Toronto Area. The OGTA, for example, focussed on a strategic vision 
for the GTA and the coordination of regional issues; the forum of 
GTA mayors and chairs concentrated on economic development and 
marketing in the GTA; and the GTA Task Force and the who Does 
what Panel both emphasized the need for a government body to cover 
the entire region. The major policy concern was the coordination of 
service delivery across the region and, in particular, the coordination 
of transportation and land use planning, water provision, and waste 
management. Neither the creation of the new City of Toronto nor the 
GTSB adequately addressed these fundamental regional problems. 
The boundaries of the City of Toronto made it too small to address 
the regional issues; the GTSB was not given sufficient authority to 
accomplish anything and was soon dissolved. Regional land use 
planning and transportation issues remain essentially in the hands of 
the provincial government.
Cost savings?
One of the main issues around Toronto’s amalgamation was the 
ability to save costs. 33 At its simplest the argument that reducing the 
number of local governments will cut costs is true in the sense that 
amalgamation in all likelihood will reduce the number of politicians 
and administrators. However, it is equally true that the amalgamation 
of municipalities with different service levels and different wage 
33 This section draws heavily from Slack (2000). 
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scales tends to result in expenditure increases. As Tindal (1996, 50) 
notes: “past experience tells us that there are strong upward pressures 
on costs after an amalgamation.” 
In the case of Toronto, potential cost savings were fairly small since the 
three largest expenditures (welfare assistance, transit, and policing) 
were already Metro responsibilities before the 1998 amalgamation.34 
These three services accounted for 70 percent of the total upper-tier 
and lower-tier expenditures combined. Potential cost savings were 
thus limited to 30 percent of the total budget of the new city. 
Some savings did occur, mostly from staff reductions. Between 1998 
and 2002, 2,700 positions were eliminated through amalgamation. 
Over the same time period, however, an additional 3,600 positions 
were added to improve service levels, with the overall result being 
a net increase in employment over the period (Schwartz 2004). 
Unfortunately, it is not possible to determine the extent to which these 
new positions may have been created in response to the amalgamation 
since a wide variety of other provincial initiatives affecting local 
government spending were  also introduced in 1998.35 
In an attempt to determine the long-term effect of amalgamation 
on local spending, we assembled for four services – fire, garbage, 
libraries, and parks and recreation – a data base of expenditures per 
household in constant 2008$ for the six lower-tier municipalities 
(and, for some services, also for Metro) from 1988 to 1997 and for the 
amalgamated city from 1998 to 2008.36 Fire and garbage expenditures 
were chosen because they were solely lower-tier expenditures before 
the amalgamation. Although parks and recreation as well as libraries 
were also largely lower-tier responsibilities, each had a small upper-
34  The provincial government based much of its case on the potential savings from the 
Toronto amalgamation on a study it had commissioned (KPMG 1996).  This study, however, 
estimated cost savings in the area of policing, a service that had already been amalgamated 
in 1967. The study also did not estimate the potential impact of the harmonization of wages 
and salaries and services that would occur following the amalgamation. 
35 In particular, the local services realignment described briefly below (and in more 
detail in Bird, Slack and Tassonyi 2012).
36 we are most grateful to Adam Found for invaluable assistance in assembling and 
analysing these data.
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tier component. Of the 30 percent of total expenditures where there 
was potential for cost savings (i.e. those that were not already 
amalgamated at the upper tier), these four services accounted for 
about 40 percent of lower tier expenditures prior to amalgamation.37 
Another reason for focusing on these four services is because they 
were not affected by the province-wide local services realignment 
that also occurred in 1998. This realignment resulted in the transfer 
of full responsibility for many previously cost-shared services 
such as water, sewers, roads, transit, social housing, public health, 
ambulances, and some increased responsibility for social services 
to municipalities. In return, the provincial government uploaded 
primary and secondary education from school boards and a few other 
services from municipalities to the provincial level.38 Unfortunately, 
it is not possible to separate the impact of amalgamation from the 
impact of the services realignment for the downloaded activities. 
37 This estimate does not include the portion of libraries and parks that were already 
at the upper tier.
38 At the same time, the provincial government took over tax rate setting for the 
education portion of the property tax and lowered the residential tax rate to give tax room to 
municipalities.
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Figure 1 Fire expenditures per household 1988–2008
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For fire services, expenditures per household before amalgamation 
were much higher in the City of Toronto than in the other 
municipalities. This difference likely reflects the higher density of the 
downtown area and the concentration of commercial buildings.  The 
linear trend line for all fire expenditures even in Toronto, however 
is, as Figure 1 shows, downward sloping prior to amalgamation;39 
after amalgamation, the trend is upward sloping. Fire expenditures 
have clearly increased since amalgamation. Of course, in some cases 
higher expenditures may mean higher service levels; in other cases, 
they may reflect the increased need for specialized services as new 
commercial growth took place outside the central business district 
(i.e. the former city of Toronto). Unfortunately, no consistent and 
comparable information on changes in either costs (e.g. wages) or 
service levels (e.g. response times) is available.
39  The dotted line in each graph shows the linear predicted trend for the newly 
amalgamated city from 1998 to 2008. The solid line shows the trend for the Metro total 
(upper and lower tiers) from 1988 to 1997 and hence where the pre-amalgamation structure 
would have ended up had the 1988 to 1997 trend persisted. 
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Figure 2 Garbage collection expenditures per household,  
1988–2008
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As Figure 2 shows, the trends with respect to expenditures on garbage 
collection are similar.  As with fire services, these costs were higher 
in the former City of Toronto than other lower-tier municipalities 
prior to amalgamation. This difference likely reflects the fact 
that the City of Toronto provided pickup service to commercial 
properties whereas other municipalities did not as well as the greater 
proportion of such properties in the City. Again, however, the trend in 
expenditures on garbage collection was downward both in total and in 
the former City prior to amalgamation but turned upward following 
the amalgamation.  As with fire services, it is not clear to what extent 
the expenditure increase reflects higher wages and salaries or higher 
service levels. Interestingly, one municipality (Etobicoke) contracted 
out garbage collection to the private sector before amalgamation, and 
private sector delivery remained for that part of the new city after 
amalgamation. 
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Figure 3 Parks and recreation axpenditures per household,  
1988–2008
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The effect of amalgamation appears again to increase the expenditure 
trend for parks and recreation (Figure 3). For libraries, however, the 
previous downward trend in expenditures per household continued 
after amalgamation (Figure 4) even though service levels almost 
certainly increased since access to the library system for the whole 
metropolitan area was much easier following the amalgamation. 
This decline is especially noteworthy in a period in which the nature 
of public library service changed markedly from handing out books 
to providing electronic and internet services. 
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Figure 4 Libraries expenditures per household, 1988–2008
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To the extent higher costs are associated with the equalization of 
service levels they are not necessarily bad. If some municipalities 
provide lower levels of services than their citizens would have 
preferred simply because they do not have adequate resources, 
amalgamation allows them to provide at least the same level of 
service as other municipalities in the region. But this means that 
costs are likely to rise, not fall. For example, the former City of York 
and the former Borough of East York were experiencing declining 
tax bases (assessments) and hence inadequate levels of service. 
Amalgamation likely increased the level of services for residents 
in these two municipalities and hence resulted in increased equity 
within the former metropolitan area.
In addition to the harmonization of service levels and wages and 
salaries, municipal amalgamations generally result in transitional 
costs, which are – as is perhaps to be expected (Flyvbjerg 2008) 
– almost always higher than anticipated (Vojnovic 1998). If the 
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transition is towards a more efficient, effective, and accountable local 
government, then the costs may be more than offset by the benefits. 
If not, transitional costs become an additional argument against 
amalgamation. One-time transition costs in Toronto, for example, 
included acquisition of new technology for financial, human 
resources, and payroll systems; renovation of existing facilities such 
as the Toronto City Hall; and hiring of technical and professional 
expertise with respect to areas such as telecommunications (City of 
Toronto 1999). In addition to the one-time costs, there are also costs 
associated with staff exits. 
One of the major challenges of the Toronto amalgamation has been 
the amalgamation of the seven previous administrations: “the key 
post-amalgamation problem has been leading and controlling the vast 
administrative behemoth that the amalgamation created” (Sancton 
2004, 28).  The task of integrating the operations and services of the 
seven municipalities following amalgamation was enormous and 
required the creation of a new administrative and reporting structure, 
the implementation of new information systems, the consolidation of 
corporate services, real estate portfolios, and other functions, and the 
harmonization of human resources policies and classifications (Côté 
2009). 
Tax increases, or decreases?
Three different questions may be asked about the effects of 
amalgamation on local taxes. First, did taxes increase or decrease 
as a result of the amalgamation? Secondly, what was the effect of 
the amalgamation on tax competition within the amalgamated area? 
And, thirdly, what was the effect on tax competition within the region 
as a whole, the GTA? As with cost savings, the data do not permit 
definitive answers to any of these questions but some things can be 
said.
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Figure 5 Residential taxes per household, 1988–2008
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Figure 6 Business taxes per household, 1988–2008
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The first question is the easiest to answer: on the whole, taxes 
declined, particularly those on business property. Figures 5 and 6 
show residential and business property taxes per household in constant 
2008$ before and after amalgamation. Prior to amalgamation, it is not 
surprising that residential property taxes per household were highest 
at the Metro level of government since that level accounted for 70 
percent of total expenditures. Residential property taxes per household 
were next highest in the City of York, the poorest municipality in 
Metro and were generally lowest in Etobicoke and Scarborough. 
Although residential property taxes per household were generally 
declining prior to amalgamation in the lower tier municipalities, they 
were rising in Metro. In 1998, residential property taxes increased 
sharply because of the local services realignment mentioned earlier. 
The downloading of some services to municipalities coupled 
with lower education property taxes (now levied by the province) 
resulted in higher municipal property taxes. Despite this important 
change, however, as Figure 5 shows residential property taxes in 
the amalgamated city have declined slightly (in real terms) since 
1998, with the overall result that residential property taxes after 
amalgamation are not that dissimilar to what they would have been 
in the absence of amalgamation. 
Prior to amalgamation, business property taxes per household were 
much higher in the City of Toronto than any of the other constituent 
municipalities both because of the City’s much larger commercial 
and industrial tax base compared to the suburban municipalities and 
to the higher tax rates applied in the city. Business property taxes 
for the amalgamated city have fallen since 1998, reflecting both 
the amalgamated city’s stated policy of reducing the tax burden 
on business and the way in which the complex and changing set of 
provincial rules governing property taxes  have affected Toronto 
(Bird, Slack and Tassonyi 2012).
The other two questions are more difficult to answer. As mentioned 
earlier, Charlot, Paty and Piguet (2012) found in a study of France 
that reducing the number of municipalities resulted in an increase in 
tax rates.  As Figure 6 shows, however,  since amalgamation resulted 
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in lower rather than higher business property taxes in Toronto (in 
real terms per household), it appears that any effect from reduced 
competition for tax base within the metropolitan area has been more 
than offset by other factors. One such factor seems to have been 
the increasingly strong competition between the (expanded) City of 
Toronto and other GTA regions and municipalities. As Bird, Slack, 
and Tassonyi (2012, p, 196) conclude, “changes in neighbouring 
jurisdictions emerge as one of the most significant drivers of business 
property tax rates in the GTA: yardstick competition, it seems, is alive 
and well in the GTA.” In addition, the same study notes (p.197) that 
Toronto’s amalgamation had significant negative effects on business 
property tax rates not only in Toronto (as shown in Figure 6) but also 
its most immediate (and most developed) neighbouring regions, Peel 
and York.
Governance
Some authors have argued that one of the main failures of 
amalgamation has been the decline in active citizen participation 
(Golden and Slack, 2006). Prior to the amalgamation, the city 
provided many opportunities for citizen participation (Toronto 
Transition Team 1999): direct contact with politicians; deputations 
to committees of council and participation in public consultations 
on specific issues; opportunities for involvement in council sub-
committees and task forces; membership on municipal agencies, 
boards and commissions; involvement in partnerships, coalitions, 
and joint working groups among citizens, business groups, elected 
representatives, and municipal staff; and community development 
initiatives. 
Although governance processes remained transparent and accessible 
after amalgamation, local government in Toronto is definitely less 
participatory than before amalgamation (Côté 2009). The creation 
of a much larger city has reduced the opportunities for citizen 
involvement. The creation of community councils was designed, 
to some extent, to improve citizen access and participation. The 
councils were intended to be accessible to citizens and to provide 
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a place where they could bring local concerns. In reality, however, 
community councils operate mostly as local planning committees 
rather than as forums in which broader community issues can be 
addressed (Golden and Slack 2006). In addition, the councils almost 
invariably address localized and individual interests rather than city-
wide issues.
The business community saw one objective of amalgamation as 
creating a more effective entity for economic development and 
marketing (Stevenson and Gilbert 1999). Indeed, the Toronto Board 
of Trade strongly supported the amalgamation on these grounds.40 
A larger government was thought to be more effective at promoting 
economic development by reducing bureaucracy and duplication and 
eliminating inter-municipal competition. In reality, as mentioned 
earlier, there is still duplication and the bureaucracy faces persisting 
problems in merging both organizational cultures and such important 
governance tools as zoning bylaws.  In addition, as noted earlier, 
inter-municipal competition between Toronto and surrounding 
municipalities persists.
The amalgamation led to further reforms in governance, most notably 
the passage of a new City of Toronto Act in 2006 which gave the city 
somewhat greater authority and autonomy than other municipalities 
in the province. In particular, the Act gives the City the power to 
impose “direct taxes,” although as yet little has been done along 
these lines.41 This legislation represented a fundamental shift in the 
traditional relationship between the City and the Province, replacing 
40  The Toronto Board of Trade is a voluntary organization with about 10,000 
members from the business community, including large and small businesses and individual 
members.
41  This provision has a long list of exclusions, however: taxes cannot be imposed on 
income; on capital income; on sales of goods and services; on accommodation (including 
hotels/motels, apartments, clubs, etc.); on wealth (including inheritance); on machinery 
and equipment used in research and development or manufacturing or processing; on the 
acquisition of any gas or liquid that may be used for generating power by means of internal 
combustion; on the consumption or use of energy (including electricity); on the generation, 
exploitation, extraction, harvesting, processing, renewal, or transportation of natural 
resources; on the supply of natural gas or artificial gas; and on the use of highways with 
respect to placing equipment under, on, or over the highway, The city is also excluded from 
levying a poll tax. 
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the prescriptive framework with broad permissive powers for the 
City. The Act recognized that the City of Toronto was unique  and 
gave it authority to negotiate directly with the federal government 
rather than going through the province as it had done in the past 
and as other municipalities still must (Côté 2009). A larger one-tier 
government with more powers has allowed it to play a stronger role 
on the regional, provincial, national, and international stage. In the 
late 1990s, for example, Toronto took the lead in bringing national 
attention to the issue of homelessness and advocated for a new deal for 
cities nationally through the Federation of Canadian Municipalities 
and the Big City Mayors’ Caucus (Côté 2009). 
Final observations on the Toronto amalgamation
Studies leading up to the creation of the new City of Toronto all 
identified problems of service coordination between Metropolitan 
Toronto and the other regions in the GTA. The creation of the new 
city was largely irrelevant to the problems faced both by Toronto and 
by the GTA as a whole. Regional issues need regional solutions that 
go beyond Toronto’s boundaries. The problems currently facing the 
new City of Toronto are no less significant now than they were before 
the city was created; they have not been ameliorated by the creation 
of the new city. At the same time, the amalgamated city has resulted 
in reduced access and participation by residents in local decision-
making. 
Amalgamation solved no problems. But it may, nonetheless, have 
had some benefits, for example, a stronger presence in economic 
development, a fairer sharing of the tax base among rich and poor 
municipalities, equalizing local services so that everyone can enjoy 
a similar level of services, and a stronger voice for Toronto with 
respect to municipal issues within the region and across the province 
and country. 
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4.5 Are there lessons for Finland?
If any lessons are to be learned from Toronto, they would mainly 
apply to Helsinki as the largest city in Finland. Even so, there are 
many important differences between Toronto and Helsinki ranging 
from size to the structure of governance and local finance. Although 
both cities account for about half of their regional population, Toronto 
is much bigger: 2.5 million in a region of about 5 million, while 
Helsinki is about 600,000 in a region of almost 1.4 million. More 
importantly, Finland is a unitary country which decentralizes the 
delivery of important social services to the local level, while in Canada 
those services are provided largely at the provincial level with local 
governments being responsible only for ‘local’ services.   In Canada, 
local governments account for only 11.5 percent of public sector 
expenditure; in Finland, the corresponding ratio is over 40 percent. 
The differences are equally marked on the revenue side, with Finnish 
local governments financing 41 percent of their expenditures through 
(mainly) a local income tax and only 2.5 percent from a property tax, 
while in Canada, municipalities finance almost 50 percent of their 
expenditures through property taxes. Finally, although there is some 
cooperation among municipalities in Canada with respect to a few 
services, municipal cooperation in Finland is much more developed 
and more important.
The main reasons for the current Finnish interest in mergers appear 
to be, first, to achieve economies of scale and, second, to reduce 
problems associated with relying on extensive inter-municipal 
cooperation. It is possible that mergers may indeed enable some 
smaller municipalities (at least those that are in close proximity) 
to reap economies of scale. It is unlikely, however, that any such 
gains are to be reaped in the case of Helsinki. There may of course 
be other reasons for considering mergers in the metropolitan area 
such as addressing externalities, coordinating service delivery, land 
use planning and transportation for the region, and more equitable 
sharing of costs. Inter-municipal cooperation may both make it harder 
to develop and implement a ‘regional’ vision and be less clearly 
accountable since it is not always clear who is responsible. However, 
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cooperative arrangements do both allow local governments to retain 
more autonomy and permit them to be more responsive to the wishes 
of local residents. On the whole, although the ‘two-tier’ approach has 
its own problems, it may perhaps be the best way to reconcile the 
economic and political problems inherent in devising an appropriate 
governance structure for a metropolitan area such as Helsinki.  Such 
a structure may also perhaps be worth considering as a more effective 
way to provide services in more scattered, sparsely populated (and 
often aging) small communities elsewhere in the country (Kitchen 
and Slack 2006).  
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5.1 Introduction
In most countries, the production and funding of many public services 
is decentralized to local governments or municipalities. This type of 
decentralization raises two important and often intertwined questions 
that need to be answered. The first is the question of assignment of 
functions and revenue sources to different levels of government.2 
According to classic arguments by Musgrave (1959) and Oates 
(1972), in the absence of scale benefits in the provision of a public 
good or service and interjurisdictional spillovers, decision making 
should be decentralized so that public good provision can be matched 
to heterogeneous preferences of the voter population. 
The second question concerns the optimal size of municipalities 
once the assignment of tasks and taxes has been settled. In theory, the 
optimal size of municipalities is determined as a tradeoff of opposing 
1 we thank Essi Eerola, Jani-Petri Laamanen, Antti Moisio and Heikki Pursiainen 
for helpful comments. we also thank seminar participants at the PEARL conference in 
Helsinki and at VATT for useful discussions. Oskari Harjunen provided excellent research 
assistance. Janne Tukiainen is grateful to the Emil Aaltonen Foundation for financial support.
2 See Oates (1999) for an overview of this literature.
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forces. On the one hand, economies of scale and interjurisdictional 
spillovers from local public services favor large municipalities. On the 
other hand, as the size of a municipality increases so does preference 
heterogeneity among the voters making it more difficult to tailor the 
services to match voter preferences (Alesina and Spolaore 1997 and 
2003).3 A related result by Tiebout (1956) offers decentralization as 
a tool for efficient pricing of local public goods in a world where 
mobile households shop for a suitable tax and public good bundle 
offered by municipalities. Fewer and larger municipalities mean 
that citizen-voters have fewer choices and municipalities face less 
competition, which may lead to a situation where Tiebout’s result 
does not hold.4 
The above arguments make it clear that the size and number of 
municipalities is a key policy decision in achieving a welfare 
maximizing production of decentralized public services. Furthermore, 
for a variety of dynamic reasons, such as migration, different trends 
in aging and advances in production technology of public services, 
municipality borders need to be redrawn occasionally while 
considering the above arguments. 
Recently there has been a wave of municipality mergers in Finland.5 
Until now, the mergers have been voluntary and decided independently 
at the local level by municipal councils. However, the new coalition 
government that came to power after the 2011 parliamentary 
elections has a clear view that more mergers are necessary and 
even forced mergers, similar to Danish reform in 2007, are being 
discussed.6 Not surprisingly, this policy has raised opposition from 
both municipal politicians and citizens.  
3 There are other reasons for municipal mergers raised in the Finnish contexts. One 
example is municipal risk management. In the absence of municipal insurance markets or 
joint liability, the economy of a small municipality may be threatened by a single citizen 
with a costly disease. 
4 Naturally, the Tiebout model is unrealistic in many ways. See Boadway and 
Tremblay (2012) for a recent review of the model.
5 Saarimaa and Tukiainen (2012) present empirical evidence on what municipal 
characteristics are associated with these merger decisions. They also present a more detailed 
description of the merger process. 
6 Forced mergers are technically possible even today. 
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The public arguments opposing mergers in Finland usually refer 
to diminishing local representation and an increasing mismatch of 
voter preferences and implemented policy.7 The usual argument is 
as follows. In larger municipalities, relatively small interest groups 
find it increasingly difficult to elect a politician that represents their 
interests into a position of power. For example, a merger involving 
a small municipality and a large municipality will most likely result 
(after the next elections) in a new council, where only a few (if any) 
councilors are citizens of the smaller municipality. As mergers are 
partly motivated by economies of scale, it is likely that a merger will 
result in restructuring of public services, perhaps by concentrating 
the provision of services to densely populated areas. A councilor that 
is originally from the small municipality is likely to defend local 
services because her voters and the councilor herself prefer them. we 
will discuss this issue at length in Section 5.2.
The purpose of this paper is to analyze empirically whether voters 
truly value local representation and whether they vote strategically (as 
opposed to voting sincerely) in order to obtain a local representative. 
To be more specific, we analyze how voters reacted to the recent 
municipality merger wave in Finland using data from two municipal 
elections, before and after the merger wave. Our analysis is possible 
due to a unique individual candidate and polling district level 
data. Using these data we can decompose a merged municipality 
into the original pre-merger municipalities and trace back the vote 
distributions of candidates at the pre-merger municipal level. These 
data facilitate difference-in-differences (DID) analysis where the 
unit of observation is the old municipality and voting data come 
from elections before and after the merger wave. If voters value 
local representation, we should observe a strategic response from 
the voters to fiercer competition in the next election so that they 
pool votes to candidates in the old municipalities. while there is a 
vast literature showing that households value local services, to our 
knowledge, this is the first paper to offer plausible causal evidence 
7 Naturally, local politicians are also concerned about their re-election because 
mergers reduce the number of available council seats and change the set of candidates 
running for the same seats. See Hyytinen, Saarimaa and Tukiainen (2012) for details and 
empirical evidence.
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concerning  references for local representation that uses actual voting 
data, instead of survey or house price data.8
We find that voters in municipalities that underwent a merger pool 
their votes to strong candidates compared to voters in municipalities 
that did not merge. Moreover, we find that this effect is heterogeneous 
with respect to the relative size of the merged municipalities and 
their geographic distance. In smaller merged municipalities, the 
pooling effect is much larger than in the larger merger partners. The 
heterogeneity in the effect is even clearer with respect to distance 
between the merger partners’ municipal centers.9 Moreover, when 
we analyze distance and population heterogeneity jointly, we find 
that only distance matters. This implies that the location of services 
is the main reason behind strategic voting. We also find that voters 
concentrate votes only within parties. This means that while local 
representation is important, voters are not willing to cross party lines 
in order to guarantee local representation. Finding that the location 
of services is important for citizens is hardly a surprise, but it is very 
surprising and important that other dimensions of heterogeneity do 
not seem to matter.
This result is useful in two respects. First, while the evidence on 
the importance of preference heterogeneity as a determinant of 
local government formation is strong (Brasington 2003a and 2003b, 
Alesina Baqir and Hoxby 2004, Gordon and Knight 2009, weese 
2011 and Saarimaa and Tukiainen 2012), we contribute to this 
literature by further dissecting the different channels through which 
preference heterogeneity among voters may influence municipal 
decision-making. More precisely, we show that voters’ preferences 
over the location of public services are the main reason why voters 
value local representation. While we are quite confident that this result 
is causal and internally valid (the result applies to the municipalities 
that actually merged), external validity of the result is an open 
8 A typical approach in the literature has been to show that the quality of 
neighborhood services capitalizes to house values. See e.g. Black and Machin (2011) and 
the references therein. 
9 Municipal center is simply defined as the town or city hall where the municipal 
council meets.
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issue. It could be, for example, that voters in the municipalities that 
ended up merging have more homogenous preferences than voters 
in municipalities that did not merge.10 Nonetheless, if the central 
government is going to force mergers on municipalities, local 
representation and the location of public services should be among 
the key issues that need to be resolved in the process. 
Second, this paper contributes to the large literature on strategic 
voting.11 Both economists and political scientists have been for 
long interested in whether voters vote sincerely (always vote their 
preferred candidate) or strategically (vote someone else than their 
preferred candidate, because it is optimal once accounting for 
expectations concerning other voters’ behavior). This distinction 
is fundamental for the understanding of the democratic process in 
general, formulating theoretical models in political economy and 
designing election mechanisms. Despite the massive theoretical (e.g. 
Besley and Coate 1997 and Myatt 2007) and empirical (e.g. Cain 
1978, Cox 1998 and Karp et al. 2002) literature on the topic, credible 
causal evidence is scant. To our knowledge, the only existing causal 
test of strategic voting theory is by Fujiwara (2011), who uses 
regression discontinuity design and finds causal evidence in favor of 
Duverger’s law.12 Our paper can be seen as a causal test of strategic 
behavior of voters as we basically ask whether voters desert their 
preferred local candidate in order to guarantee local representation in 
the post-merger council. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 5.2, we 
raise some theoretical arguments on why local representation 
may matter to voters. Section 5.3 presents a short overview of the 
institutional setting of Finland with respect to the role and nature 
of local governments, election mechanisms and the merger process. 
In Section 5.4, we describe our data and formulate our empirical 
10 The results from Saarimaa and Tukiainen (2012) support this claim.
11 Lyytikäinen and Tukiainen (2012) show using regression discontinuity design that 
voters in Finnish municipal elections are rational, i.e. they account for the probability of 
their vote affecting election outcomes when they decide whether to vote or abstain. Given 
that these voters are rational, it makes sense to ask whether they are also strategic. 
12 Duwerger’s law asserts that a plurality rule election system (or first past the post 
rule) tends to favor a two-party system over multipartyism because of strategic voting.
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strategy. we show some descriptive graphs in Section 5.5 and the 
actual results in Section 5.6, including how reliable the results are. 
Section 5.7 concludes.
5.2 Why local representation matters? 
In this section, we sketch some theoretical arguments why voters 
may value local representation, especially after a municipal merger. 
The arguments raised here are not meant to be formal or exhaustive. 
Rather they serve as motivation for our empirical analysis in the 
subsequent sections. 
In general, voters may benefit from having a local representative in 
the council for (at least) four reasons. First, if households with similar 
preferences have a tendency to sort into same municipalities (or 
neighborhoods) as suggested by Tiebout (1956), a councilor living 
close to a voter is more likely to share the preferences of the voter 
in terms of the service-tax bundle provided by the municipality.13 If 
there are costs related to the distance between a voter and a candidate 
in acquiring information on the preferences of candidates, voting for 
a local candidate becomes desirable. 
The second reason why local representation may be important is 
related to the common pool problem presented by weingast, Shepsle 
and Johnsen (1981). If there are identifiable (geographic) local groups 
within a municipality that benefit from spending in their area and if 
the spending is financed globally by all taxpayers in the municipality, 
having a local representative may be instrumental in receiving the 
benefits from local spending. Clearly, the citizens of pre-merger 
municipalities can be seen as representing different local groups.
Third, if councilors and voters consume similar services and dislike 
travel costs, a councilor living close to a voter is more likely to 
share the voter’s preferences over the geographic location of public 
services (schools, basic health care centers etc.). Furthermore, since 
13 See e.g. Bayer et al. (2007) and Bayer and McMillan (2012) on the importance of 
sorting according neighborhood quality and observable household characteristics. 
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house values are tied to the prevalence and quality of (public) services 
in the neighborhood, house value becomes an incentive device that 
may align councilors’ and voters’ preferences. This can be easily seen 
when both the councilor and the voter are homeowners. In this case, 
both want to promote policies that increase their house value.14 The 
closer the councilor lives to the voter, the more correlated their house 
values are, and because of this, the more aligned are the incentives 
of the councilor with the voter’s preferences. Moreover, both parties 
do not have to be homeowners in order for this incentive mechanism 
to work. For example, a voter with school-aged children may be 
more likely to vote for a local homeowner councilor without children 
than a councilor with children that lives in another neighborhood. 
The logic is that the homeowner councilor has incentives to promote 
investments into the local school because it makes the neighborhood 
more attractive and raises neighborhood house prices.15 
In some cases voters face a tradeoff between voting for a candidate 
that shares her preferences over the service-tax bundle and voting for 
a local candidate. This happens when sorting is imperfect and a voter 
simply does not have a local candidate that shares her preferences. 
That is, a voter’s preferred candidate in terms of the service-tax bundle 
lives in another neighborhood. Furthermore, this tradeoff is a function 
of neighborhood population so that electing a local representative 
is harder in smaller neighborhoods. In this case, voters from these 
types of neighborhoods may have incentives to vote strategically (as 
oppose to voting sincerely) and concentrate their votes for a single (or 
few) local candidate even when this candidate is not the first choice 
for all of the voters. Municipal mergers create plausibly exogenous 
variation in the set of voters who face this tradeoff and how, in a 
sense, large this tradeoff is.
Finally, jurisdiction size may have a direct effect on voting behavior. 
For example, Dahl and Tufte (1973) argue that as jurisdiction size 
increases voters’ beliefs about their competence in understanding and 
14 See e.g. DiPasquale and Glaeser (1999).
15 For example, Hilber and Mayer (2008) find empirical evidence that even 
households without children promote investments into local schools because the investments 
raise their house values. See also Fischel (2001). 
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taking part in politics weakens.16 Recently, Lassen and Serritzlew 
(2011) find using DID methods and the Danish municipality reform of 
2007, that jurisdiction size has a sizeable negative effect on citizens’ 
beliefs in this respect, as perceived in a citizen survey. Turnout may 
diminish in municipalities that undergo a merger due to an increase in 
population size and the effect should be larger in small municipalities 
as they experience a relatively larger population increase. Reduced 
turnout would make pooling of votes even more crucial for those 
who vote in small municipalities. 
5.3 Institutional background 
Local governments play an important role in the economies of many 
countries. In Finland, public goods and services are provided by two 
tiers of government where municipalities constitute the local level.17 
Because of the variety of tasks assigned to them, municipalities are 
of considerable importance to the whole economy. The GDP share of 
municipality spending is roughly 18 percent and they employ around 
20 percent of the total workforce. The bulk of Finnish municipalities’ 
expenditures come from producing social and health care services 
and primary education. In most of these services, in addition to 
costs, quantity and quality, also the location should be relevant for 
the citizens. Municipalities fund their spending mostly through their 
own revenue sources. The most important revenue source is the flat 
municipal income tax which the municipalities can set freely. Due 
to extensive tasks and power in setting taxes, municipal councils 
are relatively powerful compared to municipalities in many other 
countries. An extensive central government grant system is used to 
equalize local cost and revenue disparities. 
The number of municipalities in Finland has diminished considerably 
since the 1940’s as can be seen from Figure 1. In the 1960’s almost 
16 In political science this is coined as political efficacy. It can be further divided into 
internal and external efficacy. The former refers to citizens’ beliefs that they are competent 
to understand and take part in politics and the latter to whether their participation may have 
an effect on policy outcomes.
17 See Moisio et al. (2010) for details.
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all and in the 2000’s all of the mergers have been voluntary. Besides 
the two merger waves, municipality structure has been quite stable 
through time. In this paper, we analyze mergers that took place between 
the 2004 and 2008 municipal elections. Between these two elections, 
there were 47 municipal mergers involving 130 municipalities. The 
number of municipalities in a given merger ranged from 2 to up to 10 
municipalities.
Figure 1 Number of municipalities in Finland, 1917–2010
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Mergers between municipalities are voluntary and the municipality 
councils are allowed to decide which potential mergers they consider. 
A typical merger process is as follows: After an initial feasibility study, 
the municipal boards make a proposal of the merger to the municipal 
councils. This proposal is voted on by the councils. In about half the 
cases, the potential merger includes more than two municipalities. If 
the proposed merger gains a majority in all the participating councils, 
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the merger goes through. If not, it is cancelled and the municipalities 
continue as they were.
Finland has a multi-party system and currently there are eight parties 
in the Finnish parliament and these parties also dominate municipal 
politics. In the 2004 municipal elections the three largest parties 
(the Centre Party, the Social Democrats and the National Coalition) 
received roughly 68 percent of the votes with roughly similar shares.18 
In addition to the traditional left- and right-wing division (roughly the 
Social Democrats and the National Coalition), a somewhat peculiar 
feature of the Finnish political landscape is the strong support for the 
Centre Party (formerly known as the Agrarian League). 
Municipal council size is a step function of municipality’s population 
and is determined by law. The council size function is as follows: 13 
or 15 for 2000 or less, 21 for 2,001–4,000; 27 for 4,001–8,000; 35 for 
8,001–15,000; 43 for 15,001–30,000; 51 for 30,001–60,000; 59 for 
60,001–120,000; 67 for 120,001–250,000; 75 for 250,001–400,000 
and 85 for over 400,000. The maximum number of candidates for 
each party is 1.5 times the legally determined council size. So, in 
addition to reduced council size, a merger may also lead to a reduced 
number of candidates for a given party. 
Each municipality has only one electoral district (i.e. constituency) 
and no geographic quotas are in place. This applies also to the 
merged municipalities. However, most municipalities have many 
polling districts, which simply define the location where people go to 
vote (e.g. local school). The election data is registered and publicly 
available at the polling district and candidate level (also votes given 
in advance are registered to the correct polling district). Since these 
polling districts do not change because of the mergers, we know the 
location of voters also after the mergers. That is, even though we do 
not know the addresses of the candidates, knowing the location of the 
votes facilitates our empirical analysis of strategic voting.
18 In the 2011 parliamentary election, the Finns Party became the third largest party 
in the parliament overtaking the Centre Party.
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The Finnish municipal elections use the open-list method. This 
aspect is crucial for our analysis because voters vote not only for 
the party, but for the individual candidates. Thus, they can influence 
the position of their local candidate on the party list even after 
the merger. However, parties act as gatekeepers and choose 
the candidates. This may confound our analysis, because if only few 
local candidates from smaller municipalities make it to the post-
merger lists, the observed change in concentration after the merger in 
small municipalities may not be due to strategic voting, but simply 
due to changes in the set of candidates. we can address this issue to a 
certain extent in the subsequent analysis.
5.4 Data and empirical strategy
Data
Our main data source is the election database maintained by 
the Ministry of Justice.19 we have data on votes received by 
individual candidates from two municipal elections held in October 
of 2004 and 2008. The 2008 municipal elections were held using 
the new merged municipalities as constituencies.20 The novel feature of 
our data is that they include information on polling districts within a 
municipality. That is, we observe the number of votes coming from 
different polling districts for each candidate. The number of polling 
districts varies between municipalities, but the important thing 
for our purposes is that polling districts are used only for vote counting 
and voting location purposes and there are no quotas in municipal 
councils based on the polling district division. 
Since municipalities are divided into (time invariant) polling 
districts we can build a panel data set where the cross-sectional 
units are the municipalities in 2004, i.e. before the mergers.21 That 
19 Similar data are also freely available online at Statistics Finland’s website.
20 In some cases, the municipalities merged officially at the start of 2009. However, 
also in these cases the new municipality division was used in the 2008 elections. 
21 In some cases, the polling districts changed and we were unable to trace back the 
old municipal division. In these cases, we drop the entire merger from the analysis. 
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is, we can trace back which candidates received votes from the pre-
merger municipalities also in the post-merger elections in 2008. Our 
comparison would not be possible if we would only observe the 
number of votes for each candidate at the municipal level. If this 
were the case, we could not trace back which votes actually came 
from different parts of a given merger.
Econometric model
we analyze strategic voting behavior using a DID strategy. 
The simplest specification that we use can be written as 
(1)  
0 1 2 3 ,it i it i it ity treated after treated after uα α α α= + + + ⋅ +
where yit is the outcome in question for municipality i (2004 division) 
in year t, treated a dummy variable that equals one if the municipality 
underwent a merger between the two elections, after a dummy variable 
that equals one if the data come from post-merger elections and u is 
the error term. In this setup, if a merger changes voter behavior, we 
should find that α3 differs statistically from zero. 
Furthermore, if voters value local representation, we should observe 
voters from small municipalities in a given merger to concentrate 
their votes more than voters from larger municipalities simply 
because smaller municipalities have a lower chance of electing 
representatives to the post-merger council. To test this hypothesis we 
estimate the following regression
 
(2) 
 0 1 2 3 4
5 ,
it i i it i it
i it i it
y treated popdiff after treated after
treated after popdiff u
β β β β β
β
= + + + + ⋅
+ ⋅ ⋅ +
where popdiff is the difference between a municipality’s population 
and the population of the largest municipality in the group of 
municipalities that took part in the same merger. The population is 
measured only in 2004 (we observe 2008 municipal populations 
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only at the merger level). The variable popdiff is defined only for 
municipalities that underwent a merger, because we do not have 
any merger partners for the control group. Furthermore, the popdiff 
variable is zero for the largest municipalities in a given merger group. 
This specification is similar to the difference-in-difference-in-
differences estimator with the exception that popdiff is continuous 
and does not vary within the control group or over time.22 Thus, 
we cannot fully saturate the model with respect to the pair wise 
interactions of all the right hand side variables. More precisely, the 
excluded interaction treated*popdiff equals popdiff, and thus, popdiff 
controls for both. Potentially more problematic is the exclusion 
of the interaction variable popdiff*after, because it equals the 
treated*popdiff*after variable. Thus, our main parameter of interest 
captures a joint effect. In theory this is an issue, but not in practice. 
Municipal populations do not change much over the 4 years and there 
is no reason to assume that changes in popdiff would have any effect 
on voting behavior independent of the merger. Therefore, we can 
conclude that if the parameter β5 differs statistically from zero, voters 
from smaller municipalities react differently to mergers compared to 
voters from larger municipalities. 
The second aspect of within merger heterogeneity that we analyze 
concerns party preferences. To this end, we estimate the following 
model
 
(3)  0 1 2 3 4
5 ,
it i i it i it
i it i it
y treated diffparty after treated after
treated after diffparty u
γ γ γ γ γ
γ
= + + + + ⋅
+ ⋅ ⋅ +
where diffparty equals one if a municipality had a different largest 
party in the 2004 elected councils than the largest municipality in 
the same merger and zero otherwise. For the largest municipality in 
a merger, diffparty is equal to zero. If party preferences matter, we 
should find that γ5 is statistically significant and most likely positive. 
That is, voters from a smaller merger partner with different party 
22 This variable simply cannot be calculated for the control group who do not merge 
or contemplate a merger.
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preferences compared to voters in the largest merger partner should 
concentrate their votes more if party preferences are an important 
aspect of strategic voting. Note that since the diffparty variable is 
based on the 2004 election outcome it is time invariant. Excluding 
diffparty*after is not a problem, because it is equal to diffparty.
Finally, we analyze whether the location of public services (schools, 
basic health care centers etc.) matters to voters. It is plausible to 
assume that there is pressure to concentrate services to the center of 
the largest municipality of a merger, and thus, the farther away the 
center is the more costs voters have to bear when accessing these 
services after a merger. we try to capture these effects by calculating 
for each merged municipality the distance between its pre-merger 
center and the center of largest municipality in the merger. Using this 
variable, the DID model can be written as
 
(4)  0 1 2 3 4
5 ,
it i i it i it
i it i it
y treated dist after treated after
treated after dist u
δ δ δ δ δ
δ
= + + + + ⋅
+ ⋅ ⋅ +
 
where dist is Euclidean distance in kilometers. we set this variable to 
zero for the largest municipalities in each merger group.
we also estimate the DID models separately for each party within the 
2004 municipal division. These models should reveal whether there 
are differences across parties in the way that voters concentrate their 
votes. Moreover, we can analyze whether the preference for local 
representation is stronger than party preference. 
outcomes of interest
We use four different outcomes in our analysis. The first outcome is 
the number of candidates in a municipality. By analyzing this variable, 
we illustrate that for institutional reasons, the number of candidates 
that voters can choose from increases after a merger. This is because 
in most cases the council size of the merged municipality is larger 
than the individual council sizes of the municipalities before the 
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merger. The number of candidates is tied to the council size because 
the maximum number of candidates for a party is constrained to be 1.5 
times the legal council size. Thus, the number of candidates a voter 
can choose from should be higher after a merger in most cases.23 In 
this case, if voters vote sincerely, we should expect a wider dispersion 
of votes due to an increase in potential voter-candidate matches. 
The second outcome is the total number of votes. Given that the 
number of eligible voters remains quite stable between the two 
elections this variable can be seen as a rough measure of turnout. 
Using this outcome should give us the first impression on the way 
voters react to a merger. If different people vote and abstain in the 
pre- and post-merger elections, we should observe a change in turnout 
(unless these effects cancel each other out at the level of the treatment 
group). 
Our main interest lies on whether voters concentrate their votes to 
particular candidates. To this end, we use two outcomes to measure 
the concentration of votes that are defined as
 
(5) 
 
( ) 2
1
max , 1,...,  and ,
N
i i
i
C s i N H s
=
= = =∑
 
where si is the vote share of candidate i in a particular municipality 
and N is the total number of candidates in the municipality. The first 
measure (C) is simply the vote share of the most popular candidate. 
The second measure we use is the Herfindahl index (H). The larger H 
is the more concentrated the vote distribution is. These measures are 
(roughly) invariant to other changes that occur because of the merger, 
such as changes in council size and number of candidates. This is 
important because concentration measures that are not invariant to 
the number of candidates would capture mechanical effects that are 
not due to changes in voter behavior. 
23 Naturally, the overall number of candidates decreases in most cases after a merger. 
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5.5 Descriptive analysis
we start our analysis with a graphical example of the phenomenon we 
are after. Strategic voting due to preferences for local representation 
should show up as concentration of votes to the candidates that have 
a chance of making it into the new council. As an example, we look 
at the merger between a small municipality of Savonranta and the 
city of Savonlinna. The populations of these municipalities are 1,238 
and 27,463, respectively. Figure 2 shows the vote distribution in 
Savonranta before (in 2004) and after the merger (in 2008) and Figure 
3 shows the respective distributions for Savonlinna. Candidates who 
receive zero votes are omitted from these histograms.
The distributions of votes in both municipalities look roughly similar 
before the merger. Moreover, the distributions of votes in Savonlinna 
before and after are very similar. However, in Savonranta, the vote 
distribution changes dramatically after the merger. Before the merger, 
votes were spread out quite evenly, whereas after the merger two 
clear “superstars” gather a lot of votes (note the change in the scale 
of y and x-axis) and also the number of candidates receiving only one 
vote increases dramatically. Similar patterns, with clear evidence of 
concentrating votes to strong candidates in small merger partners, are 
observed also in the other mergers. Importantly, the overall number 
of votes in these two municipalities did not change dramatically 
between the two elections.
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Figure 2 Vote distribution in the municipality of Savonranta in 
2004 and 2008
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Figure 3 Vote distribution in the municipality of Savonlinna in 
2004 and 2008
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5.6 Econometric results
In this section, we present the results from our DID analysis. First, 
we present results from municipality level analysis using different 
outcomes and specifications. This is followed by municipality-party 
level analysis. Finally, we discuss some validity checks. 
DID results at municipality level
In Table 1, we present the DID results from the specification in Eq. 
(1). The cross-sectional units in all the regressions are the 2004 
municipalities. The first two columns in Table 1 report the effect of 
merging on the number of candidates who received votes and the 
total number of votes. The results tell us that on average there are 95 
candidates in the control group municipalities and that this average 
does not change between the two elections. Furthermore, the merger-
dummy gets a statistically insignificant coefficient meaning that 
the municipalities that undergo a merger are no different from the 
control group in this respect prior to merging. The coefficient on the 
interaction merger*after reveals that, as expected, mergers increase 
the number of candidates a voter can choose from on average by 71. 
One should bear in mind that this increase takes place when the pre-
merger municipality division is used. In fact, the overall number of 
candidates summed over a given merger group may, and often does, 
decrease after a merger. This effect is due to the council size law.  
Looking at the second column, we notice that the average number 
of votes in municipalities is about 6000 and the average is similar 
across the treatment and the control groups. Turnout is also similar 
across election years. Moreover, there is no significant response in 
turnout to the mergers. If different people vote and abstain in the pre- 
and post-merger elections, we should observe a change in turnout 
(unless these effects cancel each other out at the level of the treatment 
group). Since we observe that turnout is not affected, it is unlikely that 
the possible changes in the shapes of the vote distributions are due 
to different people voting in different elections. Thus, we can quite 
safely interpret any distributional changes as evidence of roughly 
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the same people voting differently after the merger than before the 
merger. Interestingly, this result is in contrast with the hypothesis 
that a larger jurisdiction leads to a smaller turnout.24 The result also 
differs from Lassen and Serritzlew (2011) who find that after the 
Danish municipal reform, voters in merged municipalities felt less 
competent to take part in municipal politics. Of course, Lassen and 
Serritzlew (2011) do not directly measure turnout. 
Table 1 Basic DID results
Number of 
candidates
Number of 
votes
Maximum 
vote share
Herﬁndahl 
index 
[1] [2] [3] [4]
constant 95.08*** 5898*** 0.061*** 0.025***
[5.534] [1079] [0.001] [0.001]
treated 0.457 -1033 0.001 0.003*
[9.179] [1269] [0.003] [0.002]
after 2.314 386.7 0.004 0.001
[7.927] [1586] [0.002] [0.001]
treated*after 71.34*** 54.07 0.049*** 0.022***
[15.32] [1882] [0.010] [0.007]
R 2 0.07 0.0009 0.15 0.08
N 816 816 816 816
Notes: The results are from OLS models. Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors are 
reported in brackets. ***, ** and * indicate statistical signifigance at 1, 5 and 10 percent 
level, respectively.
 
Columns 3 and 4 in Table 1 present our first results concerning vote 
concentration. According to the results, in a typical control group 
municipality, the most popular candidate received about 6% of votes 
24  On the other hand, the result can be explained within the context of rational 
voting. Less seats/population means that pivotal probability is lower, but on the other hand, 
the stakes are higher in a larger municipality and potentially also due to the merger implying 
more policy considerations.
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while the Herfindahl index was 0.025 on average. The treatment group 
is no different from the control group in the pre-merger elections 
with respect to the maximum vote share, but the Herfindahl index 
is slightly higher in the treatment group. Neither measure changes 
over time in the control group. However, a merger increases the 
concentration in the vote distribution, which can be seen from both 
measures. This increase is large (almost doubles the baseline in both 
measures) and highly significant.
Table 2  DID results with heterogeneous effects
Heterogeneity:
Dependent 
variable:
Maximum 
vote share
Herﬁndahl 
index 
Maximum 
vote share
Herﬁndahl 
index 
Maximum 
vote share
Herﬁndahl 
index 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
constant 0.061*** 0.025*** 0.061*** 0.025*** 0.061*** 0.025***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
treated 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.011*** -0.007**
[0.003] [0.002] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.001]
heterogeneity 0.00004 0.0001 0.002 0.005* 0.001*** 0.001***
[0.0001] [0.00007] [0.005] [0.003] [0.0002] [0.0001]
after 0.004** 0.001 0.004** 0.001 0.004** 0.001
[0.002] [0.001] [0.002] [0.001] [0.002] [0.001]
treated*after 0.028*** 0.015** 0.040*** 0.021** -0.005 -0.011
[0.010] [0.007] [0.012] [0.006] [0.010] [0.009]
treated*after 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.030 0.005 0.004*** 0.003**
*heterogeneity [0.0003] [0.0002] [0.020] [0.013] [0.001] [0.001]
R 2 0.21 0.10 0.16 0.08 0.44 0.38
N 816 816 816 816 816 816
Largest party DistancePopulation
 
Notes: The results are from OLS models. Heterogeneity refers to population, largest party 
and distance respectively. Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors are reported in brackets. 
***, ** and * indicate statistical signifigance at 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively.
 
In Table 2, we allow within merger heterogeneity in the response to 
the merger. In columns 1 and 2, we compare municipalities within a 
merger according population size. what we learn on top of the results 
from Table 1 is that the vote concentration is higher the smaller a 
merged municipality is compared to the largest municipality in the 
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merger. This is consistent with strategic voting where voters from 
smaller municipalities concentrate their votes to particular candidates 
in order to make sure they gain a representative into the new post-
merger council. 
In columns 3 and 4 we report results concerning vote concentration 
and differences in political preferences between merger partners. The 
results imply that smaller municipalities with a different largest party 
than their larger partner do not concentrate votes more than other 
municipalities in the same merger. we will examine party differences 
more closely in the next subsection. 
Columns 5 and 6 of Table 2 present results concerning vote 
concentration and distance. The results indicate that the effect of a 
merger on vote concentration increases as the distance between the 
old municipality and the new municipality center increases. The effect 
is quantitatively large. As the distance of the smaller municipality to 
the center of the largest municipality in a merger increases by 10 km, 
maximum vote share increases by 4 percentage points.  
Finally, in order to separate the effects that are due to general 
preference heterogeneity (for example concerning the service-tax 
bundle) from the effects of location of public services, we subject the 
models (2) and (3) to a horse race by estimating the following model
(6) 
 0 1 2 3 4 5
6 7 .
it i i i it i it
i it i i it it
y treated dist popdiff after treated after
treated after dist treated after popdiff u
φ φ φ φ φ φ
φ φ
= + + + + + ⋅
+ ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ +
 
The results from this model are reported in Table 3 and are 
surprisingly clear cut. According to the results, distance seems to be 
the only relevant measure of heterogeneity. Since the estimates for 
merger*after*popdiff interaction variable change compared to those 
in Table 2, omitting distance related variables was probably causing 
omitted variable bias in the population difference model. However, 
Do voters value local reprentation? Strategic 
voting after municipal mergers
152
since the results for the merger*after*dist are identical to Table 
2, omitting popdiff did not cause omitted variable in the distance 
model. Therefore, the location of services is the main determinant of 
preference heterogeneity.
Table 3 DID results with heterogeneity in both population and 
distance
Maximum vote share Herﬁndahl index 
[1] [2]
constant 0.061*** 0.025***
[0.001] [0.001]
treated -0.009*** -0.006**
[0.003] [0.001]
population diﬀerence -0.0004*** -0.0002***
[0.0001] [0.00006]
distance 0.001*** 0.001***
[0.0002] [0.0001]
after 0.004** 0.001
[0.002] [0.001]
treated*after -0.006 -0.010
[0.009] [0.007]
treated*after 0.0002 -0.0005
*population diﬀerence [0.0006] [0.0005]
treated*after 0.004*** 0.003**
*distance [0.001] [0.001]
R 2 0.45 0.40
Number of observations 816 816
Notes: The results are from OLS models. Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors are 
reported in brackets. ***, ** and * indicate statistical signifigance at 1, 5 and 10 percent 
level, respectively.
DID results at party level
Next we analyze whether the observed effects of mergers on vote 
distribution vary across parties. The results in Tables 4 through 6 are 
estimated using the DID specification in Eq. (4) and the cross-sectional 
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units are parties in the 2004 municipalities.25 From the number of 
observations, we see that none of the parties had candidates in all the 
municipalities and that the three largest parties are represented more 
often than the other parties. In table 4, we report results concerning 
whether parties lose votes to other parties due to mergers. We find no 
evidence of this. In general, the merger has no effects on the number 
of votes that parties receive. This means that voters are not willing 
to tradeoff their party preferences for local representation. This also 
implies that any vote concentration by voters should be within parties. 
According to the results reported in Tables 5 and 6, this is indeed the 
case. For the larger parties, and especially for the Centre Party, the 
party level effects largely mimic what we find at the (old) municipality 
level. However, we find no evidence of increased concentration 
among the smaller parties. Finding the strongest effects for the Centre 
Party is as expected, because the Centre Party has a strong support 
in almost all rural municipalities, but limited support in most urban 
areas. Therefore, the Centre Party has most to lose from mergers in 
terms of political power, and thus, its voters have most to gain from 
strategic voting.
25 We also estimated the model specifications in Eq. (1) and (2). The results were 
similar to those reported Tables 4 through 6.  
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Discussion and validity checks
There are several potential alternative explanations that could 
explain our basic DID results in Table 1. The first alternative 
explanation is that due to a merger some prominent national 
politicians or other “superstars” become available to all voters of 
the merging municipalities. This could happen especially when a 
small municipality mergers with a larger city. However, this does not 
seem to be the case in our data. For example in the Savonranta and 
Savonlinna case, one of the two superstars in Savonranta 2008 was a 
local incumbent and the other a new candidate. The second alternative 
explanation is gatekeeping by political parties. If the set of available 
local candidates becomes very limited after a merger, the candidate 
that the voter prefers may no longer be available. Thus, our result 
may not imply strategic voting, but simply a change in the choice 
set. Both of these stories are also consistent with the heterogeneous 
effects results with respect to population difference, but it is hard to 
imagine why these explanations would show up as heterogeneity in 
distance. Therefore, we are confident that our main story of strategic 
voting, preferences over local representation and the location of 
services are driving the results.
The fact that mergers were decided endogenously by the municipalities 
is a challenge to internal validity of the results. It is plausible that 
some unobservable factors may have an effect on both merging and 
post-merger vote decisions. However, even if this is the case, the 
heterogeneous effects analysis should be internally valid, because 
there the main comparison is within mergers. Thus, these analyses 
should not be biased by factors that cause the mergers. we repeated 
our DID analysis using only the sample of municipalities that merged 
and the results remained largely the same, even though we lose a lot 
of degrees of freedom in doing so.
Some of these concerns could be alleviated using placebo tests. One 
possibility would be to use municipal election data from 2000 and 
2004 as placebo because merging was rare between these elections. 
Unfortunately, polling district level election data is not available 
from the 2000 municipal elections. This also means that we cannot 
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test for common trends. Another option for a placebo would be to use 
voting data on parliamentary elections. However, this is not possible 
because the closest parliamentary elections were held at 2003 and 
2007, and in 2007 only some of the analyzed mergers had taken place.
Furthermore, external validity of the results is an open issue. On 
the one hand, the mergers involve a significant share of Finnish 
municipalities, the effects are strong and the within comparison 
involves very heterogeneous set of coalitions. Therefore, one could 
argue that it is safe to generalize the results to Finland. On the other 
hand, merging is a major decision on part of the municipalities 
and it could be, for example, that merged municipalities are more 
homogenous in terms of voter preferences than municipalities that 
choose not to merge. Furthermore, we cannot generalize the results 
to other countries, if they have very different political institutions 
or municipalities are responsible for different tasks. As usual, meta-
analysis in other countries with merger activity would be useful.
5.7 Conclusions
In this paper, we analyzed empirically whether voters value local 
representation and whether they vote strategically in order to obtain a 
local representative. The identifying variation in our analysis comes 
from changes in political competition caused by municipal mergers. 
The analysis was possible due to a unique individual candidate and 
polling district level data. Using these data a merged municipality can 
be decomposed into the original pre-merger municipalities and this 
makes it possible to trace back the vote distributions of candidates 
at the pre-merger municipal level. These data facilitate difference-
in-differences analysis where the unit of observation is the old 
municipality and voting data come from elections before and after 
the merger wave. 
we found that voters in municipalities that underwent a merger pool 
their votes to strong candidates compared to voters in municipalities 
that did not merge. Moreover, this effect is heterogeneous both in 
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the relative size of the merged municipalities and their geographic 
distance. In smaller merging municipalities, the pooling effect is 
much larger than in the larger merging partners. The heterogeneity in 
the effect is even larger with respect to distance, and when analyzing 
distance jointly with population differences, only the distance matters. 
This implies that the location of services is the most important reason 
why voters value local representation. we also found that voters 
concentrate votes within but not between parties. This means that 
while local representation is important, voters are not willing to cross 
party lines in order to guarantee local representation. 
In addition to shedding light on the nature of preferences over local 
representation, our results can be seen as an important contribution 
to a surprisingly scarce empirical literature on strategic voting. An 
interesting future avenue for research would be to analyze whether 
voters from merged municipalities actually succeed in electing their 
preferred candidates by concentrating votes and whether this has an 
effect on subsequent policy decisions in the merged municipality. 
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